Three essays on competition in airline markets with recent liberalisation by Oliveira, Alessandro V M
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/2627
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
4ý 
RS 
WARWICK 
Three Essays on Competition in 
Airline Markets With Recent Liberalisation 
by Alessandro Vinicius Marques de Oliveira 
4 
Thesis subirnitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Econormcs 
Department of Economics 
University of Wwwick 
July 2004 
I 
to my wife, Rachel 
Summary 
This thesis aims at investigating the behaviour of airlines in recently liberalised markets, by 
making use of the Brazilian air transportation as a case study. In order to accomplish this 
objective, the following three essays were developed: a study of low cost carrier entry 
behaviour, an analysis of the pricing behaviour of the major incumbents in the industry, and, 
finally, an assessment of airline conduct in the most important market in the country. All 
essays contain empirical investigation performed by making use of data supplied by Brazil's 
Department of Civil Aviation, DAC. 
In the first essay, the entry of Gol Airlines on several Brazilian domestic routes, in 2001 and 
2002, is analysed in order to draw inference on the competition between a discounter in rapid 
expansion and the full-service carriers. A route-choice model is estimated by making use of a 
flexible post-entry equilibrium profits equation and accounting for endogeneity of the main 
variables. 
The second essay aims at empirically investigating the pricing behaviour of the legacy carriers 
in Brazil, with special focus on reactions to the entry of Gol, in 2001. A study of localised 
competitive advantage regarding the determinants of pricing power is performed along with 
the analysis of the pattern of price reactions by the incumbents. A single econometric 
framework is designed and estimated with panel data controlling for city-specific effects. 
And finally, the third essay aims at assessing the impacts of economic liberalisation on the 
route Rio de Janeiro - Sdo Paulo. By making use of both a two-stages budgeting 
representation of the demand system, and a competition model with product heterogeneity 
among rivals, and based on the framework of the New Empirical Industrial Organisation, it 
was possible to examine the existence of a structural change on airlines' conduct parameters 
due to the regulatory reform. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 The Brazilian Airline Industry: Characteristics 
The airline industry is one of the sectors of the economy of Brazil that are usuallý regarded as 
"strategic" by both market analysts and the government; among the reasons is the constant 
need of enhancing the integration between its most important regions - undoubtedlý a major 
issue for a country with the 5 th largest area in the world, with approximately 8.5 million 
squares kilometres. 
In terms of economic justifications, one has that air transport represents approximately 3% of 
the country's gross domestic product, meaning a total (direct and indirect) impact of 
approximately 18 billion dollars on the economy (Marchetti et al., 200 1 a). 
Brazil is notably the most important airline market in Latin America. According to Pasin and 
Lacerda (2003), out of the 75 million passengers in the whole region in 2000 (domestic and 
international traffic), the major stake, 35%, were carried by Brazilian airlines (mainly Varig 
and Tam); in fact, among the major Latin America airlines, and still considering figures of 
2000, one had Varig with the largest global market share (14,9%), followed by Aeromexico 
(13%), Tam (11,9%) and Mexicana (11,7%). 
Table LI permits having an idea of the relative importance of each of the segments (domestic 
and international) and associated sub-markets (passengers in scheduled flights, passengers in 
chartered flights, mail, freight and others) in the Brazilian airline industry, by means of a 
disaggregation of the revenues generated in 2002: 
I 
Table 1.1 - Air Transport Revenues by Segment (2002) 
Sub-Market International Domestic Total % 
Scheduled - Pax 4,734 8,6-1 13,405 85qo 
Charter - Pax 18 241 259 211o 
Mail 50 176 226 190 
Freight 1,148 709 1,857 12% 
Others 0 21 21 0% 
Total 5,950 9,818 15,768 100% 
Notes: Source - Statistical Yearbook of DA C (vo/. II), - ii. in million RS, 
values deflated to 2004 by using IBGE's IPCA 
Firstly, it is important to emphasise the relevance of both domestic and international segments 
of the air transport industry in Brazil. In fact, one can see that there is a split of approximately 
40%-60% of total revenues between the international and domestic segments (approximately 
6 million reais in the former and 10 million reais in the latter). 
The international segment is mainly related to traffic either within Latin America, or to 
Europe/United States. According to Pasin and Lacerda (2003), the traffic to/from the United 
States, Europe and Argentina, accounted for, respectively, 26%, 34% and 18% of the total 
number of passengers in the international segment of the Brazilian air transport sector. The 
major policy issue in this segment, however, is related to the increasingly loss of participation 
of the national airlines on the international routes, which usually causes concerns about the 
current account of the Balance of Payments (Services Balance). For example, Pasin and 
Lacerda (2003) mention that the share of national airlines on the route Brazil-United States 
decreased from 60%, in 1991. ) to 
35% in 2001. 
As Table 1.1 also permits observing, the domestic segment of air transport in Brazil is formed 
mainly by scheduled passenger traffic, which represents approximately fifty five percent of 
the total revenues in the whole sector (R$ 4.7 million). The domestic segment is also 
representative of a fast-growing industry. According to the Statistical Yearbook of the 
Department of CiNil Aviation (vol. 1). there were 26.8 billion passenger-kilometres flo\\n in 
200-1 against 17.8 billion in 1997, representing growth of approximately seven percent per 
year, this is certaink, a much higher rate than the countrN's overall econorn. y. 
Table 1.2 below presents the evolution of the main figures of the sector: 
Table 1.2 - Evolution of Passenger times Kilometres (Domestic Segment) 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Pax. Km (million) 17,824 22,539 22,204 24.284 26,296 26.784 
Pax. Km Growth (%) 7.5% 26.5% -1.5% 9.4% 8. -3 % 1.900 
Revenues (Million RS) 6,525 6,701 7,734 8,684 9.265 9,818 
Costs (Million RS) 5,832 6,539 7,944 8,176 9,936 10,632 
Profits/Losses 693 162 -211 508 -671 -814 
Profits/Losses 10.6% 2.4% -2.7% 5.8% -7.2% -8.3% 
Load Factors 57% 59% 55% 59% 58% 57% 
A"ofes: i. Source - Statistical Yearbook of DAC (vol. II), - 
ii. values in RS deflated to 2004 by using IBGE's IPC, 1. 
One can also infer from Table 1.2 that, despite the rapid growth of the industry and the 
relative stability of the load factors figures, it was observed a large degree of instability in the 
profitability of the sector, with a range from -8.3% to +10.6% in only six years. This may be 
regarded as consistent with the international evidence of air transportation, in which major 
airlines across the world had significant losses recently'; indeed, as with most airline 
industries around the world, the Brazilian air transport is rather dependent on both domestic 
and international economic conditions on account of derived demand characteri StiCS2. 
It is important to emphasise, however, the effects of a relevant country-specific feature of the 
period: Brazil faced a strong volatility of currency exchange rates (specially the US dollar). 
This usually affects not only demand for international travel, but also aircraft lease, 
maintenance, and fuel costs, causing recurrent financial distress. In fact, three relevant shocks 
in costs due to currency devaluation were observed after the federal government changed the 
country's monetary regime allowing fluctuation, in early 1999. The three exchange rate 
shocks (EXRS) were observed from, respectively, January 1999 (EXRS99), January 2001 
' For example, since September II US Airways has already filled for bankruptcy protection twice in the US 
market. 
2 As transport (movement from one geographical point to another) is usuallý a consequence of an economic, 
political or social activitý, it is then considered a "derived demand", that is, it is unnecessary but for the activities 
pursued at the ends of trips. 
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(EXRSO I), and during the presidential election in 2002 (EXRS02). These events represented 
major sources of the bad performance of profits observed in Table 1.2. 
There are four major airlines currently operating scheduled flights in the domestic segment of 
Brazil: Varig, Vasp, Tam and GoL Table 1.3 provides some details on their market shares in 
both the domestic and international segments: 
Table 1.3 - Disaggregation of Passenger Times Kilometres by Airline - 2002 
Market Varig Vasp Tam Gol Others 
Domestic Segment 
Pax. Krn (billion) 10,481 3,3 86 9,344 33,2 24 33 50 
Market Share 39% 13% 35% 12% 1% 
International Segment 
Pax. Krn (billion) 18,983 2,732 14 
Market Share 8-% 13% 0% 
Notes: Source - Statistical Yearbook of DA C (vol. II) 
On can see that Varig and Tam have dominant positions in both markets. Varig was the first 
airline in Brazil, with operations started in 1927; traditionally this airline had a major stake of 
the international traffic (-flag carrier" status), which clearly conferred her with a higher 
diversification of routes than the rivals; this means that she is more susceptible to variations in 
the exchange rates, for example, but also that she is in a position of, for example, awarding 
travellers with more frequent flier advantages. Also important to emphasize that Varig is a 
member of Star Alliance, a still select group of international airlines. 
In fact, it was only recently that Tam, which is based in Sdo Paulo and was founded in 1976, 
has occupied a position of dominance in the Brazilian market: this airline managed to increase 
her domestic market share from 14% (1996), when she was a regional airline, to 35% (2002), 
consolidating positions specially in very dense and business-related markets. 
The other major airlines in operation in Brazil are Vasp and Gol. Vasp NN as founded in 1933 
and was state-oxNned for most of the period until the early nineties, \\hen the airline was 
privatised. Gol Airlines \\as not only the first scheduled LCC of Brazil, but also \\ithin all 
Latin America, with operations started in January 200 ] 3. Owned by Grupo Aurea. a 
conglomerate that has 38 companies and a major operator of urban and long-distance coach Z__ 
services across Brazil, the airline's innovative positioning in the market produced the most 
effective threat to the so-called "Big Four" legacy majors, Varig, Vasp, Tam and the defunct 
Transbrasil, since the establishment of liberalisation in 1992 (see details of the regulatory 
reform in next section). With a successful path of growth and penetration in the domestic 
market, after only two years of operations Gol was already Brazil's onlý profitable airline 
with operational profit of R$ 38 million (6%). 
According to the Department of Civil Aviation (Yearbook, vol. 11), the following airlines also 
operated in the scheduled domestic segment in 2002 (the "others" column of Table 1.3)): 
Abaet6, Meta, Nordeste, Pantanal, Passaredo, Penta, Puma, Rico, Rio-Sul, Taf, Tavaj, Total, 
and Trip. All these 13 airlines have smaller regional operations within the country. According 
to Franco et al. (2002), the liberalisation measures adopted since 1992 promoted a significant 
increase in the demand for air transportation at the regional level. Indeed, from 1992 to 1998, 
there was a large boost in the number of regional airlines, but most of this growth Nvas 
associated with subsidiaries of Tam and Varig; actually, there was a wave of acquisions by 
large national airlines (Rio-Sul by Varig, Nordeste by Rio-Sul, the defunct Brasil Central and 
Helisul by TAM). 
Table 1.4 reports the evolution of yields (revenue per pax. km) for the domestic segment of 
passenger air travel: 
3 Gol Airlines and U Air (Uruguay) are the only scheduled LCC's based in Latin America nowadays. Some 
North-American LCC's provide service to Mexico and the Caribbean, such as JetsGo, Frontier and JetBlue. but 
do not lim e operational basis at the region (source: website lowcostairlines. org). 
6 
Table 1.4 - Yields Evolution - Scheduled Domestic Segment - Pax 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Revenues (Million RS) 
Pax. Km (million) 
Yield (Pax. Km) 
5,331 5.455 6.472 7.395 7.949 8.671 
17,824 22,539 22.204 24.284 26.296 26.784 
0.299 0.242 0.291 0305 0.302 0.324 
Notes: i. Source - Statistical Yearbook of DAC (vol. II); 
ii. values deflated to 2004 bi, using IBGE's IPC. 4. 
In terms of demand, one has that the price elasticity in the domestic segment is usuallý 
acknowledged as being fairly low. According to Franco et al (2002), the Secretariat for 
Economic Monitoring - SEAE, of the Ministry of Finance, estimated the price-elasticitý of 
demand as being approximately -0,44; also, estimated income-elasticities were found to be 
around one. These results were to some extent confirmed by a study carried out by the 
Airlines Association - SNEA, which arrived at the conclusion that 71% of the passengers in 
Brazil in 1996 was travelling with business-related purpose, while the average in other 
countries is usually regarded to be around 55%. Also, according to a survey performed by the 
newspaper Gazeta Mercantil, the three most relevant factors taken into account by 
businessmen when choosing the airlines were (in this order of relevance): firstly, the existence 
of direct flights; secondly, the time of departure, thirdly, the number of frequencies; and 
finally, fares. All these studies are reported by Franco et al. (2002). 
With respect to the supply side, firstly, one can have a detailed view of the structure of costs 
in Table 1.5: 
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Table 1.5 - Structure of Costs -4 Major Airlines (2002) 
ITEM % 
Flight Crew Salaries and Expenses 8% 
Aircraft Fuel and Oil 23% 
Flight Equipment Insurance 1% 
Flight Equipment Rental 13% 
Flight Equipment Depreciation and Amortization 3% 
Maintenance and Overhaul 12% 
Total Direct Costs 60% 
Landing and Associated Airport Charges 2% 
En route Facilities Charges 3% 
Station Expenses 5% 
Passenger Services 4% 
Ticketing, Sales and Promotion 18% 
General and Administrativc 7% 
Other Operating Expenses 2% 
Total Indirect Costs/]Expenses 40% 
Total Operating Costs/Expenses 100% 
Notes: Source - Statistical Yearbook qf DA C (vol. I]), - ii. airlines: 
I'arig, Vasp, Tam, Gol; iii. reflects ICAO's Costs Structure 
standards as reported bY Betancor and, Vombela (2001). 
Table 1.5 disaggregates costs into Direct and Indirect Operating Costs/Expenses, by making 
use of the figures of the 4 major carriers. One can infer from Table 1.5 that the items with 
higher participation in costs are fuel and oil (23%), sales and promotion (18%), flight 
equipment rental (13%) and maintenance and overhaul (12%). Overall, total direct costs 
represent the majority of operating costs (60%). 
Table 1.6 presents details on the fleet composition of the scheduled airlines in the market: 
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Table 1.6 - Fleet Composition by Airline - Average, 2002 
Manufacturer Aircraft 
. Airbus A-319 
Airbus A-320 
Airbus A-330 
ATR AT42 
Boeing B-737-200 
Boeing B-737-300 
Boeing B-737-500 
Boeing B-737-700 
Boeing B-767-200 
Boeing B-767-300 
Cessna C-208 
Embraer E-I 10 
Embraer E-120 
Embraer 
............. 1 
E-145 
1-- .......... ....................... . .. Fokker - . . F-100 
Mcl-Douglas MD-1 I 
Others 
. .. . . 
Others 
.................. ... . .. ......... ... Total ................... Total 
Seats Varig I Vasp Tam Gol Others Total % 
120/122 8 8 210 
108/150 
......... ...... . .... . ...... .. . ..... 
26 
. ..... . 
26 800 
211/225 8 8 20o 
45/49 15 15 40o 
107/143 12 20 2 34 1000 
118/132 39 4 43 120, o 
117 19 19 50 ý0 
120/144 8 13 21 Vo 
174/225 6 6 2% 
191/224 6 1 7 20, o 
9 
-1 13 4% 
12/18 11 11 3(ýo 
28/50 8 14 22 6 "o 
50 15 
........... - 
15 40, o 
108 49 49 14% 
239/285 15 15 40/6 
........ 
21 
..... - 
8 2 6 37 1 Po 
148 32 91 16 ........ 59 ... .... ..... . 346 
Notes: Source - Slalistical Yearbook of DAC (vol. 11) 
As one can see, the aircraft manufacturer Boeing has the largest share of the market, with 
around 40% of the number of aircraft in operations, followed by Ernbraer (14%) and Airbus 
(12%). It is important to emphasise that the industry is characterised by aircraft with more 
than 100 seats (more than two-thirds), and not by smaller, regional aircraft; this is probably an 
indication that there might be economies of route density to be exploited by larger aircraft in 
the market. 
1.2 The Evolution of Regulation in the Brazilian Airline Industry 
Until recently, one of the most relevant characteristics of the Brazilian air transport industry 
was the gradual and continuous process of economic liberalisation that had been initiated in 
the early nineties by the Department of Civil Aviation, DAC, within a broader governmental 
pro, grarn for deregulation of country's economy. Table 1.7 presents the evolution of the t: ) 
regulation structure of the air transport industry, considering six main stages in the last thirtý 
years. 
The most representative stage of the regulatory period was from 1973 to 1986. where 
regulation was performed along with mechanisms of development policy (L Regulation with 
Industrial Policy). In fact. the government accomplished a frameNvork of "four national 
9 
airlines and five regional airlines" in order to both regulate and promote industr)'s 
development, in a policy completely enacted by 1976. Prices were fixed by authorities, entry 
was banned. ) and the country was 
divided into five main monopolies for regional airlines. 
Besides that, competition between regionals and national (trunk) airlines ýN, as virtually absent. 
From 1986 to 1992, the government started being more intrusive in terms of macroeconomic 
interference in the industry, especially with respect to inflation stabilisation targeting (2. 
Regulation with Active Stabilisation Controls). This policy was remarkable in terms of 
interfering in the pricing of all infrastructure industries in the country and led to artificiallý 
low real fares, which airlines still claim have caused them great losses. 
Liberalisation effectively started from 1992 on, although some measures of deregulation were 
already present since 1989 (fare bounds, for example). During this First Round of 
Liberalisation (3. Liberalisation with Inactive Stabilisation Policy Controls), regionals' 
monopolies were abolished, with exception to the airport-pairs linking city centres of four 
major cities - Sdo Paulo (CGH), Rio de Janeiro (SDU), Belo Horizonte (PLU) and Brasflia 
(BSB) -, called "special" airport-pairs, SAP. Furthermore, the policy of "four nationals & 
five 
regionals" was abolished, and newcomer's entry was stimulated by the regulator, which has 
led to a tide of new small airlines into the market. 
Also, there were now reference prices and bounds from -50% to +32% of the main value in 
substitution of price fixing, and competition in prices was seen as "healthy" for the industry, 
and was encouraged; fare bounds were conceived only as temporary instruments for 
enhancing price rivalry. This can be regarded as a period of inactive stabilisation policy 
control, as there was no need for the macroeconomic authorities to interfere in the market, no 
pressure for price increase, and lower instability in the costs side, as exchange rates were 
stable during most of the period. 
In the late nineties the aviation authorities decided to remove two relevant regulatory devices 
still remaining: the fare bounds and the exclusivity of rights for operating SAPs 
b,, re-ionals. 
This generated the Second Round of Liberalisation (enacted in Dec/97-Jan/98), \\hich 
triggered much strategic interaction bN airlines, N\ ith intense price and frequenc\ competition. 
Another relevant characteristic of the period \\as the strong instabiliv, of exchange rate,,. 
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especially the high devaluation of January 1999, which represented a major increase in all 
airlines' operational costs. As the pressures for price increase throughout the economy ýNere 
strong, macroeconomic authorities (Minist6rio da Fazenda, MF) started interfering in the 
industry again (4. Liberalisation with Stabilisation Policy Constraint). This has represented 
a relevant constraint to the airlines' strategies, as they could not increase prices as desired. but 
instead had to wait for previous authorisations from both the DAC and the MF. Besides that. 
antitrust authorities were now closely monitoring the market. 
In 2001, most of the remaining economic regulation was removed, as xNell as the 
macroeconomic interference. All airlines could then set their prices freely -a "quasi- 
deregulation" period, as entry, price and frequencies were also almost entirely liberalised (5. 
Quasi-Deregulation). 
Finally, in 2003, Brazilian aviation authorities, following directives of the new federal 
government, started implementing some procedures of re-regulation, aiming at controlling an 
alleged excess capacity and over-com petition in the market (6. Re-regulation). New aircraft 
imports were banned, price competition controls were put in practice once again, and strategic 
movements increasing market concentration, such as the code-share agreement between the 
two major airlines, Varig and Tam, were neither disallowed nor discouraged. 
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1.3 An Overview of this Study 
The main target of the present thesis is to permit some understanding of the competition 
among airlines in recently liberalised markets, by means of empirical modelling. Here I make 
use of two major events in the sector, in order to pinpoint the behaviour of carriers in the 
domestic segment of air transportation in Brazil: the process of economic liberalisation of the 
late nineties, and the entry of the low cost carrier (LCC) Gol Airlines. Three essays were 
therefore developed by considering those events, and are presented in, respectively, Chapter 
2,3 and 4. 
Chapter 2 provides a study of the entry of Gol Airlines in several Brazilian domestic routes, 
in 2001 and 2002, in order to draw inference on the competition between a LCC in rapid 
expansion and the full-service carriers (FSQ - an issue that has recently become one of the 
most relevant of the airline industry. 
A route-choice model is estimated by making use of a flexible post-entry equilibrium profits 
equation and accounting for endogeneity of the main variables. Results indicated the 
relevance of market size and rival's route presence as underlying determinants of profitability. 
Furthermore, the consistency of Gol's decision making with the pattern of entry classically 
established by Southwest Airlines for the LCC segment - short-haul and high-density markets 
- is investigated. 
Evidence is found that although Gol initiated operations by reproducing standards of 
Southwest, she quickly diversified her portfolio of routes and became more in accordance 
with JetBlue Airways's entry pattern, focusing mainly on longer-haul markets, although with 
some relevant country -spec i fic idiosyncrasies. 
As Gol entered the markets within the country, the legacy FSC's started responding v"'ith cuts tn 
in prices. Chapter 3 aims at empirically investigating the pricing behaviour of the 
incumbents 
and the response to the entry of LCC Gol Airlines in the Brazilian 
domestic market. A studý 
of localised competitive advantage regarding the determinants of pricing po\\er 
is performed 
along \\ ith the analysis of the pattern of price reactions by the 
legacý carriers. A single 
econometric framework is designed and estimated \\ ith panel 
data controlling for city-specific 
effects. 
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Results indicate that market structure at both the route and airport levels are relevant at 
explaining pricing behaviour, and that the degree of the newcomer's product differentiation is 
a relevant feature in determining the intensity of reactions. By comparing these results with 
the findings of Evans and Kessides (1993), which rejected market share effects at the route 
level, it was possible to arrive at the conclusion that here the analysis better suits airline 
markets at a very recent and/or immature stage of economic liberalisation, as is the case of 
Brazil. 
Finally, Chapter 4 aims at assessing the impacts of economic liberalisation on the route Rio 
de Janeiro - Sdo Paulo. The measures of liberalisation had relevant impacts on competition on 
this route, the country's densest flow linking its most known cities; actually this started years 
before Gol's entry, at the beginning of the Second Round of Liberalisation. 
One very relevant subset of this market is the airport-pair Santos Dumont (SDU, Rio de 
Janeiro) - Congonhas (CGH, Sdo Paulo), the most important of the "special airport-pairs" 
(SAP's). Notably, the SDU-CGH airport-pair is closely associated with the competition of 
multi-frequency, walk-on, air shuttles in the market. In fact, it was there where the first air 
shuttle in the world was created, the "Ponte A6rea", in 1959 - two years before the pioneer 
service of Eastern Airlines shuttle in the United States. 
By making use of both a two-stages budgeting representation of the demand system, and a 
competition model with product heterogeneity among rivals, and based on the framework of 
the New Empirical Industrial Organisation, it was possible to infer whether a structural 
change on airlines' conduct parameters due to liberalisation was observed. This exercise 
ultimately served as a test of the efficacy of the policy employed by the regulators since 1998. 
The main conclusions were that regulatory reform effectively stimulated firms to significantly 
increase the degree of competition in the market, and that marginal-cost or even beloNý- 
marginal-cost pricing was not rejected for some airlines. 
I s; 
1.4 Literature Review 
This thesis contains research associated with three major areas of the air transport economics 
literature, namely, entry, pricing, and market power in airline markets. Below is a brief 
review of this related literature, which constitute the basis for Chapters 2,3 and 4. 
1.4.1 Entry and Price Reactions to Entry in Airline Markets 
Some of the most relevant studies on airline entry behaviour are Morrison and Winston 
(1990) and (1995), Sinclair (1995), Berry (1992) and Bogulaski, Ito and Lee (2004). Berry 
(1992) considers an empirical methodology that makes use of the route entry decisions of 
airlines as indicators of underlying profitability, and implements a discrete game model of 
firm entry which is in line with Bresnahan and Reiss (1987) and (1991). He develops an 
equilibrium entry model in which "at the beginning of the period, each firni takes its overall 
network structure as given and decides whether to operate in a given city pair" (Berry, 1992). 
The assumed model is therefore a two-stage game in which entry is followed by competition 
between the newcomer and the incumbents; also, instead of assuming a particular model of 
competition in the second stage, the author considers a general profit equation as an 
approximation to the actual game. 
By making use of a simulation estimator, Berry (1992) was in a position of considering firm- 
specific characteristics along with the traditional market-level variables such as market size 
and the number of firms. By considering data for the US market in 1980, his results were 
overall consistent with the wisdom that airport presence is relevant in determining airline 
profitability. 
In a recent study, Bogulaski, Ito and Lee (2004) make use of probit estimation to investigate 
the patterns of city-pair entry of the pioneer low cost carrier Southwest Airlines by making 
use of data from 1990-2000. Results indicated that "roughly 10% of the large net-vi, ork 
carriers' revenues itill be exposed to new Southwest non-stop competition within the nextfive 
vears, roughly the same proportion that became exposed throughout the entire 1990s". Also, 
evidence \\as found that the entry strategies of the carrier have changed signicantlý 
throuo-hout the last decade, bv considering "a number of relatively thin, long-haul markets 
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that it hadpreviously avoided. They also identified those markets that are the most likek for 
future non-stop entry and suggested which network carriers are most vulnerable to future 
Southwest expansion. 
With respect to airline pricing behaviour, Evans and Kessides (1993) report several studies 
investigating post-US liberalisation conditions, which can be classified into two different sets: 
i. Inter-routes analysis, in which data is disaggregated at the route level, and 
usually a cross-section of routes is considered, market-level variables such as 
flight distance, number of airlines, concentration, route presence of LCC's, 
presence of LCC on adjacent routes, etc. are used in order to estimate an average 
price equation. Examples in the literature being Bailey and Panzar (1981) and 
Hurdel et al. (1989), Dresner, Lin and Windle (1996) and Morrison (2001), among 
others. 
Intra-routes analysis, in which data is disaggregated at the airline level; carrier- 
specific characteristics such as route market share, airport market share and 
network size out of an airport, percentage of seats in direct or round-trip flights, 
etc., are used to control for effects of heterogeneity among firms in the market. 
Examples being Borenstein (1989), Berry (1990) and Evans and Kessides (1993). 
Commonly, studies in both phases targeted testing the contestability theory and arrived at the 
conclusion that local market structure matters in the airline industry, and then variables like 
concentration levels have significant effect on prices - for example, fewer effective players 
facilitates collusion, increases incumbents' ability to create additional entry barriers or make 
them more effective, etc. What is more, second-generation studies provided evidence for the 
significance of market share measures as determinants of within-route competitive advantage. 
and therefore called attention to the consequences of dominance: "consumers are 1villing to 
1)qv a premium for the services of the dominant airline [at an airport]" (Berry, 1990). In fact, 
the studies usually found relevance for both sorts of measures, market share and 
concentration, and thus conciliating different 10 traditions 4 
Slade (2004b) proN ides a detailed discussion of the "market share" and "market structure" models NN ithin the 
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In contrast to the consensus of the relevance of considering firm-specific disaggregation in 
pricing analysis, debate was established on at which level structure affects performance in this 
industry: either if at the route or at the airport level. Evans and Kessides (1993). for example, 
argue that, due to linear route system replacement by hub-and-spoke strategies, the increasing 
control of airport facilities by fewer airlines, the advent of frequent-flyer programmes and the 
usage of travel agent commission overrides, "the bulk of any deviation from competitiveness 
in the airline industry is (now) associated with airport characteristics rather than with the 
structure of routes ,5. By making use of route-specific fixed-effects, they found onlý, airport 
market share effects as statistically significant for the US domestic market, contrary to the 
results of Borenstein (1989). 
Airport and route dominance, defined as presence in the market, usually in terms of market 
share either of passengers or of seats available, can be described in the following way: first, in 
terms of airport dominance, one has the incumbent's bureaucratic control over airport 
operations (slots, facilities, etc), as they usually represent the major source of financing for 
many airports in the US; this may permit them to efficiently block the entry or expansion by 
rivals. Berry (1990) also mentions that airlines with a large presence in a given city also have 
advantages from frequent flyer plans and non-linear travel agent commission schedules. All 
these features are likely to facilitate collusion between incumbents, and market-sharing 
agreements and alliances are commonly observed. 
And second, with respect to route dominance, one can consider competitive advantage of 
large route presence stemming from lower distance between flights (lower "schedule delay", 
which appeals to business travellers) and therefore can be considered a proxy for higher 
service quality levels. The dominance effect can be regarded as one of the main reasons for 
Southwest's avoidance of head-on competition with incumbents in the United States. 
More recently, there have been some few studies on the specific subject of pricing behaviour 
in response to LCC entry: firstly, Dresner, Lin and Windle (1996), which found significant 
spillover impacts of LCC entry onto other competitive routes, as on other routes at the same 
industrial Organisation. 
Levine ( 1987) is one of the most influential papers on this issue. 
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airport and on routes at airports in close proximity to where entry occurred: this analysis \\as 
performed by inspecting, among others, the entry of Southwest Airlines into the Baltimore- 
Washington International Airport, in 1993. 
Secondly, Windle and Dresner (1999) investigated the impacts of entry by ValuJet into Delta 
Airline's hub, Atlanta, and refuted the US DOT's claim that the latter increased fares on non- 
competitive routes to compensate for lost revenues on the competitive routes. And finallý, 
Morrison (2001) examined the total extent of Southwest's influence on competition, bý 
investigating its impacts with actual, adjacent and potential route presence, on other carriers' 
fares in 1998, obtaining a result of 20 per cent of US airline industry's domestic schedule 
passenger revenue for that year. 
1.4.2 Airline Conduct 
Brander and Zhang (1990) make use of the New Empirical Industrial Organisation, NEIO, 
approach to estimate conduct parameters for a set of duopoly airline routes in the US. By 
assuming product homogeneity and by making use of an approximation to the route level 
marginal costs, they estimate the mean conduct parameter for American Airlines and US 
Airlines in order to infer about whether Bertrand, Cournot, or cartel models are supported by 
the data. Conduct parameters are estimated and results provide evidence that data is much 
more consistent with the Cournot model. This seems to be a reasonable outcome for their 
model of competition in quantities with product homogeneity between firms; this setting is 
likely not to be a proper representation of competition, however, for airline markets 
characterised by product differentiation, as with the rivalry between full-service and low cost 
carriers. 
A dynamic analysis is found in Brander and Zhang (1993). By focusing on competition 
between United Airlines and American Airlines as in their paper of 1990, they were in a 
position of estimating quarterly conduct parameters and test constant behaviour Bertrand. 
Cournot, cartel, and two regime-sw itching models in line "vith Green-Porter (1984). The 
constant behaviour models are all rejected and evidence is provided that the regime-sN\ itching 
models describe the data, with a Cournot-based version having the best results. 
Bcrry, Carnall and Spiller (1996) estimate a model of airline competition for the US market. 
19 
by assuming (non-spatial or "Chamberlinian") product differentiation and economies of 
density; they also make use of a nested logit framework and a flexible specification of 
marginal costs. Consistent with Borenstein (1989), they reach the conclusion that -a hubbillo, 
airline's ability to raise prices is focused on tickets that appeal to price- inelas tic business 
travelers, who favor the origin-hub airline, even while paying an average preinhim of 20%. 
These high prices do not, however, provide a 'monopoly umbrella'to other non-hub airline. s ". 
They also find evidence of economies of density on longer routes, but not on shorter routes of 
the US market. 
Roller and Sickles (2000) develop a two-stage model for airline competition in two variables, 
namely, capacity and prices: In the first stage firms make capacity decisions followed by a 
product-differentiated, price-setting game in the second stage. They estimate the structural 
model of demand, costs, and conduct for the European airline industry by making use of data 
for the period 1976-90. By performing some specification tests, they find evidence in favour 
of a "fat-cat" strategy: -European airlines over-invest in capacities [airplanes, for example] 
in order to be less aggressive". Final results illustrated that firms' market power in the 
product market is significantly overestimated whenever capacity competition is not accounted 
fo r. 
And finally, Fischer and Kamerschen (2003) make use of a reduced form model to identify 
price-cost margins in selected airport-pair markets originating from Atlanta, US. With the 
assumptions of product homogeneity, simultaneous moves, conjectural variations, and 
competition in quantities (as Brander and Zhang, 1990), the authors find that conduct revealed 
by data is consistent with the Cournot behaviour; they also provide estimates for the Lerner 
index and final results indicated that incumbent airlines exerted a considerable degree of 
market power in all airport-pairs considered. 
2. Estimation of a Model of Low Cost Carrier Entry 
2.1 Introduction 
Competition between rapidly expanding low-cost carriers (LCC) and traditional network full- 
service carriers (FSC) has recently become one of the most significant issues regarding the 
airline industry. Although basically a phenomenon of fully or partially liberalised markets - 
and thus dating back to the US deregulation process of the 1970s -, it was only recently, 
however, that the LCC segment won recognition as a relevant and distinct business strategy as 
well as a profitable market niche. Following the successful paradigm of the pioneer Southwest 
Airlines, in the United States, airlines such as Ryanair and EasyJet, in Europe, flourished in 
the market, and soon the concept has spread worldwide. Moreover, this segment is expected 
to expand considerably within the next few years, and this has undoubtedly been forcing 
legacy carriers to respond progressively -a movement that is shaping the frontiers of 
competition in the industry. 
The present paper addresses this matter by examining the entry of the low-cost carrier Gol 
Airlines, in the Brazilian domestic market, in 2001. By making use of this case study. one is 
able to make inferences on the strategy of a successful and fast-growing newcomer LCC in an 
airline industry with recent liberalisation. The ultimate objective here is therefore to inspect 
the route choice decisions in order to pinpoint entry patterns which could be associated with 
notable benchmarks of the LCC niche. 
Gol Airlines was not only the first scheduled LCC of Brazil, but also within all Latin 
America, and represented the most effective threat to the so-called "Big Four" legacy majors, 
Varig, Vasp, Tam and Transbrasil, since the establishment of liberalisation in 1992. By 
offering basic air transport service, without frills and lower prices, and above all x\ ith lo\\ er 
costs and careful choice of routes, Gol started a successful path of growth and penetration in 
the domestic market. the consequence N\ as that, after only two years of operations. the carrier 
was already Brazil's only profitable airline, and ý\ ith a thirteen percent stake in the market. 
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The literature on LCC is rather scarce and the few existing studies are usuallý related with the 
investigation of the FSC's pricing behaviour in response to entry: firstly. Dresner. Lin and 
Windle (1996), which examined and found significant spillover impacts of LCC entry onto 
other competitive routes, as on other routes at the same airport and on routes at airports in 
close proximity to where entry occurred; this analysis was performed by inspectingy. among 
others, the entry of Southwest Airlines into Baltimore- Washington International Airport, in 
1993. Secondly, Windle and Dresner (1999) investigated the impacts of entry by ValuJet into 
Delta Airline's hub, Atlanta, and refuted the US DOT's claim that the latter increased fares on 
non-competitive routes to compensate for lost revenues on competitive routes. And finallý. 
Morrison (2001) assessed the total extent of Southwest Airlines's influence on competition, bý 
investigating its impacts with actual, adjacent and potential route presence, on other carriers' 
fares in 1998, obtaining a result of 20 per cent of US airline industry's domestic schedule 
passenger revenue for that year. 
In contrast, Ito and Lee (2003b) and Bogulaski, Ito and Lee (2003) are more focused on route 
entry decisions and entry patterns by LCC's. Whereas the former is aimed at studý'ing the 
implications for further growth of the LCC's in the US market, by considering their propensity 
to enter high-density routes, the objective of the latter is to determine and quantify "the 
market characteristics which have influenced Southwest's entry decisions". Main conclusions 
are that LCC is no longer a niche segment restricted to particular geographic markets or 
leisure travellers and that the legacy airlines' degree of exposure to LCC competition is very 
likely to increase from "roughly 30% today tojust under 50% in thefuture"; also that markets 
with high traffic density are becoming increasingly contestable, with relevant implications to 
market structure and competition. Other remarkable examples of empirical airline literature 
on entry are Berry (1992), Whinston and Collins (1992) and Joskow, Werden and Johnson 
(1994). 
In order to study Gol Airline's entry decisions in the Brazilian market, an empirical model of 
route choice was designed in the same fashion of Bogulaski, Ito and Lee (2003). By 
considering a fairly flexible post-entry equilibrium profits equation, the model is estimated bý 
making use of Newe\ (1987)'s methodology, and therefore Amemiya's Generalised Least 
Squares (AGLS) \Nas employed; this approach is able to result in consistent and 
asymptotically efficient estimation of the parameters of a limited-dependent variable. such as 
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the newcomer's entry decisions, for the case of the presence of some endogenous regressors. Zýl 
Final results indicated the relevance of market size and rival's route presence as underlying 
determinants of profitability. Unobservables at the airport/city levels, such as sunk costs and 
economies of scope, are also found to be significant. Furthermore, the consistencý, of Gol's 
decision making with the pattern of entry classically established by Southwest Airlines for the 
LCC segment - short-haul and high-density markets - is investigated; evidence is found that 
although Gol initiated operations by reproducing standards of Southwest, she quicklý' 
diversified her portfolio of routes and became more in accordance with JetBlue Airývays's 
entry pattern, focusing mainly on longer-haul markets, although with some relevant countrý- 
specific idiosyncrasies. 
This paper has the following structure: Section 2.2 portrays the background of the entry of 
Gol Airlines in the Brazilian airline industry, with a description of the main paradigms related Z: ý 
to LCC entry patterns along with some facts about the deregulation process in Brazil and the 
newcomer. Section 2.3 presents the empirical model and the econometric issues. Section 2.4 
reports the results and includes an analysis of Gol's entry patterns consistency, which is 
followed by final conclusions. 
2.2 Background: LCC Niche and Entry of Gol Airlines in Brazil 
2.2.1 The LCC Market Niche and its Paradigms 
The entry of low-cost carriers (LCC) providing basic air transport service with no frills and 
lower fares in a regular basis, has considerably transformed competition in the airline 
industry. Notwithstanding a phenomenon of partially or fully liberalised airline markets and 
thus dating back to the US deregulation process of the seventies, it was onlý recently, 
however, that this "loic-cost revolution" (Doganis, 2001) has resulted in the formation of a 
well recognised and distinct business strategy and a sustainable market niche. 
The LCC niche is usually associated N\ ith the Southwest Airlines Paradigm (hereafter SWP). 
mainly because that airline pioneered this sort of operations with standards that are 
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deliberately reproduced around the world 6. The most widely known characteristics of this 
paradigm are (Silva and Espirito Santo Jr., 2003): fleet standard isation; simplification or 
elimination of in-flight service; use of less congestioned secondary airports; direct sales to 
consumers; ticketless or electronic tickets; dense, short-haul, point-to-point flights x\ith no 
interlining or transfers, which means a simple network structure, with absent or ý\eak feed to 
long-range flights; single-class cabin lay-out; simple or no frequent-flyer programme, high 
level of fleet utilisation; and highly motivated employees 
7. Moreover, LCC's are typically 
associated with a very aggressive pricing strategy, typically with the use of simplified fare 
8 structure with few or no restrictions, and low one-way fares 
The cost advantage permitted by the SVVP is not merely an issue of paying lower salaries or 
operating at cheaper airports, and, contrary to common sense, not even due only to the lack of 
frills; instead it is rather a function of fundamental differences in the business model 
associated with it, emerging mainly from a very careful choice of markets, targeting at dense, 
short-haul routes in order to exploit economies due to higher seating density and higher 
aircraft utilisation, especially with non-stop service. According Boguslaski, Ito and Lee 
(2003), Southwest has resulted in unit costs that are 28 to 51 per cent lower than the US major 
airlines, considering 2001 US DOT unit cost figures. 
Since the early nineties, and in particular very recently, a plethora of de novo, LCC entry, has 
been observed around the world. Inspired by the more than three decades of success of 
Southwest Airlines, and stimulated by liberalisation measures of their own markets, airlines 
such as Ryanair and EasyJet in Europe, Air Asia and Virgin Blue in the South Pacific, I Time 
and Kulula in Africa, and Gol and U Air in South America, flourished in the market, meaning 
6 As the Chief Executive of Ryanair (UK) once said: "We went to look at Southwest. 11 was like the road to 
Damascus. This was the waY to make Ryanair work" (Doganis, 2001). 
7 This description refers to what can be considered "classic" Southwest paradigm. One has to bear in mind, as \Ne 
will see below, that Southwest's actual patterns of operations has had some changes recently: "its strategyý 
evolved during the latter half of the decade to include a much more heterogeneous mix of markets, including a 
number of markets which were both long-haul and surprisingly thin" (Boguslaski, Ito and Lee, 2003). 
' Trethexvaý (2004) points out that the introduction of low one waý fares ultimately serxed to undermine the 
ability of the FSC's to price discriminate, and not only resulted in a considerable increase in competition but also 
in an exposure of the problems associated with the FSC business model. 
" 
9 that the concept has rapidly achieved global recognition 
In parallel to the worldwide spread of the low-cost operations based on the SWP. alternati\ e 
standards for the segment have been successfully implemented in the United States: firstly, 
the AirTran-Frontier Paradigm (AFP), with a clear focus on the low-fare business market by 
making use of multi-service operations, usually with mini-hubs to provide con\, enient 
connections and more possibilities in terms of origin-and-desti nation markets, and with a 
more complex fare structure and even business classlo, secondly. the JetBlue Airvi'avs 
Paradigm (JBP), which is associated with the focus on long-haul routes (usually more than 
1,500 kilometres), resulting in the highest average stage length of the LCC segments''. 
And finally, one has the Ryanair Paradigm (RYP). Ryanair, the most successful LCC in the 
world in terms of profitability, is extremely focused in selecting only destinations X\ ith 
underutilized secondary and tertiary airports. Contrary to all other major LCC's like EasyJet 
or even Southwest Airlines, Ryanair has always resisted entering either primary or congested 
airports; this permitted her to always be in a position to negotiate airport fees (cost control) 
and to focus almost completely on the leisure travellers segment, which makes this paradigm 
completely distinct from, for example, the AFP. 
It is important to emphasise two caveats on the above-mentioned paradigms, however. First of 
all, whilst newer standards of operation have clearly emerged in the segment, the essence of 
the SWP remains dominant for most of LCC's, namely the absence or weak presence of frills 
and the lower costs, typically resulting in low prices; from this point of view, the SWP is still 
the ma . or benchmark for LCC's. In addition to that, it is clear that, due to the ever-changing 
state of the competition in deregulated airline markets, it is rather unlikely to observe the three 
9 According to the website lowcostairlines. org, there were ninety low cost carriers all over the world in March 
2004 (56 in Europe, 14 in the USA, 6 in Canada, 9 in Asia and South Pacific, 2 in Africa and 3 in South 
America). 
10 AirTran Airways operates in the eastern United States with Atlanta as its hub, being the second-largest carrier 
at Hartsfield International Airport, and providing service to 45 cities within the country. Frontier Airlines 
operates routes linking its Denver hub to 38 cities in 22 states and Mexico. 
II With operations started in 2000, JetBlue Airways soon was marked bý her oýernight, "red-eýe". flights, 
Usualb. in non-stop transcontinental routes in the US. The airline ser\es point-to-point routes bet\\een 22 
destinations in H states and Puerto Rico. It is important to emphasise that both JBP and AFP are usually 
considered in a different categor-\ from Southwest when it comes to passenger amenities and 
in-flight 
entertainment (I FE). 
above-mentioned paradigms in a very strict basis, but rather as a mixture of them. Indeed. the 
volatile frontier of competition along with the need of market expansion have forced LCC's to 
also enter atypical markets, with relevant examples being the recent entry of Southwest in the 
coast-to-coast markets of the United States (US Department of Transportation, '1001 and 
2002). This trend has resulted in LCC's serving a variety of short/medium/long haul, 
business/tourism, direct/indirect routes, which has ultimately increased the exposure not onlý 
to FSC competition but also among LCC's. 
Nevertheless, despite those caveats, my argument here is that the idea of paradigms is still 
useful for a better identification of actual LCC behaviour, especially because the industry all 
over the world is observing a wave of small entrants, most of them claiming to be LCC's. 
Actually it is not always straightforward to identify if a given airline is really operating as a 
LCC and this causes much confusion among industry analysts. Therefore. in order to better 
analyse and pinpoint patterns of entry behaviour by entrants that are trully consistent with 
LCC operations, some form of representation, such as the paradigms, is needed. 
For example, one can study a newcomer's marginal propensity to enter a market with respect 
to flight haul in order to make inferences on her conformity with either SWP or JBP. The 
analysis of preference with respect to flight haul, in this specific case, is crucial to distinguish 
between both paradigms, in addition, a thorough investigation of the commercial and 
operational practices of the newcomer (with respect to strategic choices regarding frills, 
network, airports, labour, advertising, etc), can be very effective in permitting its correct 
classification. 
Figure 2.1 presents a diagram with this sort of analysis: 
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Figure 2.1 - SWP versus JBP: Effects of Flight-Haul on LCC Entry Probability 
As Figure 2.1 permits observing, the probability to enter of a SWP-like LCC is increasing in 
flight haul but with diminishing returns, in such a way that the highest probabilit-N, is 
associated with relatively shorter-haul markets. On the other hand, a JBP-like LCC has 
typically an ever-increasing entry probability with respect to flight distance, with highest 
levels associated with long-haul domestic flights. 
As one can see, by performing a simple inspection of the marginal effects of distance on the 
probability to enter a market by an alleged LCC's, it is possible to have a straightforward 
analysis of consistency with either SWP or JBP. Similarly, it would be possible to make 
inferences on the conformity of a given carrier with AFP by inspecting, for example. her 
degree of hubbing and propensity to enter business-related cities' 
Next sections were designed to permit an examination of entry patterns of the Brazilian LCC 
Gol Airlines, and some inferences on her consistency with the above-mentioned paradigms. 
Before that, however, a brief report on the liberalisation measures undertaken in Brazil along 
NN ith a description of country's solitary scheduled LCC are presented in 2.2.21. 
12 In this case, ho\\e\er. an analysis of carrier's overall service attributes is probablý more useful to infer the 
conformity with AFP than a focus on route entrý decisions. None of them are accomplished 
in this paper, 
" 
2.2.2 Liberalisation and LCC Entry in Brazil 
The removal of regulatory barriers in the Brazilian airline industry since the early nineties had 
a crucial role in the process that ultimately led to Gol Airline's entry and to an unprecedented 
increase in competition. Started at the beginning of the nineties within a broader 
governmental program for deregulation of country's economy, the measures of liberalisation 
were then performed gradually, in three main rounds, by the Department of Civil A\! iation, 
DAC. See Section 1.2 for an overview of process of liberalisation in Brazil. 
Gol Airlines was not only the first scheduled LCC of Brazil. but also Nýithin all Latin 
America, with operations started in January 2001 13 . Owned by Grupo 
Aurea, a conglomerate 
that owns 38 companies and a major operator of urban and long-distance coach services 
across Brazil, the airline was in a position of enhancing airport accessibility by setting 
counters at key airports for air/coach connections and transfers between multiple airports in 
the same city. 
By offering a very simple fare structure, with prices that at the beginning were up to 45% 
below those of FSC competitors - which gradually became 25% as fares were matched - Got 
started a successful path of growth and penetration in the domestic market. After only two 
years of operations, Got was already Brazil's only profitable airline with operational profit of 
R$ 38 million (6%). Table 2.1 presents some characteristics of Got, compared with the major 
legacy airlines within the country in 2002; Got's figures of 2001 are also presented to permit 
having an idea of the airline's rapid growth. One can see that Got's unit costs and yields were 
roughly a third lower than her opponents' and average stage length was approximately twenty 
percent lower; also, it is possible to visualise the pace of expansion of the LCC, which, from 
the start-up year, 2001, to 2002, increased air passenger traffic (number of passengers times 
kilometres flown) by 148% and passenger market share (number of passengers) by 78%: 
however. 
" Gol Airlines and U Air (Uruguaý ) are the onlý scheduled LCC's based in Latin America nowadays. Some 
North-American LCC's provide service to Mexico and the Caribbean, such as JetsGo, Frontier and JetBlue, but 
do not have operational basis at the region (source: website lowcostairlines. org). 
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Table 2.1 - Comparison of Gol and Incumbent FSC's (2002) 14 
' 
FSC LCC 
Figures Unit of Measurement TAM VRG VSP GOL GOL Growth 
2002 2002 2002 2002 2001 2001-02 
Air Passenger Traffic pax * kin (million) 9,3 233 7,158 3,384 33,136 1,265 148% 
Traffic per Employee pax * kin (thousand) 1,224 611 698 1,5 14 1,081 40% 
Market Share Pax fi-action 0.36 0.20 0.11 0.13 0.07 78% 
Load Factor ftaction 0.5.33 0.61 0.55 0.63 0.62 2% 
Unit cost seats kin (R$) 0.174 0.182 0.169 0.126 0.108 16% 
Yield pax kin (R$) 0.290 0.294 0.266 0.210 0.184 14% 
Operational ProfalLoss ftaction -0.12 -0.02 -0.16 0.06 0.02 153% 
Average Stage Length kin (pax) 868 1,179 1,016 792 772 3% 
Notes: i. RS means Brazilian currency (Real, current values); 
ii. pax means number ofpassengers travelled 
Some additional characteristics of the newcomer are: absence of complete food service (only 
snacks and cereal bars); standardised fleet (Boeing 737-700s and 800s, the largest operator of 
Next-Generation 737 aircraft in Latin America); availability of full e-ticketing service and 
heavy distribution via internet (65% of sales, according to Silva and Espfrito Santo Jr., 2003); 
reservation system software acquired from JetBlue ("Open Skies"); around half of the original 
staff coming from outside the industry and half recruited from other airlines - especially flight 
crew and technical staff -, although not more than 15% from any particular carrier' 
5. 
In March 2003, the prominent tale of triumph and incessant growth permitted Gol to 
successfully trade 20% of her equity shares to the US insurance company American 
International Group, AIG. The twenty-six million transaction aimed at enhancing the airline's 
perspectives of further expansion, especially with respect to the acquisition of extra leased 
14 Source: DAC's Statistical Yearbook, vols. I and 11. 
15 According to Lima (2002), hiring personnel from other carriers was made easier due to the downsizing process 
taken place at Vasp and specially at the bankrupt Transbrasil (Lima, 2002). According to Sil\a and Espirito 
Santo Jr. ('210033), Gol had the following internal slogan: "theYoungest and most expei-ienced aii-line in Bi-a:: ir'. 
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aircraft. Early plans of additional growth were not put in practice, however, due to the recent 
policy of Brazilian aviation authorities (DAC) which, as discussed before, started to deny 
access to imports of new aircraft, on account of an alleged overcapacity in the market (see 
1.2). 
At the beginning, Gol's marketing efforts were clearly orientated to become "the people's 
airline", concentrating more on potential travellers with lower income than on current 
travelling-public (Zalamea, 2001, mentions "small business officials, blue collar workers, 
students, Armers and others who have never flown before" as targeted segments of 
consumers). For example, Tarcisio Gargioni, Gol's Vice President for Marketing and 
Services, once revealed: "Our business plan identified that in 2000, out of the 170 million 
Brazilian population only 6 million flew commercial aviation. Out of the remaining 164 
million, some 25 million could also become potentialfliers providedfares were reduced 3001o" 
(Lima, 2002). 
Nevertheless, demand stimulation from non-travel I ing- lower- income consumers was 
eventually not enough to guarantee the expansion of the airline and in fact Gol's rapid growth 
was achieved primarily at the expense of the legacy carriers, being particularly enhanced by 
Transbrasil Airlines's exit in 200 1: "We did a market survey in September [2001] andfound 
only 4% of our passengers had never flown before" (Gargioni, as in Lima, 2002). 
Undoubtedly, Brazil's economic instability, lower per capita income and high wealth 
concentration can be regarded as the major sources of Gol's lack of success in attracting non- 
travelling public. Also, the country's high interest rates are usually associated with higher risk 
of enterprise, which probably forced Gol not to venture providing service to new domestic 
destinations where new demand could be created, but to focus only on already existing routes. 
Another relevant restriction is the lack of infrastructure for typical LCC operations in other 
cities than the major conurbations in Brazil (suitable secondary airports, for example). 
This does not mean, however, that Gol's entry was totally ineffective in stimulating new 
demand on existing routes; on the contrary, if one considers the top-500 densest routes in 
Brazil, and by comparing traffic density of 2002 with 2000 (previous to entry), it is possible I= 
to arrive at the conclusion that routes entered by Gol observed a 13.1% average increase in 
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traffic density (pax), against a 7.0% increase on all 500 routes: actually, non-entered routes 
16 had a 11.5 decrease in traffic density within the sarne period . 
A major issue is whether the above-mentioned difficulties in new demand generation have 
ultimately forced the airline to substantially alter her initial route entry strategy in order not to 
affect expansion. Indeed, this may be particularly true with respect to the effect on route 
choice of flight haul - as seen before, a crucial variable with respect to analysis of confori-niv, 
with LCC paradigms. For example, it was observed that, since 2002, medium-to-long haul 
routes were increasingly added to Gol's network, as one can visualise from the maps of 
Figure 2.2: 
2001 2002 
Figure 2.2 - Evolution of Gol's Network within Brazil (Source: DAC's 
HOTRAN reports) 
Actually, at the beginning of 2001, Gol was restrict to six 737-700s, providing service 2n 
between Sdo Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Florian6polis, Brasilia, Porto Alegre and 
Salvador, and thus with the maximum haul below 1,500 kilometres. This straightforward link 
with SWP is not surprising since Gol positioned herself as an admitted follower of Southwest 
during the start-up of operations (Guirnardes, 2002). This recipe permitted the newcomer to 
rapidly achieve higher-than-average levels of efficiency, with aircraft having 10 to 12 flights a tý Z: ) t__ 
day and very fast ground turn-around times, between fifteen and thirty minutes. In fact, by 
December 2001 there was only one city-pair in the entire network which could be classified as 
" Own calculations based on fi,,,, ures of DACs Statistical Yearbook (volume 1). Results are consistent with 
findings of Dresner, Lin and Windle (1996), for the US market. 
direct long-haul route: Brasilia-Bel6m, with 1,610 km. 
By the end of 2002, on the other hand, situation was clearly very different: the LCC had 
already 22 aircraft in operation, serving a much wider network with many routes with higher- 
than-average distance and certainly an additional target of feeding long-range flights 17 . For 
example, routes like Rio de Janeiro - Manaus (2,860 km), Rio de Janeiro - Recife (1,863 km) 
and Brasilia - Fortaleza (1,690 km) were added to the network structure, indicating a higher 
propensity to enter long-haul direct routes and rapidly increasing the possibilities of traffic 
between extreme regions like the South and the North/Northeast. 
Table 2.2 gives some details on the route profile of the airline with respect to flight haul, bý 
considering entry on the top-500 routes in terms of traffic density: 
Table 2.2 - Direct Routes Served by Gol - Flight Haul Distribution 
# 500 Direct Routes Direct Routes 
Flight-Haul Intervals 
Top Served 2001 Served 2002 
- kilometres - Routes 
# % % 
QO - Q, Less than 390 125 8 6.4% 11 8.8% 
Q, - Q2 390to 716 125 11 8.8% 15 12.0% 
Q2 - Q3 716 to 1,466 125 9 
'7 1 
. _% 
18 14.4% 
Q3 - Q4 more than 1,466 125 5 4.0% 10 8.0% 
i Total 1 500 1 33 1 6.6 %1 54 1 10.8% 
Notes: i. Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4 mean the quartiles considering a 
sample with the 500 densest routes, - ii. # means number o routes )f 
and % means percentage out of the top routes 
As one can observe in Table 2.2, Gol increased by 21 the number of direct routes served from 
2001 to 2002 (54-33). Out of these 21 new routes, two-thirds (14) were formed by medium- 
to-long-haul routes (that is, with flight haul above the median, 716 kilometres). Indeed, Gol 
doubled her presence on longer-haul routes in 2002 (28 routes above the median, against 14 in 
2001); these effectively changed the participation of these sort of routes from a minority 
17 This started specialk after the regulators authorised Gol's entr) at Santos Dumont Airport (Rio de Janeiro), bý 
the end of 200 1, after the carrier had difficulties to expand operations at Sdo Paulo's Congonhas -\ irport. 
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position in 2001 (14 out of 33) to a majority stake in 2002 (28 out of 54). 
All these facts raise questions over the actual standard of operations undertaken by Gol in the 
Brazilian airline industry, specially with respect to which paradigm she might be consistent 
with. One might doubt whether Gol, although claiming herself as initially inspired by 
Southwest (Guimardes, 2002), could resist entering a wider range of markets in order to 
expand or even to exploit unobservable (to the analyst) economies of scope throughout Brazil, 
increasing the number of actual origin-and-destination markets. In fact, by a simple inspection 
on Gol's website, one can quickly arrive at the conclusion that flights with more than two 
stops and/or connections are much more frequently available than non-stop flights, which 
certainly represents a departure from the typical SWP. 
The start of operations of "red-eye" flights in 2003 in order to attract more travellers from 
coach and to persist in expanding despite the restrictions of the "re-regulatory wave" serves as 
an additional argument to the claim that the LCC's standards are probably not consistent with 
the SWP, but could be potentially associated with a variant of the JBP (longer-haul routes 
target). In fact, it is known that, just before starting-up operations in Brazil, Gol's executives 
made visits to both Southwest Airlines and JetBlue Airways in order to design the airline's 
strategic planning. 
By focusing on the issue of the analysis of Gol's entry patterns, it is possible to collect further 
evidence on the change of directions by the LCC from 2002 on and to make inferences about 
the determinants of entry decisions by a LCC in a recently liberalised airline market, a task for 
Section 2.3. 
2.3 Empirical Modelling 
In this section I present the empirical modelling for the analysis of route-entry decisions of 
Gol Airlines. Firstly, the LCC's route entry problem is analysed vvith a discrete-choice model; 
secondly, the process of sample delimitation, the variables and data sources, and the 
final 
empirical specification are described; and finallv, the estimator is presented and the 
issue of 
endoe, eneitv is examined, N\ ith the discussion of the instrurnental variables employed. 
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2.3.1 Discrete-Choice Framework 
The intention here is to develop a framework of discrete choice with random Utilitý 18 for the 
analysis of the patterns of entry decisions of the newcomer Gol Airlines. It is straightfomard 
that here we have Gol as the decision maker, and the set of decisions "to enter a route" and 
"not to enter a route" as the alternatives in this "route-choice problem". 
Consider the binary variable representative of choice, PRESkt, which accounts for the 
presence of Gol on the k-th route at time t. The probability of entry can then be regarded in 
the following way: 
Pr[PRESk, =1]=Pr[ 45Zkt - 
SCk ýý' 0] 
Where the multiplicative term 6TEkt* is the present value of the stream of equilibrium profits of 
the newcomer (note that 6 is the discount factor) in case of entry, and SCk is the amount of 
sunk costs on the k-th route (considered once and for all). One can develop (1) in the 
following way: 
Pr 1,5z* - sc > 0] -- Pr >I =Pr[Inz* +Ind5-InSCk 
>O 
ki k SCk kt 
1 
By introducing E; kt, the disturbances associated with the choice mechanism within a random 
utility framework, in (2), we have the following random variable representative of equilibrium 
net present value profits at the route level (I-Ikt*): 
ri * ::::::: In 7r* + In 5- In SCk 
(3) 
kt kt 
+ 6kt 
whereF- kt is assumed to be iid - N(O, 1) 
19. 
" In the random utility approach, "the obsei-ved inconsistencies in choice behai, iour at-e taken to 
be a i-esith of 
obsei-vational deficiencies on the pai-t of the analysi" (Ben-Akiva and 
Lerman, 1984); therefore, contrar-ý to the 
constant utility approach, which assume a probabilistic behaviour 
for the decision maker, by assuming random 
utility I assume that the individual (the firm) always select the alternative with the 
highest utility (profits). By 
doing this, here we have the standard interpretation of the error term as representing 
factors that are observable 
to the firm but not to the econometrician. 
19 This is a convenient assumption. as the literature on binary probit estimation \N 
ithin a simultaneous equations 
framework is vast (examples being Amemiya, 1978, Smith and Blundell, 1986, 
Rivers and Vuong, 1988 and 
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As in a typical discrete-choice model (ex. Amemiya, 1978), we have only PRESkt as an 
observable, whereas the other terms (6,7tkt* and SCk) are latent. Actually, only the sign of 
I-Ikt* is observed: 
I if ri *>0 (4) 
PRES (Fl* kt kt kt 
0 if 1-1 *<0 
kt - 
Therefore we have PRESkt assigned with one in case of entry (expectation of positive route 
profitability) and zero in case of no entry (no expectation of route profitability). 
2.3.2 Sample Delimitation, Variables and Empirical Specification 
now turn to the description of the sample and the empirical specification. The strategy here 
was to have a sample with a large and representative cross-section of routes, in terms of 
capturing a gh percentage of total domestic traffic in Brazil. Fortunately, the Statistical 
Yearbook of the Department of Civil Aviation - volume 
1120, provides annual figures of 
domestic origin and destination traffic; thus, data was collected for the 500 densest routes 21 in 
the country, structured in a panel with two Years, 2001 and 2002, and with each observation 
being then a route-year. 
Here I define "route" in the following way: the service of passenger air transportation 
between two given citieS22 , either by direct (non-stop or with stops) or by indirect flights (any 
possible combination of non-stop flights and flights with stops and connections). Also, routes 
are considered as non-directional markets, which means that, for instance, the origin-and- 
destination market of travellers from Rio de Janeiro to Brasilia is regarded as aggregated \\,,, ith 
Lee, 1991), in opposition to the binary logit with enclogenous variables. 
20 All information contained in the yearbooks and reports used here is monthly supplied from all scheduled 
airlines to the Department of Civil Aviation according to specific legislation (Instrugdo de Aviagdo Civil - 1505). 
One of the drawbacks of the data is that one cannot distinghish direct from indirect traffic (ie, number of 
travellers with and without flight connections). This sort of data is currently unavailable in Brazil. 
2' In order to define the 500 densest, figures of the period 1998-2002, available in the Statistical Yearbooks of 
the Department of Civil Aviation, were considered. 
22 Evans and Kessides (1993) also use the city-pair definition of a route; in contrast, Morrison (2001 ) implements 
an anaIN sis disaggregated at the airport-pair level, in order to capture the effect of "adjacent" route presence. 1") 117, 
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the market Brasilia-Rio de Janeiro 23 . Therefore, the raw data available in the Statistical 
Yearbook (directional airport-pairs) was aggregated to represent non-directional city-pair 
markets. 
Also, some additional procedures of sample delimitation were performed in order to reduce 
potential heterogeneity across routes, especially with respect to demand attributes such as 
price elasticities implicit in any specification of Tci*. More specifically, it is well-knoxvn that 
flight distance and trip purpose are relevant sources of heterogeneity across routes. In fact, 
one would expect higher price elasticities of demand on routes in which there is higher 
competition either between modes of transportation or between scheduled and charter airlines: 
in the Brazilian case, one would certainly have this sort of problem with very short-haul 
routes - in which, for example, coaches have lower relative disadvantage -, and with 
exceptionally highly tourism-related routes - in which there is higher availability of charter 
flights 24 
. 
In order to deal with this problem, here all routes with unusually low flight haul and with high 
percentage of seats available during weekends (reasonable proxy for tourism-related routes) 
were discarded. Therefore I excluded routes: 1. with flight-haul that is lower than the 5 th 
percentile (160 kilometres, as measured for the top-500 densest routes sample)25 ; and 2. with 
a percentage of seats available during weekends that is higher than the 95 th percentile (also for 
the top-500 sample) 26 . This resulted 
in a final data sample with 448 routes. With this set, one 
23 For example, Ito and Lee (2003b) and Richard (2003) also makes use the assumption of non-directional 
markets; on the other hand, Berry, Carnall and Spiller (1996), Evans and Kessides (1993) and Borenstein (1989) 
use directional markets. 
24 Indeed, the Brazilian airline industry is characterised by a high proportion of business-related traffic, with 
tourism-related routes being exceptions. According to a research performed by Sao Paulo's aviation authorities, 
DAESP, in 2002, approximately 60% of the passengers in domestic trips that travelled from or to that state's 
airports had business-related purposes of travel. 
25 This is consistent with the procedure of Bogulaski, Ito and Lee (2003) when stud,, ing the route choice of 
Southwest Airlines. They had a cut-off range of 100 and 3,000 miles. In the present case, however, there is no 
route with more than 3,000 miles in the initial data sample. The authors excluded markets with 
distance outside 
this intervals as they are not likely to be targets for Southwest Airlines entry (the minimum and maximum 
distance of Southwest's markets was, respectively, 152 and 2,438 miles). In the present case. the onlý market of 
Gol xNhich was outside this range (Florian6polis-Navegantes, approximatelly 
55 miles) has been discontinued 
(not available in Gol's Nvebsite in Februarý 2003). 
, \s mentioned before, this measure can 
be regarded as a proxy for identiA ing tourism-related routes. The 
m, eraoc is 21% of total whole-week seats a\ ailable and the 
95h percentile is 351o. Source: Department of Civil 
t, 
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could still be able to represent the traffic of an average of 27 million passengers per year. 
which represents approximately 966 out of 1000 domestic trips during that NN hole period 
With respect to the algebraic specification of (3), here I propose the use of a translogarithmic 
function. This specification has advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it can 
represent any equilibrium profit function of unknown form and does not restrict the 
substitution elasticities between the arguments (permits a full modelling of substitution and 
complementarity). 
On the other hand, however, the trans logarithmic is vulnerable to multicollinearity among its 
many terms, and thus is not suitable for very disaggregated models. As the number of second- 
order terms in the right-hand side increases quickly as the set of independent variables grows, 
there is usually a trade-off between the increased flexibility permitted by having higher order 
terms and the practical difficulties associated with a elevated number of parameters to be 
estimated; examples of flexible profit functions of this type in the empirical literature are 
Mullineaux (1978) and Slade (1986). 
One alternative would be to constrain all the square and cross-product terms to zero, which 
would reduce (3) to a Cobb-Douglas equilibrium profits function. A comparison of the 
empirical performance of the two models is made in Section 2.4. 
With respect to the empirical specification of (3), there is a large list of potential regressors, 
and many of them are indicated by the literature. As the major focus here was to analyse the 
conformity of Gol Airlines with either the SWP or the JBP - especially with respect of flight- 
haul and route density -, and, at the same time accounting for the effects of market structure 
at the route level (presence of the opponent FSCs), the chosen empirical specification was 
then: 
Fl *= kt r-I 
[; 
T* kt (den,,, km sdrk, 
), 
la- Iý tbapreSkt- kI cpres I, DCI, '6kt 
] (5) 
Where denkt is route density (number of passengers) of route k and time t, 
kMkt is flight 
distance of route k. and sdrkt is the number of seats available per passenger on direct flights of 
Aviation's HOTRAN reports (various). 
FSC rivals of route k and time t; cpreSkt-I and tbapreSkt-I are dumm, "' variables that control for I 
the presence, both at time t- 1, of Go] at the endpoint cities, and of the bankrupt Transbrasi I on 
route k. Finally the DCs (1 = 1,2, ..., L) are city-specific dummies. The transio, -, 
representation of (5) would then be: 
Pr[PRES -1]=Pr[fl*, >O]= kt k 
+ v3 In sdrk, + t), In den 
2+ 
t)o + t), In denk, + v2 In km, kt 
(6) 2 Pr u5 In kmk + v6 In Sdrk2, +07 In denk, In kMk +u8 In denk, In sdrk, + 
+ug In km, In sdr + u, DC, + v, cpreSk, 
-I 
+ V2tbapreSk, -I 
+ Ekt > 
where the Us, u's and v's are parameters. Let us now present details of each of the variables 
present in (5) and (6): 
PRESM, is a binary variable that accounts for route presence of Gol Airlines, being assigned 
with one if entry has occurred in any year lower or equal than t, and with zero otherwise. 
PRESkt then means the presence of the LCC on route k in year t. 
As mentioned before, a "route" here means a unique city-pair market, being thus an 
aggregation of all travel between two given cities, irrespective of the airports of origin and 
destination, and of the travel's direction. Once route is defined, one has to precisely define 
"entry". Here I define entry as Gol's presence in any of the possible origin-to-destination (0- 
D) markets, within the period under consideration (2001-2002), for more details, see the 
discussion of cpreSkt-I below. The information of the presence of Gol in the O-D markets was 
collected from Panrotas' Domestic and International Schedules and Fares Guide 
27 and 
Airwise's website. 
The definition of PRESkt including all O-D traffic is certainly in contrast with Bogulaski, Ito 
and Lee (2003), which consider only non-stop markets and thus disregard routings with flight 
connections and stops within a given route. That procedure is certainly more reasonable for 
their case of Southwest Airlines, N\, hich is usually associated \\ith non-stop and short-haul 
27 This is database is similar to OAG's of flight schedules guide, the world's most comprehensive schedules 
database. 
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flights (the SWP, as discussed in 2.2.1). In the present case, however. one may be 
unconvinced whether Gol has typical SWP standards, but, on the contrary. would believe that 
she has some propensity to enter a more diversified range of markets, speciallý. longer-haul 
routes with stops and connections (see 2.2.2). Therefore, it would not be a reasonable 
procedure to include only either non-stop or direct flights in the definition of "route". as it 
would not be representative of Gol's operations; also, it would be impossible to investigate 
the conformity of Gol with the SWP (see Figure 2.1). Therefore, the broader definitions of 
both route and entry were considered more appropriate for this study. 
Another issue regarding the definition of entry is related to the minimum level of operations 
(MLO) within a year for Gol's presence to be accounted for. Previous literature usually had 
either absolute or relative definitions of MLO. For instance, whereas Oum, Zhang and Zhang 
(1993) and Berry (1992) used MLOs of, respectively, 100 and 90 passengers per quarter in the 
ten per cent sample collected by the US DOT 28 , Evans and Kessides (1993) used a fractional 
definition, considering effective presence as more than 1% of total traffic on the route. The 
latter is certainly a more flexible filtering criterion which could be adapted for the Brazilian 
conditions; however, as here traffic disaggregated by airline is not observed, the proxy used 
was to adapt Evans and Kessides (1993)'s approach by using the minimum percentage of 
(observable) seats available at the endpoint cities 29 , considering then "entry" when actual 
figures are higher than I %. 
denkt is route density of traffic (in million passengers) and was collected from the Statistical 
Yearbook of the Department of Civil Aviation (volume 11) for the years 2001-2002. 
Consisting of origin-and-destination traffic figures, this variable represents total (non-airline- 
specific) domestic number of trips, aggregating all direct and indirect, single-trip and round- 
trip, traffic (that is, revenue passengers). 
kMk represents route distance, that is, the one-way distance between origin and destination 
airports. This information was provided by Department of Civil Aviation's Laborator) of 
Simulation and was calculated by using the polar coordinates method. One important issue 
28 U. S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Origin and Destination Sur\ eý. 
29 Source: Department of Cl\ 11 A\ iation's HOTRANs (various). 
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about kMkt is related to distance calculation when the sample presents more than one airport in 
one or both endpoint cities of the given route. In both cases the latitude and longitude of the 
airports closest to the city centre was employed and considered representative of the distance 
between citieS30. 
Another aspect of kMk is that it represents the minimum distance between two given airports, 
and therefore does not take into account neither actual airway distance nor the effect of flight 
connections and/or stops. In principle, one would object using this proxy for flight distance, 
specially for medium-to-long-haul routes, because their higher availability of seats in flights 
with stops certainly represents higher actual distance flown than can be assessed by kMk. 
Therefore, the lower the participation of non-stop flights on a given route the more one would 
underestimate the effect of actual flight distance on profits via a decrease in unit CoStS31 . Also, 
more stops are known to actually increase costs - for instance, via additional 
land i ng/departure fees; moreover, on the demand side, stops usually increase passengers' 
flight disutility, generating competitive disadvantage and also reducing profitability -a 
product differentiation effect. In spite of these arguments, we can therefore interpret kMkt as 
capturing the broad effect of flight distance on the probability of entry by the LCC 32 . 
sdrkt is the number of total seats available per passenger on direct flights of FSC's on route k 
and time t. A relative measure, that is seats per passenger, was considered a better indicator 
than the absolute figure of seats available, as it avoids strong collinearity with denkt; it is also 
a proxy for the inverse of capacity utilisation on direct routes. Data for total number of flights 
disaggregated by airline and by each day of the week is available in Department of Civil 
Aviation's HOTRAN, "Hordrio de Transporte", a data system that generates reports 
containing operational information of all scheduled flights within the country (non-published 
data). This information was extracted from their system on every month for the period 2001 - 
2002, and subsequently aggregated by year. Sdrkt is then both a measure of product 
'0 As mentioned before, there were only three cities in this situation found in the data sample: Rio de Janeiro, 
Sao Paulo and Belo Horizonte. In all cases the largest city airport (in terms of figures of number of passengers 
and movement of aircraft) is located closer to the city centre. Source: INFRAERO's website (February, 2004). 
31 A phenomenon known as "cost taper" in the transport literature, see Brander and Zhang (1990). 
32 Some collinearity with sdrk, is expected cx-antc, however. 
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differentiation - that is, more seats available meaning more convenient flights and ser\ ice 
levels generated by the FSC's -, and of the degree of how well or underserved a given route 
actually is. 
cpreSkt-1 is a binary variable that controls for entry at any of the endpoint cities of a route in 
the previous year. It is assigned with one for each route in 2002 that had one of the endpoint 
cities entered by Gol in 2001, and zero otherwise. This variable is crucial in the present 
framework as it is designed to control for the effects of sunk costs at the city level, that is, 
once one given airport/city was entered, it is then expected to be easier for the newcomer to 
provide services on other routes out of it, as she had already incurred in most of the sunk 
costs, such as advertising in one city, the sales and operational structure at the airport and the 
city, etc. It also controls for the effects of routes already entered in the year before and thus 
making a distinction between "new" or "true" entry and "previous" entry: in this sense, this 
variable makes this study in line with Toivanen and Waterson (2001 )33. 
tbapreht-l is a binary variable representative of the presence of the bankrupt (and no-longer 
existing) Transbrasil Airlines on route k and time t-1. One the one hand, one would think of 
the exit of this airline as giving an opportunity to entry for Gol; this would be certainly the 
case in city-pairs in which airports are subject to slots restrictions, for example; on the other 
hand, however, one would think of the exit of Transbrasil as a clear signal for Gol that those 
routes were not profitable. The prior intuition here is that the latter effect is stronger than the 
former, specially if one considers that very few airports are slot-constrained in Brazil-, in this 
case, the sign of this coefficient is expected to be negative. 
DCI, which are city-specific duninfies: assigned with I if the city is one of the endpoint cities 
of the city-pair, and 0 if not. The city dummies provide an economical way to capture and 
control for a large number of truly significant (frequently exogenous) variables, which can be 
regarded as being actually city-specific, instead of route-specific-, also, most of them are in 
fact unobservables by the researcher. 
33 The authors criticise the common procedure found in the entry literature, of treating "entry" of existing firms, 
meaning the continuation of operations, in a similar way to entry of new firms; this would be equivalent to 
"making the assumption thatfi-ins can in eivi-T pet-iod, without a change 1. n costs, revieu, theit- e1711T decision". 
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Below is a list of some of the potential effects that may be controlled by the city dummies: 
a. Characteristics of travellers from/to a city: consumers' purchasing behaviour and 
attributes, like the percentage of the travellers which frequently makes use of the 
intemet when searching and buying; consumers' attributes: income. niche preferences, 
propensity to make either tourism-related or business-related trips, etc; city's gross 
domestic product and wealth in general, as a factor of business-trips generation: 
percentage of migrants established in one city (ex: large participation of migrants from 
Northeast in Sdo Paulo, a fact that is potentially trip-generation enhancing), 
geographic idyosincrasies; 
b. Characteristics of the airports of a city: sunk costs; airport accessibilitv and costs 
of the access to the airport (price of taxi, distance from the zones-o f-tri p-generat ion, 
etc), the size of the zone of influence of the city's airport(s) in terms of trip generation 
(nearby cities); operational costs and expenses related to a particular city (airport fees, 
cost of hiring personnel, cost of contracts in general, etc. )-, presence of airports with 
constrained capacity (slots) or with spare capacity; subsides and incentives given by 
authorities to operations in one given city, presence of airports owned by the public 
enterprise Infraero; vacant slots or frequencies left by the bankrupt Transbrasil; 
airport/airway infrastructure: size of the runway, air traffic control capacity; 
c. Characteristics of network out of a city: size of the airlines* network 
(unobservable degree of product differentiation, economies of scope, etc. at the airport 
level); presence of hub or mini-hub in a city; frequent flyer effect: number of possible 
destinations out of a city; 
d. Characteristics of the competition in a city: quality/availability of motorways out 
of a city, tolls; presence of charter; number of travel agents; commission fees to travel 
agents of a city; airport dominance by particular airlines-, number of airlines operating 
out of a city and concentration levels; levels of advertising and forms of effectke 
media in one city; number of flights and excess capacity out of a city. 
They state: "Given stink costs, we believe that particular assumption to be univarranted, and ii e 
do no ittili: e it" 
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Most of these effects are expected to generate persistent heterogeneity in the error-term 
structure across cities (but not routes), which can be controlled via the city-specific dummies. 
DC S34. 
Another relevant feature of the dummy-specific cities is that one is able to identify onlý the 
effects of actually entered cities. This is a common problem of any discrete-choice model, in 
which "one cannot use as a regressor a dummy variable iffor any of the vabies it takes, Ilicre 
is no variation in the dependent variable" (Toivanen and Waterson. 2001). This is precisely 
35 the case of non-entered cities, all of them with no variation in PRESikt . However, by having 
dummies only for actual ly-entered airports, one is certainly inducing somewhat artificially 
designed correlation with the dependent variable, due to the obvious fact that only routes from 
and to actually chosen airports/cities will be entered. The extreme alternative, namely 
dropping all city dummies, would probably be inappropriate as it would induce omitted 
variables bias. 
Thus, in order to balance between the gains of controlling for city-specific effects and to 
avoid the aforementioned sort of artificial correlation, I then focused on the network decisions 
of any potential newcomer in the Brazilian domestic market. In fact, given that "there are no 
secondary airports near major Brazilian cities able to handle midsize jet operations (73 /Ts, 
A3201319, etc. )" (Silva and Espirito Santo Jr., 2003), any major player considering entering 
the market would not be able to avoid having operations in the airports of some of the most 
important cities within the country. Indeed, this is a sort of networking decision that is 
expected ex-ante, irrespective of the type of operations and specific niche of the potential 
competitor. This evidence is per se a justification for the inclusion of dummies for the major 
cities present in the sample (ten in total), as they constitute the potential mini-hubs for an',. ' 
entering carrier; at the same time, one would not be causing unreasonable correlation \\ ith the 
dependent variable, as the dummies are designed independently of Gol's entry decision. 
(Toivanen and Waterson, 200 1, p. 3). 
34 The cities included xN'ere: Brasilia, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, Manaus, Fortaleza, Porto Alegre. Recife, Rio de 
Janeiro, Salvador and Sao Paulo; this was the list of the top-ten cities in terms of total densit,, of traffic from 
1998 and 2002 (source: Statistical Yearbook of DAC, vol. 1). 
35 The other extreme N\ould be the case of the sample containing cities with all routes actuallý entered. and thus 
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Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the empirical model are presented in Table 2.3: 
Table 2.3 - Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Designation 
PRESjk, =0 
Mean 
PRESik, =l Full Sample 
Std. De%. 
(Full Sample) 
pres, i,., Route Presence - Gol - - 0.198 0398 
denkt Route Number of'PAX/Year 21,551220 236,466475 64,007.379 246,566.718 
kMkt Route Distance 966.817 1,383.838 1,049.197 776293 
sdrki Route Direct Seats per PAX 1827 2,626 2.787 7.362 
cpresk-, -, 
City Presence - Go] (One Lag) 0.309 0.599 0.366 0482 
tbapreSkt-l Route Presence - Transbrasil (One Lag) 0.050 0.113 0.063 0.242 
Belo Horizonte Durnmy of City 0.039 0.124 0.056 0.230 
Brasilia Dummy of City 0.085 0.164 0.100 0.301 
Curitiba Dummy of City 0.046 0.141 0.065 0246 
Fortaleza Dummy of City 0.054 0,073 0.058 0,234 
Manaus Dummy of City 0,083 0.045 0.076 0265 
Porto Alegre Dummy of City 0.042 0.124 0.058 Oý234 
Recife Dummy of City 0.039 0 147 0.060 0.238 
Rio de Janeiro Dummy of City 0.051 0.186 0.078 0.269 
Salvador Dummy ofCity 0.053 0.158 0.074 0.261 
Sdo Paulo Dummy ofCity 0.135 0,186 0,145 0.352 
It is pertinent to emphasise that both denkt and sdrkt have zero as minimum. This is on account 
of routes in which air transport operations were either interrupted or there were no direct 
flights in a given year. This generated the problem of dealing with the logarithm of zero in 
(6). One way to circumvent this problem is by having the data transformation indicated by 
Fox (1997): "fto] add a positive constant (called "start') to each data value to make all the 
values positive". Hence, a "start" of, respectively, 10 and 0.10 units, was then applied to all 
observations of both variables in order to permit accomplishing proper estimations. 
,, enerating the same problem -a case not present in the current data sample. 
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2.3.3 The Issue of Endogeneity, Instruments and Estimator 
One relevant issue related to the estimation of (6) is the potential correlation of denk, and sdrkt 
with the error term Eikt. In fact, one would expect both variables to be jointly determined \\ ith 
F1kt* and thus causing simultaneous equations bias to emerge. The correlation would be in the 
following fashion: if actual profits are higher than the predicted, that is. a positive Ekt, ýN, hich 
stimulates entry, then route density may be higher due to new demand generation permitted 
by the low-cost carrier (a fact reported by Whinston and Collins, 1992), and thus one would 
have positive correlation between denkt and Ekt. Similar effect is expected to happen with sdrkt: 
a positive E; kt would cause post-entry reactions in terms of increase in route presence via 
higher capacity and sdrkt (also reported by Whinston and Collins, 1992). Of course, the 
opposite may happen in case of a "crowd ing-o ut" effect caused by Gol's entry, that is, FSC 
rivals reducing sdrkt after Gol enters, via reduction in the number of flights, in the size of 
36 
aircrafts or even exiting the market . In 
both cases, with either positive or negative 
correlation with the error term, the standard probit estimation would either overestimate or 
underestimate the true effects on entry as one would not account for post-entry route density 
and presence adjustment in the estimation. 
As endogeneity is potentially present, one needs to perform a test for exogeneity in the model; 
the variables under suspicion were denkt, sdrkt and their second-order terms sdrkt 
2, sdrkt * denkt, 
sdrkt * kMk, denkt 2, denkt * kMk. The test employed was the one suggested by Smith-Blundell 
(1986), which is more suitable for discrete-choice models than, for example, the frequently 
used Hausman test. It is Chi-squared distributed with m degrees of 
freedom -m being the 
number of endogenous variables in the model -, and tests the null 
hypothesis that all 
explanatory variables are exogenous, a rejection therefore indicates that the standard probit 
should not be employed. For the present model, the Smith-Blundell statistic x\as 
14.58 (P- 
36 For example, Transbrasil exited the market some months after Gol's entrý'. 
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value of 0.04), permitting the rejection of the nul 137. 
Once exogeneity of denk, and sdrkt (and related terms) is rejected, one needs an instrumental 
variables estimator for binary variables. Moreover, GMM estimation would be required in 
case of rejection of the hypothesis of homoskedasticity Of E; kt. In order to test for this. a 
likelihood-ratio test of heteroskedasticity in the discrete-choice framework was performed 
after a maxim um- I ikel ihood heteroskedastic probit estimation. This test requires the 
specification of an indicator vector of suspected explanatory variables that could affect the 
unobservables, which, in this case, was set equal to [sdrkt-1, denkt-1, kMk]38 . The null 
hypothesis of homoskedasticity was not rejected at 10% level of significance - the Chi- 
squared statistic with 3 degrees of freedom was 1.57 (P-value of 0.6671). 
As homoskedasticity is not rejected, one possible discrete-choice estimator that control for 
endogeneity is the Amemiya (1978)'s Generalised Least Squares (AGLS); here I employed 
the AGLS implementation of Newey (1987). In the case of disturbances that are normally 
distributed, this estimator is consistent, and asymptotically equivalent to the efficient 
minimum chi-square estimator (Lee, 1991 and Newey, 1987); also it is shown to be more 
efficient than other popular two-stage estimators for simultaneous equations with binary 
response models (for example, the 2SIV estimator of Rivers and Vuong, 1984 39). 
The steps of AGLS estimation are the following: firstly, a set of regressions is estimated by 
OLS to obtain the reduced form parameters and the respective predictions and residuals are 
computed; this is followed by running a probit with the exogenous variables and the predicted 
endogenous variables as regressors; thirdly, a probit is regressed by making use of the 
exogenous variables, the instruments, and the predicted residuals from the reduced form 
model; and finally, a generalised least square estimator relating the previous estimated 
parameters is performed in order to obtain efficient estimates of the structural parameters. 
" The list of instrumental variables used for this test (and for estimations) is described below. 
3' According to Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2003), when testing for heteroskedasticit-, in a simultaneous 
equation framework, the indicator vector must be exogenous and is tý pically formed bý "either instruments ot* 
, 
functions qf the instruments". 
39 Blundell and Smith (1989) and Rivers and Vuong (1988) provide additional discussion on relative efficieric" 
of the AGLS estimator in comparison to others found in the literature. 
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This estimator requires consistent standard errors correction to account for the first-stage 
estimation,, which is performed here by making use of Newey (1987)'s approach 40 
The basic procedure for identification here was to employ lagged variables as instruments and 
test for their validity. The list of instrumental variables included denkt-1, sdrkt-1. Sttkt-1 (total 
direct seats available), swekt-1 (total direct seats available during weekends) and aSZkt- I 
(average size of aircraft); it also comprised respective second-order terms: (In denkt-1) 
2, (in 
sdrkt- 1 )2, In denkt-1 * In kMk, In denkt-1 * In sdrkt-1, In kMk * In sdrkt-1. The validity of 
instruments is supported by the following diagnostics described below; all figures are reported 
in Appendix 2.1. 
Firstly, in terms of relevance of the instruments, by having a look at the matrix of correlations 
between endogenous and instrumental variables one can have an idea of the reasonably high 
correlation among them (Appendix 2.1, Tables 2.12). Also in terms of relevance of the 
instruments, by inspecting the partial R-squared and the F-test of joint significance of the 
excluded instruments in the first-stage regressions, the minimum R-squared was 0.55 and the 
minimum F-statistic was 105.20 (p-value of 0.00), which further indicated they are fairly 
correlated with the endogenous variables (Appendix 2.1, Tables 2.13). 
Since the number of instruments exceeds the number of endogenous regressors I made use of 
over-identification restrictions tests to check for the validity of the instruments proposed 
(tests of orthogonality, as in Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993; see Baum, Schaffer and 
Stillman, 2003, for a survey); by regressing a linear probability model in two-stages least 
squares (LPM/2SLS) one could confirm the validity of instruments. The tests used were the 
Sargan N*R-squared test and the Basmann test, and both failed in rejecting the null 
hypothesis that the excluded variables are valid instruments (Appendix 2.1, Tables 2.13). 
With the intention of emphasizing the relevance of controlling for endogeneity, I perform 
comparison between the standard (single stage) probit with the AGLS in the results 
presentation of Section 4; this is specially useful to have an idea of the magnitude (and si"n) 
of the underlying simultaneous equations bias. 
40 Stata's routine "ivprob" was used to perform all estimations and standard error corrections in NeýNeN ( 1987)'s 
fashion (Harkness, 2001). 
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2.4 Estimation Results 
The estimation results of the empirical modelling developed in Section 2.3 are reported in the 
first column of Table 2.4; these results are indicative of the AGLS instrumental variables 
estimator with ful I -specification, that is, with the inclusion of both first and second-order 
terms of equation (6): 
Table 2.4 - Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable 
(1) 
AGLS 
PR 1 ENTRY= 11 
(2) (3) 
AGLS- PROBIT 
(4) 
RFM PROBIT 
In denk, 0.078 * 0.052 t 0.057 0.071 t 
(0.039) (0.009) (0.032) (0.031) 
(In denkt) 2 0.003 0.006 ý 0.008 t 
(0,003) (0.002) (0.002) 
In kmk 0.464 t 0-077 0.562 t 0.635 
(0211) (U021 (0205) (0,209) 
(In kmk )2 -0.033 t -0.038 t -0.042 
(0,015) (0.015) (0.015) 
In sdrkt -0.183 * 0.013 -0.105 -0.097 
(0.072) (0.010) (0ý054) (0.052) 
(In sdrk, ) 2 0.012 * 0-006 t 0.007 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
In denk, * In kmk -0.012 * -0.007 -0.0 10 * 
(0.006) (0,005) (0005) 
In denk, * In sdrkt 0.014 * 0.005 * 0.0u t 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.002) 
In knIk * In sdrk, 0.015 0.011 0.009 
(0.009) (UM) (U007) 
0.049 t 0.109 t 0.061 t 0.063 t cpreSk(-) 
(0.023) (0.034) (0.021) (0.0--0) 
tbapresk, -i -0.035 
t -0.037 -0.042 -0.044 
(0.016) (0.042) (UO 14) (0.013) 
Control for EndogeneitN YES YES NO NO 
Second-Order Terms YES NO YES YES 
2 LR X Statistic 462.001 401.85 
460.25" 45 1.11 + + 
# Predicted =0/# Actual =0 673/719 673/719 683'719 685,719 
# Predicted =I/4 Actual =1 118/177 110/177 109/177 110/177 
Lave-Efron Pseudo-R2 0.493 0.453 U 14 0.507 
McKelvey-Zavoina Pseudo-R2 0.803 0.626 0.750 0.748 
N. Observations 896 896 896 896 
Noics. - i. marginal-effects reported: ii. standard errors in parentheses: iii. * means 
signýficant at 10%, f at 5% andl at 1% level: iv. city-spccýfic dummies not reporfed: 
v. colunin (4) reports estimated reducedform coqfficients (one-period lagged 
insiruments correspondent to the respective endogenous variables). 
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Now consider the other estimates presented in Table 2.4. Firstly, we have column (2). AGLS_. 
which reports results when endogeneity is controlled in the same way of column (1) but 
relevant misspecification is present in terms of omitted second-order effects. Secondly, X\e 
have column (3), which reports results when one does not control for endogeneity (standard 
probit), but makes use of the same variables set of column (1). And finally, column (4) 
presents a reduced-form model (RFM PROBIT) where all endogenous variables are 
substituted by their one-period tagged counterparts, with standard probit also being estimated, 
reduced-form models of entry decisions are also employed by Berry (1992) and Toivanen and 
Waterson (2001). 
The relative performance of estimators in columns (2), (3) and (4) of Table 2.4, with respect 
to column (1), can be better inspected if one analyses thefull effects of the variables denk, 
kMk and sdrkt on the probability of entry. In order to accomplish that, arc elasticities were 
extracted, that is, considering the effects of an arbitrary percentage change in each variable on 
the estimated probability; the elasticity was considered a better measure than the marginal 
effects as it is invariant to the unit of measure. Figures were calculated by making use of the 
formula (Pri -Pro)/O. 10, where PrI is the predicted probability with the explanatory variables at 
the sample mean, except for the one under analysis, which is increased by ten percent 
(represented by 0.10), and Pro is the predicted probability holding all variables at the sample 
mean 41 . It is important to emphasise that, as 
here we have a translog specification, which 
engenders interactions between terms, the elasticity of any variable always depends on the 
values of the other variables in the model. 
The resulting elasticities for each estimator are reported in Table 2.5: 
" in terms of the binary explanatory variables, cpreSkt-I and tbapreSkt-I were set equal to zero and the 
DCs were 
considered by extracting the average effect times two (as each route 
has two endpoint cities). 
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Table 2.5 - Estimated Elasticities 
(1) (2) (3) (4) RFM 
-1 ()-(1) (4)-( 1) Variable 
AGLS AGLS PROBIT PROBIT % % % 
denk, 0.151 0.1334 0.2 8 -3) 0.274 -11% 88% 82% 
kMk 0.061 0.198 0.194 0.157 22-% 220% 159% 
sdrkt 0.166 0.034 0.179 0.182 -79% -% /0% 
Notes: i. figures calculated at the sample mean: ii. calculated as a 10% 
increase in each variable at the mean, - iii. "all" means the qffect of a 10% 
change in all variables; iv. column (4) reports elasticities of the one-period 
lagged instruments correspondent to the respective endogenous variables: 
Figures in Table 2.5 are interpreted in the following way: if, for instance, denkt is increased by 
10%, the probability of entry (at the sample mean) is increased by 1.5%. By examining the 
differences (in percentage) between estimated elasticities across estimators, in Table 2.5, one 
can see that all alternative estimators of column (2), (3) and (4) present significant deviation 
from the results of the fully-specified and more efficient AGLS of column (1); in fact, this is 
in line with joint-significance tests of the second-order terms, and also with the exogeneity 
tests reported in Section 2.3, all supportive of the AGLS estimator. 
Also, by inspecting Table 2.5 one can infer that no single alternative estimator persistently 
outperforms the others and therefore failure to control for either endogeneity or second-order 
effects can severely damage the estimation results. Another comment is related to the bad 
performance of AGLS-, which serves as an illustration that the gains permitted by the 
instrumental variables estimator cannot overcome major problems of model's 
misspecification. 
Finally, let us analyse the impacts of the simultaneity bias, by comparing the elasticities 
implied by AGLS's and PROBIT's estimated coefficients. As expected, there seems to be a 
positive bias related to density (the difference between estimators is +88%), 
indicating that 
this variable is positively correlated -vvith the error term, and, as discussed 
before, this being 
probably due to new demand generation caused by LCC entry 
42 
. What 
is more, the positive 
simultaneity bias caused by not controlling for endogeneity of sdrkt 
(associated \\ ith the +7% 
against a 7.0% increase As mentioned in Section 1, routes entered by Gol had 1-1.1% 
increase in traffic densit. 
on all 500 top-routes, when comparing figures of 2002 (posterior to entr\ 
) with 2000 (prex ious to entr% 
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difference between elasticities) provides some evidence that LCC entry causes FSC presence 
to adjust upwards - and therefore providing basis for the re ection of the hypothesis of 
"crowd ing-out", which is consistent with Winston and Collins (I 992)'s results of an increase 
in 25% of incumbents' seats offered in response to low cost airline entry. The last coefficient, 
kMk, has large positive difference between estimators (+220%); although flight distance is not 
per se an endogenous variable, its full effect measured by the elasticity presented in Table 2.5 
is formed by endogenous variables, namely, the second-order terms In denkt *In kMk and In 
kMk * In sdrkt. On account of these interactions, one would expect that, ceteris paribus, the 
true sensitivity of an additional kilometre to be lower in case of higher demand generation and 
higher presence of competitors - which is caused by the simultaneity bias of, respectivelv, 
43 denkt and sdrkt . 
I now turn to the analysis of the signs and magnitudes of the estimated elasticities (the AGLS 
column). From Table 2.5 one can see that the elasticities of the original, not log-transformed, 
variables denkt, kMk, and sdrkt were, respectively 0.151,0.061 and 0.166, all measured at the 
sample mean. Apart from the results of denkt, which can be naturally thought of having 
positive overall effects - that is, the more is a given route's density of traffic the more it is 
attractive for LCC entry -, special attention is required with respect to the analysis of the 
effects of kMk, and sdrkt. 
Firstly, we have an overall positive elasticity of sdrkt, considering everything else held 
constant at the sample mean. The immediate conclusion implied by this result is that the 
higher is the presence of the FSC competitors in terms of seats available on direct flights (per 
route passenger) the higher is the propensity to enter of Go]; in other words, the more is the 
market underserved by direct FSC supply the less is the entry probability. 
On the one hand, one could interpret this finding as an indication that Gol does not follow the 
typical LCC practice of avoiding market contact with the legacy carriers but, quite the 
opposite, prefers behaving like a follower. learning from the others' past entry decisions first, 
and then making her own route choices. The "learning" argument is in line \N ith the results of 
43 One has to be cautious with those arguments, ho\\e\, er, as here we have onlý the difference beMeen the 
estimated effects, and not the real simultaneity bias. The difference 
between the results of the estimator is 
indicative of the problems engendered h\ not controlling for the endo-eneit\ of the regressors, 
however. 
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Toinaven and Waterson (2001): "Structural form estimations shou, that the posi . ti . ve effect of 
rival presence on the probability of entry is due to firm learning: rival presence increases the 
estimate of the size of the market". Also, this would be clearly suggestive that route presence 
is a good indicator of underlying profitability, in opposition to Evans and Kessides (1993). 
which found evidence only for airport presence effects in the US market. 
On the other hand, however, one could have the "market niche" argument of the LCC's: by 
positioning herself close to well-served direct markets, Gol is able to detect market 
opportunities once not perceived by the FSC's; this is specially true if one observe that. 
contrary to both SWP and JBP, and as discussed before, Go] provides a wider range of origin- 
and-destination products with stops and flight connections, and therefore placing in the 
market as the low fare alternative for less time-sensitive passengers. 
Table 2.6 below presents a disaggregation of the elasticity of sdrkt with respect to own values 
of that variable, with both denkt and kMk held constant; one can observe decreasing but always 
positive elasticity figures, which means that a point of probability maximisation is reached at 
higher levels of sdrkt. This pattern confirms that Gol has lower preference for creating new 
markets or entering underserved routes, contrary to the SWP: 
Table 2.6 - Sdrk, Disaggregated Elasticities (1) 
sdrkt 1 0.70 1.00 1.50 3.00 6.00 10.00 
Elasticityl 0.82 0.66 0.45 0.14 0.02 0.00 
Notes: i. figwres calculated holding kMk and denk, at the 
sample mean: ii. calculated as a 10% increase in each variable 
at the mean: iii. values of sdrk, are representative of the 
following percentiles: 0.35,0.50,0.65,0.80,0.90 and 0.95ý 
Table 2.7 presents another disaggregation of the elasticity of sdrkt, with respect to kilometres 
and density, this time holding sdrkt constant at the mean: 
Table 2.7 - 
Sdrikt Disaggregated Elasticities (2) 
km k 
den ki ý 
350 500 750 1,150 1,850 2,250 2,600 
1,000 2.32 2.31 2.26 2.21 2.20 2.22 2.24 
3,000 2.55 2.36 2.15 1.98 1.89 1.88 1.90 
6,000 2.40 2.11 1.83 1.62 1.51 1.50 1.51 
15,000 1.85 1.50 1.20 0.99 0.89 0.88 0.90 
50,000 0.80 0.53 0.35 0.25 0.21 0.22 0.23 
150,000 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
300,0001 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: i. figures calculated holding sdrk, at the sample mean: 
ii. calculated as a 10 % increase in each variable at the mean; iii. 
values are representative of the following percentiles: 0.20,0.35, 
0.50,0.65,0.80,0.90 and 0.95. 
Undoubtedly, Table 2.7 is quite useful in permitting a detailed analysis of Gol's route choice 
preferences regarding opponents' presence. Actually, it is possible to observe two regimes: 
one, for the great majority of the routes, of ever positive elasticities - for routes with density 
below 150,000 pax/year-, and one with elasticities that are almost null - associated with very 
high density routes, above 150,000 pax/year. This probably means that opponent's presence is 
a good indicator of underlying profitability for low-to-medium sized markets (in terms of 
density of traffic) but it is irrelevant for high-sized ones. In other words: actual market size is 
much more observable for the newcomer the higher is traffic density, and for routes in which 
traffic is rather thin, opponents' presence becomes a better signal for entry. 
To sum up on the effects of sdrkt, one has, contrary to traditional Industrial Organisation 
literature, that rival's market presence does not inhibit entry but, on the contrary. is used as a 
warning sign for underlying profitability (mainly in markets with lower size). This is 
consistent with the results of Toivanen and Waterson (2001) which unveiled learning 
processes regarding entry 44 . 
There are three explanations for these results: first, as Brazil's 
very high interest rates are well-known for increasing the risk of enterprise, firms usually 
44 In the present case, one could think of Gol learning from the FSC's previous entry decisions, that is, from the 
number of direct seats available, in order to infer the amount of business traffic on a given route, which is 
usually associated more with direct flights. 
prefer not taking additional risk of venturing to create new markets-, second. the airline market 
all over the world has been highly volatile and uncertain in the past few years: and third, as 
regulators were stimulating entry and forcing entry barrier to vanish, it was relatively easy for 
Gol to enter the same markets of her opponents and, what is more, without much competitive 
disadvantage in terms of slots, access to airport facilities, etc. 
The other result that needs to be carefully addressed is related to the marginal effects of kMk. 
A more detailed analysis of this variable is not only essential for a proper understanding of the 
model's most relevant outcomes but also for performing an analysis of Gol's consistency Ný Ith 
either SWP or JBP, detailed in Section 2.1. The positive elasticity of flight haul, presented in 
Table 2.5, does not reveal much as it is a rather aggregate figure, measured at the sample 
mean; once again, one useful alternative is to extract the same measure for a broader set of 
combinations of density and flight-haul values: 
Table 2.8 - Disaggregated Elasticities of kMk 
350 500 750 1,150 1,850 2,250 2,600 
den 
1,000 15.59 10.05 6.16 3.62 1.83 1.28 0.92 
3,000 9.22 5.90 3.54 1.99 0.90 0.56 0.33 
6,000 6.28 3.95 2.30 1.24 0.49 0.26 0.10 
15,000 3.39 2.02 1.09 0.53 0.16 0.04 -0.04 
50,000 1.00 0.50 0.22 0.08 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 
150,000 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0-01 
300,000 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Votes: i. figures calculated holding sdrk, at the sample mean, - ii. calculated as a 
0% increase in each variable at the mean: iii. values are representative of the 
. 
following percentiles: 0.20,0.35,0.50,0.65,0.80,0.90 and 0.95. 
As one can see in Table 2.8, Gol's propensity to enter a route is marked by diminishing 
returns of both flight-haul and density. Again, one can observe two regimes: first, for routes 
Nvith traffic density values up to approximately 50,000 pax/year. where distance has an ever 
increase effect on entry (in the direction of a point of maximisation), probablý meaning that 
Gol is willing to substitute density by kilometres since she is able to force passengers to ha\ e 
stops or to flight connect, this seerns to be in line N\ ith a modified version of the JBP. And 
second, for routes N\ith very thick density (higher than 50,000 pax/year), flight haul has no 
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influence on entry; this is the outcome of the same factors affecting the elasticities of sdrkt on 
the same set of routes, as seen above - that is, for those routes, density is a clearer indicator of 
profitability than distance. 
One would claim, however, that Gol changed operational standards from 2002 on. as 
discussed in 2.2, and probably started to enter a broader range of markets, especiallý N\ith 
respect to long-haul routes and flight connections. This might be due to the opportunities 
presented by some events of 2001, such as the exit of Transbrasil Airlines, the barriers to 
expansion at Sdo Paulo, the DAC's authorisation to operate Rio de Janeiro's city-centre 
airport, and the fiercer incumbents' reactions on short-haul routes (see Chapter 3). 
If the above argument is correct, however, the aggregated 2001-2002 regressions of Table 2.4 
would present a rather "average" entry behaviour, and disaggregation with respect to time 
would then be required. In order to perform that, variables In kMk, (In kMk)2, In denkt * In kMk 
and In kMk * In sdrkt were multiplied by a dummy representative of the year 2002 (02), in 
order to test for possible structural change from that year on, thus the following variables 
were generated: In kMk * d02, (In kMk)2 * d02, In denkt * In kMk * d02 and In kMk * In sdrkt * 
d02. Table 2.9 reports the results for the same AGLS estimates but with those variables 
included: 
Table 2.9 - Estimation Results Disaggregated by Year 
PR [ENTRY =1 
Dependent Variable 
AGLS 
In denkL 0.067 
(0.038) 
(In denkt) 2 0.004 
(0ý004) 
In kmk. 0.525 
(0.222) 
(in knik) 2 -0.039 
(0,016) 
In sdrk, -0.157 
(0.073) 
(in sdrk-, ) 2 0.011 
(0.005) 
In denk, * In k-mkt -0.011 * 
(0.006) 
In krnk * In sdrk-, 0.012 
(0.009) 
In denk, * In sdrkt 0.013 
(0.006) 
In kMk * d02 -0.050 
(0.031) 
(In knik )2 * d02 0.007 
(0.004) 
In denk, * In k-Mk * d02 0.001 
g001) 
In krnk. * In sdrk, * d02 0.000 
(0.001) 
cpresk, -I 
0.008 
(0.034) 
tbapresk., 
-, 
-0.033 t 
(0.016) 
LR X2 Statistic 468.36 1 
Predicted =0/ Actual =0 670/719 
Predicted =I/ Actual =1 119/177 
Lave-Efron Pseudo-R2 0.504 
McKelvey-Zavoina Pseudo-R2 0.810 
N. Observations 896 
Noles: 1. inarginal-effects reported: ii. standard errors in 
parentheses: iii. * means significant at 10%, t at 5% and t at I% 
level: iv. city-specific dummies not reported 
Bv makincy use of the results of Table 2.9, it is possible to compare the elasticities of 
kMk 
Ib 
across flight distance and route density disaggregated by'vear, in order to inspect hoxý Gol's 
sensitivity to kilometres changed from 2001 to 2002. Tables 2.10 and 2.11 report the results: 
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Table 2.10 - Disaggregated Elasticities of kMk - 2001 
km k 
den ki ý 
350 500 750 1,150 1,850 2,250 2,600 
1,000 11.09 6.81 3.83 1.85 0.32 -0.21 -0.58 
3,000 6.65 4.02 2.17 0.92 -0.09 -0.47 -0.1-5 
6,000 4.52 2.67 1.37 0.51 -0.21 -0.51 -0. -3 
15,000 2.37 1.31 0.61 0.16 -0.24 -0.43 -0.58 
50,000 0.61 0.28 0.10 0.00 -0.11 -0.18 -0.25 
150,000 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 
300,000 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
Table 2.11 - Disaggregated Elasticities of kMk - 2002 
Mk 350 500 750 1,150 1,850 2,250 2,600 
den ki 
1,000 23.02 14.55 8.83 5.26 2.87 2.117 1.73 
3,000 13.98 8.84 5.31 3.08 1.59 1.16 0.89 
6,000 9.76 6.10 3.58 2.01 0.98 0.69 0.50 
15,000 5.54 3.32 1.82 0.94 0.41 0.26 0.17 
50,000 1.90 0.96 0.42 0.17 0.05 0.03 0.01 
150,000 0.29 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
300,0001 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: i. figures calculated holding sdrk, at the sample mean, - ii. 
calculated as a 10% increase in each variable at the mean: iii. 
values are representative of thefollowing percentiles: 0.20, 
0.35,0.50,0.65,0.80,0.90 and 0.95. 
Firstly, with Table 2.10 one can assess Gol's entry strategy in her start-up year. In this case a 
parabolic curve is clearly observed, meaning that the highest probability of entry is located 
within 1,150 and 1,850 kilometres for most cases. this could be associated with the SWp45. 
On the other hand, in Table 2.11, the estimates for 2002 resulted in an ever-positive flight- 
haul elasticities for any route density lower than 150,000 pax/year, and this is certainly more 
in line with JBP. Therefore N\e have that a pattern of entry that was in accordance with the 
4ý in comparison, the average stage lenath of Southwest Airlines in 2003 xNas approximatel\ 1160 kilometres 
(source: Southwest Airlines Annual Reports). 
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SWP, observed in 2001. seems to be replaced by a propensity to enter a more diversified set 
of routes, and thus also considering high flight sectors in 2002 (JBP). In both cases, however. 
a set of almost null elasticities for thick-density routes was observed. 
The aforesaid findings noticeably reject the notion that Gol follows a pure standard of 
operations like the SWP or the JBP, but, consistent with recent trend in the LCC se(_, ment. 
preferred to develop a more diversified portfolio of markets. Some evidence is found, 
however, that, for a great deal of medium-sized markets, Gol behaved more consistentlý with 
the SWP, but this was limited to her first year of operations; in contrast, there is unambiguous 
evidence that she accomplished a deviation towards a more JBP-like standard of operations, 
implemented since 2002. 
Two caveats must be considered with respect to the abovementioned results on flight distance: 
firstly, as discussed before, country idiosyncrasies (for example, unobserved economies of 
scope) probably influenced Gol in the strategic decision of not to focus only on non-stop short 
flight markets, but to put into practice a modified version of JBP - that is, also considering 
long-haul markets but with many stops and connections. Also, it is important to emphasise 
that, from 2002 on, Gol's pace of expansion made her the third biggest domestic airline; it is 
no surprise, therefore, that her entry behaviour became more similar to the incumbent majors 
as she started to enter every single dense route across the country, irrespective of other market 
attributes, such as flight haul or rival's presence. Once the decision of rapid expansion was 
taken it actually made the the airline path-dependent, which can potentially undermine her 
LCC attributes and cost advantage. 
2.5 Conclusions 
This paper aimed at developing an empirical model for the analysis of entry decisions of Gol 
Airlines, the first low cost carrier in Latin America. By making use of Amerniva's 
Generalised Least Squares (AGLS) it was possible to estimate a route-choice model 
associated Nvith a flexible post-entry equilibrium profits equation, and in which some of the 
regressors Nvere treated as endogenous. Z: ) 
Results revealed market size and rival's route presence to be relevant indicators of underlý ing 
determinants of profitability. The consistew of Gol's decision making \\ith the pattern of 
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entry classically established by Southwest Airlines - with stronger preference for dense and 
short-haul routes - was investigated and was not rejected for the start-up year (1001). 
Unambiguous evidence was found, however, that Gol deviated from this paradigm toý\ards a 
standard of operations more in accordance with the JetBlue Airways' paradigm (higher 
average stage length), in 2002, when compared to 2001. This tendencY engendered 
diversification of portfolio of routes, instead of specialisation in one single business approach. 
The main reason for that deviation is associated with country idiosyncrasies like unobserved 
economies of scope, which probably influenced Gol in the strategic decision of not to focus 
only on non-stop short flight sector markets, but to put into practice a modified version of JBP 
- that is, considering long-haul markets but with many stops and connections. 
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Appendix 2.1 - Additional Statistics 
Table 2.12 - Matrix of Correlations of Variables 
Variable In denkt In sdrkt 
2 
(in denkt) 
2 
(In sdrkt) 
In denkt 
*In kMk 
In denkt 
*In sdrkt 
In knik 
*In sdrkt 
In denkt 1.000 
In sdrk, 0.422 1.000 
(In denkt) 
2 0.3' 74 -0.177 1.000 
(in sdrkt )2 0.206 0.9 43 -0.287 1.000 
In denktln knlk 0.992 0.420 0.375 0.208 1.000 
In denktln sdrkt 0.847 0.310 0.630 0.083 0.844 1.000 
In kMk*ln sdrý, 0.412 0.9 73 -0.168 0.933 0.427 0.321 1.000 
In kMk 0.074 -0.003 -0.059 0.061 0.131 0.058 0.194 
(In kMk )2 0.067 -0.002 -0.064 0.066 0.124 0.052 0.194 
In denkt-] 0.795 0.282 0.497 0.104 0.787 0.763 0.270 
(In denkt-, )2 0.568 -0.018 0.862 -0.154 0.566 0.700 -0.019 
In sdrkt-1 0.246 0.7 34 -0.079 0.695 0.246 0.275 0.729 
(in sdrkt-1) 2 0.083 0.658 -0.189 0.698 0.085 0.102 0.673 
In denkt-lln krnk 0.788 0.277 0.497 0.103 0.795 0.762 0.285 
In denkt-, *In sdt'kt-1 0.762 0.347 0.602 0.156 0.762 0.865 0.140 
In kmk*ln sdrkt-, 0.244 0.717 -0.079 0.694 0.259 0.280 0.763 
In seatsk, -I 
0.125 -0.425 0.383 -0.371 0.131 0.184 -0.379 
In swekt-1 0.667 0.596 0.427 0.460 0.667 0.762 0.604 
In asZkt-1 0.289 0.017 0.315 0.073 03309 0396 0.118 
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Table 2.13 - Hypothesis Tests - AG LS Model 
Test Description HO Statistic P-Value 
Endogeneity Smith-Blundell Test (1986) 
All explanatoty variables 15.49 0.03 
are exogenous 
Heteroskedasticity 
Likelihood-ratiolMaximum- 
Homoskedasticity 1.23 0. -ý likelihood heteroskedastic Probit 
Relevance of Partial R-squared of excluded 0.55 
instruments (test of instruments (min) 
correlation with 
included endogenous F Test of excluded instruments - Instruments are not relevant 105.20 0.00 
variable) joint significance (min) 
Validity of Sargan Test 
Instruments are orthogonal 1.87 0.60 Instruments to the error 
(overidentification/ort 
hogonality test of all Bassman Test 
Instruments are orthogonal 1.82 0.61 
instruments) to the error 
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3. Localised Competitive Advantage and Price Reactions 
to Low-Cost Carrier Entry 
3.1 Introduction 
Competition between rapidly expanding low cost carriers (LCC) and traditional network full- 
service carriers (FSC) has recently become one of the most significant issues regarding the 
airline industry. Although basically a phenomenon of fully or partially liberalised markets - 
and thus dating back to the US deregulation process of the 1970s -, it was only recently, 
however, that the LCC segment won recognition as a relevant and distinct business strategy as 
well as profitable market niche. Following the successful paradigm of the pioneer Southwest 
Airlines, in the United States, airlines such as Ryanair and EasYJet, in Europe, flourished in 
the market, and soon the concept has spread worldwide. Moreover, this segment is expected 
to expand considerably within the next few years, and this has undoubtedly been forcing 
legacy carriers to respond progressively -a movement that is shaping the frontiers of 
competition in the industry. 
This paper aims at empirically investigating the entry of the Brazilian LCC Gol Airlines, in 
the domestic market, in 2001, by focusing on the price reactions by the major FSC 
incumbents. Following Evans and Kessides (1993), here I make use of an empirical approach 
that makes possible to uncover the determinants of pricing power in the industry ("localised 
competitive advantage"), a feature regarded as a precondition for pinpointing the airlines' 
patterns of behaviour with respect to de novo entry and also for better understanding 
competition in a recently liberalised airline market. 
Early contributions to the literature on entry focusing on airlines are Berry (1992), Whinston 
and Collins (1992) and Joskow, Werden and Johnson (1994). With respect to airline pricing 
behaviour, Evans and Kessides (1993) report several studies investigating post-US 
liberalisation conditions, which they classified into two different phases: the first-generation 
papers, with the methodology of inferring the effects of market structure variables on prices 
frorn cross-sectional variation over routes ("inter-routes" investigation). as 
in Baile\ and 
Panzar (1981) and Hurdel et al. (1989); and the second-generation papers. airning at 
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accounting for firm heterogeneity within a route ("intra-route" investigation), as in Borenstein 
(1989) and Berry (1990). 
Commonly, studies in both phases targeted testing the contestability theory and arrived at the 
conclusion that local market structure matters in the airline industry, and then variables like 
concentration levels have significant effect on prices. What is more, second-generation studies 
provided evidence for the significance of market share measures as determinants of within- 
route competitive advantage, and therefore called attention to the consequences of dominance: 
"consumers are willing to pay a premium for the services of the dominant airline [at an 
airport]" (Berry, 1990). In fact, those studies usually found relevance for both sorts of 
measures, market share and concentration, and thus conciliating different 10 tradition S46. 
In contrast to the consensus of the relevance of considering firm-specific disaggregation in 
pricing analysis, debate was established on at which level structure affects performance in this 
industry: either if at the route or at the airport level. Evans and Kessides (1993), for example, 
argue that, due to linear route system replacement by hub-and-spoke strategies, the 
increasingly control of airport facilities by fewer airlines, the advent of frequent-flyer 
programmes and the usage of travel agent commission overrides, "the bulk of any deviation 
from competitiveness in the airline industry is (now) associated with airport characteristics 
rather than with the structure of routes , 47. By making use of route-specific fixed-effects, they 
found only airport market share effects as statistically significant for the US domestic market, 
contrary to the results of Borenstein (1989). 
More recently, there have been some few studies on the specific subject of pricing behaviour 
in response to LCC entry: firstly, Dresner, Lin and Windle (1996). which found significant 
spillover impacts of LCC entry onto other competitive routes, as on other routes at the same 
airport and on routes at airports in close proximity to where entry occurred; this analysis Nýas 
performed by inspecting, among others, the entry of Southwest Airlines into the Baltimore- 
Washington International Airport, in 1993. Secondly, Windle and Dresner (1999) investigated 
the impacts of entry bý ValuJet into Delta Airline's hub, Atlanta, and refuted the US DOT's 
46 Slade (2004b) provides a detailed discussion of the "market share" and "market structure" models \ýithm the 
Industrial Organisation. 
. 17 Levine ( 1987) is one of the most influential papers on this issue. 
63 
claim that the latter increased fares on non-competitive routes to compensate for lost revenues 
on the competitive routes. And finally, Morrison (2001) examined the total extent of 
Southwest's influence on competition, by investigating its impacts with actual, adjacent and 
potential route presence, on other carriers' fares in 1998, obtaining a result of 20 per cent of 
US airline industry's domestic schedule passenger revenue for that year. 
This paper estimates a pricing equation to investigate the effects of LCC entry, in the same 
way of its predecessors. There are some crucial distinctions, however. Firstly, it promotes a 
previous analysis of the sources of the incumbents' competitive advantage - in terms of the 
determinants of pricing power -, which is certainly relevant for understanding the patterns of 
price reactions; as Evans and Kessides (1993), here it is possible to draw inference on the 
location of competition (whether at the airport or the route level, or both) and therefore 
producing more evidence to the Borenstein-Evans and Kessides's debate. 
Secondly, as it is disaggregated at the firm-level, it explicitly deals with elements of product 
differentiation as significant determinants of entry and post-entry competition, and allows for 
heterogeneity due to both airlines' and routes' idiosyncrasies. And last but not least, by 
controlling for city-specific fixed-effects, it is in a position of accounting for the 
econometrician's unobservables that could affect incumbent's pricing behaviour between 
routes; this represents an extension of Evans and Kessides (1993)'s framework in order to 
permit identifying route-specific effects such as the impacts of LCC entry and constitutes the 
core of the paper. Actually the belief here is that the proposed methodology constitutes an 
improvement over previous literature precisely because it permits one to examine FSC's price 
reactions along with the three aforementioned issues using one single econometric 
frarnework. 
The paper is divided into four parts: firstly, in Section 3.2, it presents the background of the 
deregulation measures of the airline industry in Brazil and the characteristics of the newcomer 
in the market; secondly, one stylised fact about LCC positioning is presented in Section 3.3; 
then the empirical framework is detailed in Section 3.4 (methodological approach, data 
description and model specification), and estimation results are displayed and discussed in 
Section 3.5; finally, the conclusions are presented. 
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3.2 Background of the Deregulation Process and Entry 
The removal of regulatory barriers in the Brazilian airline industry since the early nineties had 
crucial role in the process that ultimately led to the entry of Gol, the first scheduled IoNN cost 
carrier in Latin America and to an unprecedented increase in degree of competitiveness in the 
sector. See Section 1.2 for an overview of process of liberalisation of the industry in Brazil. 
The LCC market niche is usually associated with the Soutliwest Airlines Paradigm (SWP), 
mainly because that airline pioneered this sort of operations, during the seventies, and because 
48 her standards are deliberately reproduced successfully around the world 
The most widely known characteristics of this paradigm, according to Silva and Espirito 
Santo Jr. (2003) are: fleet standard isation; simplification or elimination of in-flight service, 
use of less congestioned secondary airports; direct sales to consumers; ticketless or electronic 
tickets; dense, short-haul, point-to-point flights with no interlining or transfers, which means a 
simple network structure, with absent or weak feed to long-range flights; single-class cabin 
lay-out; simple or no frequent-flyer programme; high level of fleet utilisation; and highly 
motivated employees 49 . 
Moreover, LCC's are typically associated with a very aggressive 
pricing strategy, typically with the use of simplified fare structure with few or no restrictions, 
and low one-way fares 50 . 
The cost advantage obtained by Southwest Airlines emerged mainly from a very careful 
choice of markets, which usually makes it possible to focus on short-haul routes and on 
markets where it can have dominant market share, and to exploit economies due to higher 
seating density and higher aircraft utilisation. According Boguslaski, Ito and Lee (2003), 
Southwest has resulted in unit costs that are 28 to 51 per cent lower than the US major 
airlines, considering 2001 US DOT's unit cost figures. 
4' As the Chief Executive of Ryanair once said: " He went to look at Southwest. It was like the road to Damascus. 
This was the wai, to make Ryanair work" (Doganis, 200 1 
41) This description refers to what can be considered "classic" Southwest paradigm. One has to bear in mind, as we 
will see below, that Southwest's actual patterns of operations has had some changes recentlý: "its sit-ateg. 1- 
cvolved dut-ing the latter ha4f qf the decade to include a much more hetei-ogeneous mix of mat-kets, including a 
number of mai-kets it-hich wei-e both long-haid and siti-pi-isingly thin" (Boguslaski, Ito and Lee, 2003). 
50 Tretheway (2004) points out that the introduction of low one \\, ay fares ultimately served to undermine the 
abilit, \ of the FSC's to price discriminate, and not onk resulted in a considerable increase in competition 
but also 
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Go] Airlines was not only the first scheduled LCC of Brazil, but also within all Latin 
America, with operations started in January 2001 51 . Owned by Grupo 
Aurea, a conglomerate 
that owns 38 companies and a major operator of urban and long-distance coach services 
across Brazil, the airline was in a position of enhancing airport accessibility by setting 
counters at key airports for plane/coach connections and free bus transfers in selected cities. 
For additional characteristics of Gol airlines, see Section 2.2. 
It is important to emphasise, however, that the Brazilian airline industry is particularl. ", 
difficult for the implementation of typical LCC operations, mainly because of lack of 
secondary airports with required infrastructure: "There are no secondary airports near major 
Brazilian cities able to handle midsizejet operations (737s, A3201319, etc. )", report Silva and 
Espirito Santo Jr. (2003). What is more, the policy orientation followed by DAC since the 
First Round of Liberalisation was clearly to facilitate newcomers' entry in order to reduce 
entry barriers as much as possible. On account of that, and considering that the major 
Transbrasil Airlines started exiting the market in mid 2001, it was relatively straightforward 
for Gol to enter the same airports of its opponents, in direct competition with incumbents in 
virtually all situations. 
3.3 Reactions to Entry and An Stylised Fact About Low-Cost Carrier 
Positioning 
There are a number of ways incumbents can respond to LCC entry. Matching prices is the 
most commonly used but usually has undesirable outcome if employed without other strategic 
moves, for example, product differentiation: "Price competition with homogenous services 
triggers a vigorous price war and erodes the profits of operators. Therefore, taking entry as 
given, there exists a strong incentive for both the incumbent and the entrant to differentiate 
their product in order to recover some profits" (De Villerneur, Ivaldi and Pouyet, 2003). 
Besides that, differences in efficiency between newcomer and incumbents may be crucial in 
determining the ultimate post-entry result. Even reasonably assuming both product 
in an exposure of the problems associated with the FSC business model. 
51 Gol Airlines and U Air (Uruguay) are the onlN scheduled LCC's based in Latin America nowadaNs. Some 
North-A merican LCC's provide serN ice to 'Mexico and the Caribbean, such as JetsGo, Frontier and JetBlue. 
but 
do not ha\ e operational basis at the region (source: website lowcostairlines. or, -, ). 
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heterogeneity and efficiency gap between FSC's and LCCs, the sort of incumbents' reactions 
may still be determined by the degree of market segmentation and brand loyaltý. nemork 
structure, ability to commit to pre-entry strategy, newcomer's expected capacity. etc. 
Below is a list of possible incumbents' post-entry pricing decisions. Here I further assume 
there are two ma or demand segments, one with higher willingness to pay (business travellers) j 
and the other with lower willingness to pay (leisure travellers), and that there is some degree 
of interdependency among them. Therefore, in case of LCC's entry, FSC's may: 
a. Not to react in prices, keep existing fare structure 
b. React in prices, keep existing fare structure 
b. 1 Reduce prices for leisure travellers and maintain prices for business travellers 
b. 2 Reduce prices for leisure travellers and increase prices for business travellers 
b. 3 Reduce prices for both segments 
c. React in prices but migrate to a simplified fare structure or to single fare scheme 
The cases a, b. ] and b. 2 may be representative of markets with a very high participation of 
business travellers and in which the disutility associated with travelling with the LCC is high 
(higher degree of product differentiation). It may be more profitable for the incumbents, in 
these cases, to increase quality or to stimulate brand loyalty, either before or after entry 
(commitment, for example), and either with or without price changes. This may be 
performed, for example, via more flights - the "cut fares and add flights" response (see 
Whinston and Collins, 1992, for the entry of People Express in the eighties). Other actions 
may include more advantages to first-class or business-class flyers, better service, more and 
easier frequent-flyer upgrades, etc. 
b. I and b. 2 can be also representative of a situation in which the LCC is capacity constrained 
and there is strong demand segmentation. In this case, the FSC's may prefer price competition 
for leisure travellers (using some of the lo\\er fares available in their existing fare structure) in 
order to lead the LCC to ftill utilisation, specially during the peak time: this ultimately permits 
the FSC to restore the monopoly situation \\ ith respect to the business traveller segment (for 
example, last-minute purchases). increasing its average yields and profitabilitý. speciallý if 
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followed by increases in own capacity to also capture the new demand generated by the fare 
war. 
When the FSC's possess a well consolidated hub-and-spoke structure, the decision between 
"price react" and "not to price react" is also conditioned by potential network effects. For 
example, De Villemeur, Ivaldi and Pouyet (2003) emphasise that in this case not only the 
incumbents may have a substantial cost advantage over the potential entrants. but also a 
strategic advantage depending on the existence of substitutabilities and complementarities in 
the network. In fact,, entry on a given route (a "local market", part of a network) may have 
positive spillover effects on the connecting markets served by the incumbents: "By staying on 
the market where entry occurred, the incumbent engages in a vigorous price competition 
(which also erodes the profit of operators on this market). Since connecting services are 
complements due to the hub-spoke feature of the network the price competition increases the 
demand on the complementary markets" (De Villerneur, Ivaldi and Pouyet, 2003). 
Another strategic move of incumbents may be to reduce prices for both segments (b. 3), as 
mentioned by Alderighi et al. (2004). The authors interpret this reaction as being a direct 
consequence of the appeal of the LCC for business travellers, which engenders 
interdependence of both segments. In such cases, "pricing strategies on the business market 
and on the leisure market have to be coordinated'. One can observe that b. 2 is also an 
example of coordinated pricing strategies; in b. 3, however, the willingness-to-pay of business 
travellers is certainly lower. 
And finally, the incumbent can migrate from existing complex fare structure based on yield 
management techiques, which is typical of FSC's, to a policy of simplified pricing and 
discontinuation of fare restrictions. The most extreme example of this strategy is Bmi, \vhich 
in spring 2002 changed to a single fare scheme, removing all restrictions such as minimum 
stays, advance purchase, etc, to compete with newcomer LCC's (Donnelly, James and 
Binnion, 2004). 
In terms of non-price reactions, one can cite cost-cutting (for example, in 2004. United 
Airlines became the first to delay payment into its pension plans in other to restructure costs), 
enter bankruptcy (a very common move bý, players in the US - the so-called 
"Chapter I I", 
the bankruptcy-court protection N\hich alloN\s airlines to restructuring, its loans. 
leases and 
I- 
capital structure), or even to become a LCC or create a ne-w 
LCC subsidiary in the market: 
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Delta's Song, Brittish Airways's Go-fly are classic examples of LCC subsidiaries. 
A very important determinant of the patterns of reaction by incumbent is related to the LCC 
positioning in the market. In Chapter Two, I presented some paradigms for LCC operations 
and, as mentioned before, the classic benchmark is the SWP, these paradigms are 
representative of the way newcomers will place their service in the market and, above all. in 
which sort of markets they will enter. With the idea of paradigms one has also a notion of 
how LCC entry will affect existing FSC's and the sort of strategic movement that \\, ill emerge 
from this positioning. 
Here I make use of the SWP in terms of LCC positioning, and draw attention to two 
features 52 : 
1. the focus on short-haul operations; and 
2. the preference for underserved routes (Doganis, 2001) or routes in which she could 
have a dominant position. Dominance here is defined precisely in the same way as 
Borenstein (1991), that is, by considering airline market position (or "presence") in 
terms of market share measures either at the route or at the airport leve 153. 
As seen in Chapter 2, in 2001 Gol had a higher propensity to follow a pattern of entry in line 
with the SWP, but increased in diversification from 2002 on. Therefore, one knows ex-ante 
that for the period covered in this chapter (2001) the airline was more likely to be observed on 
shorter-haul (typical SWP) and well-served/dense routes (atypical), and that a broadening of 
the portfolio of markets of the LCC was in course. 
Another relevant issue is that there is no clear cut-off that divides either "short-haul" from 
"medium-to-long-haul" markets or "underserved" to "well-servedfo markets. However. 
continuous variables such as route flight distance and incumbents' market share are expected 
to influence the degree of perceived product differentiation between airlines as they determine 
52 As Windle and Dresner (1999) state: "Southwest . 4irlines 
focuses on short haul routes into underutifiled or 
secondaty airporis, and as a result qfIen does not direct4l, compete with established carriers". 
53 Borenstein ( 1991 ) measures dominance using different proxies and getting consistent results. He uses shares 
of passene-, ers, shares of aircraft departures, shares of seat-departures, and share of seat- miI e-departu res. The 17, latter is developed so as to "weight b'i- plane size and the avei-age si.: e ofpurchase (distance) made by eachfil-m', s 
cusloinei-s", and is the unit of measurement of dominance used in the empirical model here (see Section 4). 
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the attributes of each market. 
Given the above description, one can consider the problem of Gol's entry in the Brazilian 
airline industry as the following: suppose an entry situation where the newcomer has a 
differentiated product from the incumbents. Besides that, consider that the characteristics of 
markets (routes) entered condition the degree of product differentiation between LCC and 
FSC competitors. And finally, consider, as indicated above, that main variable route 
characteristics are flight distance and incumbents' presence (route dominance). This can be 
surnmarised by the stylised fact below: 
STYLISED FACT: The degree of product differentiation between the full service 
airlines (FSQ and the low cost carrier (LCC) is lower in short-distance routes and in 
less dominated routes. In these kinds of markets, the newcomer operates a "tipical" 
market niche, that is, as in the traditional Southwest Airlines way (LCCI). On the 
other hand, if the newcomer chooses to enter either rather dominated or longer 
distance routes, then the perceived degree ofproduct differentiation is higher (LCC'2). 
The intuition behind the stylised fact above is that there is lower competitive advantage to low 
cost operations in LCC2 markets, on account of two factors. Firstly, higher disutility of longer 
flight haul (because of LCCs lack of in-flight meals and lower leg space, for instance); 
actually, one evidence for that is the fact that airlines usually have a broader variety of in- 
flight frills in, for example, intercontinental flights from US and Europe, than for flights 
within either regions. Quality competition may then be much more apparent in longer-haul 
markets, whereas price competition is usually tougher in short-haul markets. 
And secondly, due to higher FSC presence, market entry is less effective due to lower levels 
of recognition by consumers (the "dominant-firm advantage" effect 54 , 
discussed in 
54 Berry (1990), for example, when describing airport dominance in the US market, states that "incumbent 
airlines are the major source qffinancingfor man ,v airports and 
therefore gait7 a large degree qf bureaucratic 
control over airport operations. This control mqv enable them to block the enttl- or expansion bY rh, als. Airlines 
irith a large presence in a given citjý also gain adi, atitagesftoni. freqitent, flj, ei- plans and nonlinear tral, el agent 
commission schedides". In terms of route dominance, as mentioned before, one can consider competiti%e 
advantage of large route presence coming from lower distance between flights (which appeals to business 
travellers) and therefore can be considered a prox) for higher service quality levels. The dominance effect can be 
regarded as one of the main reasons for Southwest's avoidance of head-on competition %\ ith incumbents in the 
United States. 
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Borenstein, 1991), in non-dominated routes. Also, in this situation the newcomer LCC is 
usually in disadvantage with respect to the number of flight frequencies, having as a 
consequence a relatively higher average period gap between flights (higher "schedule delay"). 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the abovementioned ideas in a scheme of horizontal product 
differentiation: 
Situation I- Short-Hau4 Lower FSC Presence 
FSCI LCCI 
Situation 2- Longer-Haul, Higher FSC Presence 
FSC2 LCC2 
+ 
Perceived Quality 
Figure 3.1 - Low-Cost Carrier Market Positioning 
In summary, as a LCC Gol is expected to enter markets with short-distance and not 
dominated by incumbents, as with the Southwest paradigm. In this sort of markets, it can be 
argued that either the disutility of travelling with LCC is lower or the competitive advantage 
of incumbents is lower. And thus the probability of Gol capturing a broader range of 
consumers (not only budget travellers) is higher, as the product is perceived to be less 
heterogeneous than the FSC's' (LCC, is therefore near FSCI, in Figure 3.1). 
On the other hand, product differentiation becomes more evident in both long haul and ýNell- 
served markets. In the first case, the longer flight time may be regarded as a disadvantage if 
passengers have lower in-flight CoMfOrt55: in the second case, one may find that route 
55 This is even more clear in the Brazilian case, in which Gol usualk offers 
flights NNith rnaný stops and/or 
connections, specialIN for Iong-haul routes. The disutlllt\ associated with the 
LCC is, therefore. higher on routes 
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presence by incumbents is sufficient enough to provide them with competitive advantage 
(with a higher distance between LCC2 and FSC2, in comparison to LCCI and FSCI). In both 
sorts of markets, it is expected to reactions to enter to be less tough. 
Once having stated the stylised fact above, one is able draw inference on price reactions to 
entry. Undoubtedly, one expects intensive incumbents' reactions in price follo\\ing LCC's 
entry, a fact extensively reported by literature; for instance, Whinston and Collins (1992) 
described a "dramatic fall of roughly 35% in the average price of incumbents on the 15 
markets entered by People Express in a given year [of the mid eighties in the US market]". 
However, one issue that remains to be investigated is how (and it) incumbents' responses to 
LCC's entry vary across routes, and what the determinants of such variation are. This issue 
can be illustrated by having a brief inspection on data available, in the light of the stylised 
fact. For example, by isolating short from medium and long-haul routes, one is able to 
investigate whether there is uniformity of price reactions across routes. 
Table 3.1 permits having a general idea on the matter, comparing the average yields on routes 
entered with routes not entered by Gol within the same flight-distance classification. "Yield" 
is defined here as total operating revenues divided by the multiplication of total revenue 
56 
passengers and kilometres flown 
Nvith higher flight sector. 
56 Note that whereas N ields are defined on per-kilometre basis, the average price is defined on a per-passenger 
basis. 
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Table 3.1 - Impacts of Entry under Alternative Route Classification5- 
Classification Cut-Off (Km) N 
Average Yield 
Diff. % 
Entry =0 Entrv =I 
Short Haul 0-500 42 0.609 0.386 -33 70 o 
Medium/Long Haul 501- 72 0.3 ) 71 0.304 -1 V/0 
Short Haul 0-600 52 0.576 0.380 -. 33 40o 
Medium/Long Haul 601- 62 0.33 63 0.296 -1800 
Short Haul 0-700 62 0.565 0.367 -35% 
Medium/Long Haul 701- 52 0.347 0.288 -17% 
Short Haut 0-800 70 0.542 0.365 -3' 3 
Medium/Long Haul 801- 44 0.333 0.284 - 15`0 
Short Haul 0-900 84 3 0.51) 0.355 -, 10 )0 
Medium/Long Haul 901- 30 03 24 0.274 -16% 
As one can infer from Table 3.1, the price reactions caused by entry (measured by the 
percentage difference in incumbents' "Average Yield") were much tougher in short-haul 
routes (that is, higher than 30%) than on medium-to-long-haul routes (below 20%). This is 
robust to alternative route classification with respect to distance (cut-offs of 500,600,700, 
800 and 900 km). 
The present paper approaches this issue by considering product characteristics and market 
niche positioning as a possible explanation for this sort of variation in incumbents' intensity of 
response. One can expect the patterns of both entry and reactions to entry to be determined by 
the degree of perceived product differentiation by the newcomer airline. This issue of entry 
and product differentiation is empirically inspected by analysing the actual patterns of price 
reactions of incumbents in some selected city-pairs in the domestic airline market. 
Data supplied bv DAC, as will be detailed in Section 3.4. Unfortunatek, 
data not disaggregated b\ fare class 
and therefore it is not possible to pinpoint different patterns of price reactions 
for business and leisure segments. 
3.4 Empirical Analysis 
3.4.1 The Methodology 
Following Evans and Kessides (1993), airline pricing studies can be classified into the 
following categories: first, the inter-routes analysis, in which data is disaggregated at the 
route level, and usually a cross-section of routes is considered; market-level variables such as 
flight distance, number of airlines, concentration, route presence of LCC's, presence of LCC 
on adjacent routes, etc. are used in order to estimate an average price equation. Examples in 
the literature being Dresner, Lin and Windle (1996) and Morrison (200 1), among others. 
And second, the intra-routes analysis, in which data is disaggregated at the airline level. 
carrier-specific characteristics such as route market share, airport market share and network 
size out of an airport, percentage of seats in direct or round-trip flights, etc., are used to 
control for effects of heterogeneity among firms in the market. Examples being Borenstein 
(1989), Berry (1990) and Evans and Kessides (1993). 
The methodology I follow here is an intra-routes analysis of the pricing decisions of FSC 
incumbents in response to Gol Airlines' entry in the Brazilian airline industry. In order to do 
so, the basic framework considered here is the fixed effects procedure of Evans and Kessides 
(1993 )58. In their study, Evans and Kessides control for inter-route heterogeneity in price by 
having individual route effects, a procedure that can be implemented in a very straightforward 
way by, for example, employing the least-squares dummy variables (LSDV) estimator with 
route-specific dummies. These dummies ultimately serve to "controlfor ( .. ) omitted route- 
specific variables that can significantly bias the parameters estimates of the price equation" 
(Evans and Kessides, 1993). Their econometric framework can be summarised by the 
following pricing relation: 
In (price,, j = X, 6+ ikt (7) 
58 In their words, "ire note that most ofthe sample vailation in price is 
due to diftei-ences tit the mitte level that 
ai-c unineasiti-e, I and invailant to a cai-Het-'s identiti 
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where priceikt is the average price of airline i on route k and time t (see the empirical 
definition in 3.4.3), Xikt is a vector of variables that are airline, route and time specific. Vk are 
route-specific effects, and F- i kt are the disturbances, whereas P is the parameter vector of 
interest. 
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that the econometric procedure described above is 
subject to a major limitation with respect to the identification of variables that do not have 
within-route variation, such as concentration level and LCC presence, the latter a major issue 
in the present paper. In order to overcome this problem, without disposing of the controls for 
heterogeneity across routes, the authors also make use of a random-effects model, and then 
estimate the following model: 
f In (price,, j -X, 'Il 18 + Zkt + Vk + Eikt (8) 
whereZkt is a vector of variables that are route-specific and 7 is the associated parameter 
vector. This procedure is not immune to criticism, however, as the main hypothesis of this 
approach is that route effectsVk are not correlated with X and Z59 - otherwise estimates of P 
and 7 will be biased. In fact, when testing for such correlation by making use of the Hausman 
test of the equivalence between fixed and random effects, they thoroughly rejected the no- 
correlation hypothesis. This caused severe problems of inference with respect to route- 
specific variables, potentially making their framework inappropriate for investigating the 
impacts of LCC entry, the ultimate goal here. 
Fortunately, it is possible to devise an econometric procedure that overcomes this problem 
without completely abandoning the core idea of the analysis of Evans and Kessides (199i 
which aims at the control of most of route-specific idiosyncrasies. Here I propose controllill" tý 
for the effects of route origin and destination cities (CFE), instead of controlling for roLite- 
specific effects (RFE). Therefore, for each city k there will be two effects to be controlled - 
one for the city-of-origin k, (Vkj) and another for the city-of-destination k-, (Vk2): 
sim, el't' as oil airli ' 5Q This assumption is likely to be invalid; for example, unobserved advertil C 111C S PFICIIII-I Illight 
be correlated with the presence of LCC, or the unobserved premium due to a higher proportion of busine.,, N 
travellers might be correlated with the proportion of non-stop flights, etc. 
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In (price I ikt Aýfktfl + Zkr 7+ Vk I+ Vk2 + '6ýkt 
By following the above procedure, one is able to control for unobservable effects at both the 
origin and destination endpoint cities, which can be done by city dummies - these provide an 
economical way to capture and control for a large number of truly significant variables, X\hich 
can be regarded as being actually city-specific, instead of route-specific-, also, most of them 
are in fact unobservables (from the point of view of the researcher). See Section 2.3.2 for a 
list of some of the effects that may be controlled by the city dummies. 
Most of these effects are expected to generate persistent heterogeneity in the error structure 
across cities, which can be controlled via the city-specific dummies. Besides that, and 
provided that each city possesses at least one route (and ideally groups a reasonable deal of 
routes), it has the advantage of permitting the identification of the subset of variables that do 
not vary within routes, and particularly the presence of the LCC. Another advantage is that it 
is not necessary to rely on the hypothesis of no-correlation between X and Z and the route 
effects, as with the random effects mode 160. 
3.4.2 Data Discussion 
The data sample used here was collected from published and non-published data 
disaggregated by airline at the directional city-pair leve 161 . Kindly supplied by Brazil's 
Department of Civil Aviation (DAC), the sample consists of airline-specific data for 82 city- 
60 One point must be emphasised, however: although the proposal of controlling for the effects of groups of 
routes (endpoint cities) instead of individual route effects can be thought as permitting a consistent estimation 
under the LSDV approach, further investigation into the asymptotic properties of this particular setting are still 
required. Asymptotically, if the number of routes, k, goes to infinity, the number of cities tends to increase at a 
lower rate, which might confirm its properties. Moreover, as it will be pointed out in next section, as the number 
of airlines per route in the data sample is notably low (the average is between 2 and 3 airlines per route), one 
would think as a reasonable procedure to control for groups of routes instead, in order to increase the statistical 
significance of estimates (the average number of routes per city is between 8 and 9). 
61 In the sense that flights going from A to B are treated differently as the ones from B to A. Evans and Kessides 
(1993) also use the citý-pair definition of a route; in contrast, Morrison (2001) implements an analysis 
disaggre 
i gated at 
the airport-pair leý el. in order to capture the effect of "adjacent" route presence. Berry, Carnall 
and Spiller (1996), Evans and Kessides (1993) and Borenstein (1989) use directional markets also makes use the 
assumption of directional markets, on the other hand, Ito and Lee (2003b) and Richard (2003) use non- 
directional markets. 
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pairs over October and November 2001 (all information is monthly supplied from all 
scheduled airlines to DAC according to specific legislation within the country). This sample is 
representative of 76 out of the country's 100 densest airport-pairs 62 , and accounts for 61% of 
total regular domestic air traffic in Brazil. Final sample size consists of 408 observations, for 
an average number of airlines between two and three per route. 
The dataset corresponds almost entirely to the selection present in DAC's Average Yield of 
Monitored Airport-Pairs Report. Although data in this report is unique in a sense that there 
is no other more accurate source of information on yields in the Brazilian airline industry, this 
dataset contains at least three major problems: in terms of potential selection bias, there can 
be concerns regarding the period involved and the choice of routes; and in terms of data 
reliability, there is a principal-agent problem. 
Firstly, one could argue that the subsequent months after the events of September H, 200 1, 
could not be representative of typical airline activities. Notably, this could be a major problem 
if the dataset consisted of international routes, which were more subject to the structural 
change in economic conditions of the occasion; however, DAC's dataset is formed only by 
domestic airport-pairs, which served to minimise problems of abnormal interference in 
demand and cost conditions. This can be illustrated by inspecting traffic figures in DAC's 
2001 Statistical Yearbook: in the fourth quarter of 2001, there were 6,982 million domestic 
pax-km against an average of 6,909 million in the first three quarters of that year, which 
clearly indicates that the industry was operating as usual during the period 63 . 
Secondly, it would be possible to indicate the relevant problem of route choice, as the sample 
does not consist of a complete set of densest airport-pairs. On the contrary, it is formed by a 
selection of routes sampled from a broader population of routes. When conducting the final 
process of liberalisation, in 2001, DAC selected a set of 126 airport-pairs in order to monitor 
airline's pricing behaviour. this set was chosen by using a mix of strategic, geographic, and 
econornic criteria, rather than one homogeneous criterion of relevance such as density. and 
ultimately comprised the Average Yield of Monitored Airport-Pairs Report mentioned above. b 
62 As it \vill be seen below. airport-pairs were aggregated into city-pairs in order to generate the 
final database. 
63 The typical seasonalitN in Brazil consists of Q-2 and Q-3 with most of the business traffic (and business 
travellers constitute more than 600 o of total traffic). 
On account of that, here some procedures were employed in order to reduce the potential ity of 
selection bias in the sample choice, and thus only routes between airports present in the 
ranking of the thirty largest airports (in terms of traffic) were considered 64 . 
As a consequence, 
twelve routes were dropped from the original dataset; also, airport-pairs were aggregated into 
city-pairs, in order to permit comparison with the results of Evans and Kessides (1993 )65 . and 
66 therefore the 82-city-pairs sample was generated 
Last but not least, it is important to mention the problem of asymmetry of information in the 
process of data collection. In fact, there is no Brazilian equivalent to the U. S. Department of 
Transportation's Origin and Destination Survey, a 10 % random sample of all tickets in 
domestic markets of that country. On the contrary, DAC relies on information provided 
monthly by airlines - more specifically, the average yield per airport-pair in the sample, 
aggregating all non-stop and one-stop traffic in a given market. In spite of the fact that DAC's 
price analysts double-check information provided by airlines by consulting fares on ATPCO's 
screens 67 , one must take 
into account that database is subject to relevant principal-agent 
68 problem s 
A final caveat related to the sample is the definition of city-pair used here. Due to the 
procedures of data collection employed by DAC here a city-pair includes only a subset of 
the direct traffic between two given cities: the non-stop and the one-stop flights. This 
explicitly excludes more-than-one stop flights and indirect traffic (flight connections), which 
certainly constitutes a major limitation for the analysis. It is important to emphasise, however, 
64 Other criteria were also experimented in conjunction with the 30-largest-airports rule. For example, the 
criterion of routes' density was used, with similar estimation results. 
6' Evans and Kessides (1993) use observations of only the fourth quarter of 1988, for the US airline industrý. In 
that case, they had data disaggregated by airline, and controlled for route-specific effects. 
66 Some city-pairs were discarded from the original database due to some inconsistencies between the Average 
Yield Report and the HOTRAN Report, and also in order to drop observations from routes in which the 
participation of small regional airlines was abnormally high. 
6' ATPCO: Airline Tariff Publishing CompanN. ATPCO is the world's leader in the collection and distribution of 
airline fare and fare-related data, gathering information from more than 500 airlines over the world and I 
distributing it to computer reservation systems, such as the ones of global distribution sý stems like Amadeus, 
Galileo and Sabre. 
68 The principal-agent problem here refers to the difficulties that arise under conditions of incomplete and 
asymmetric information \\hen DAC (the principal) requests data from the airlines (the agents) 
but has no (or 
inefective) means of enforcing them to provide the most accurate informartion. =N 
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that this definition usually comprises most part of the origin-and-desti nation traffic betveen 
two given cities in Brazil. 
3.4.3 Model Specification 
The model specification used in this paper is the following: 
In (price, j = 
= ao +a, snsýk, + a2 SPkikt + a3 aszik, + a4 CPMSik, + a5CMSik, 
a6cphhik, + a, chhik, +a8 InkMk + ag (In lank 
)2 
+ a, 0 pres'CCk, 
+a, I 
pres'CCkt In kMk + luo, DC, +Iu, , 
FSCJ + U2DM + ck, 
Ii 
Where In priceikt is the logarithm of price of incumbent airline i in city-pair k and period t. It 
is calculated by multiplying yields available in DAC's Average Yield Report by the flight 
distance of city-pair k. Nominal prices were used as inflation is negligible within the two 
months. It is expressed in local currency (R$) for the monthly, point-to-point traffic, supplied 
by DAC, and represents R$ per trip (one way). Only incumbent's (FSC's) prices are 
considered. Average yields are not disaggregated by fare class. 
SHStikt measures the percentage of seats available in non-stop flights of airline i, on route k 
and month t. This fraction was calculated with the following expression: the total number of 
seats in non-stop flights over the total number of seats in all direct flights with either zero or 
one stop - which is in line with the abovementioned definition of city-pair. Data for total 
number of flights disaggregated by airline and by each day of the week is available in the 
Department of Civil Aviation's HOTRAN, -Hordrio de Transporte". a data system that 
generates reports containing operational information of all scheduled flights \Nithin the 
country (non-published information). This information was extracted from their system on a 
monthly basis for the period 2001-2002, and subsequently aggregated bý year. Non-stop 
flights represent both lo\Ncr disutility for the consumer. and lower costs for the airline. Prices 
may be higher or lo\N er, depending on the balance bet\\ cen those t\\ o effects. t: ý It) 
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spkikt measures the percentage of seats available in peak-hour flights of airline i on route k 
and month t, and was calculated by means of the division of the total number of seats in peak- 
hour flights over the total number of seats in all direct flights with either zero or one stop. For 
this calculation, "peak time" was defined considering all flights with departure within 5am to 
10am (morning peak) and 4.30pm to I Opm (evening peak) on weekdays, and those \\Ith 
departure from 7pm to I Opm on Sundays. DACs HOTRAN Report provides the information 
of flight number / weekdays / departure times, which made possible the segregation into 
"peak" and "off-peak" periods. One would expect that the higher is one airline's percentage of 
seats on flights during peak-time, in comparison to the average, the higher is the competitive 
advantage of this firm and the higher will be her prices 69 . 
aSZikt is the average number of seats per flight for airline i, weights were calculated based on 
the number of flight frequencies on route k. As stated in Borenstein (1989), "On flights Qf 
more than 500 miles, larger equipment has a lower per-seat-mile cost ( .. ). On the other hand, 
the quality of the product is higher on larger planes, which are generally Inore com rtable f) 
and are thought to be safer". Therefore the sign of coefficient of aircraft size depends on both 
effects. 
CPMSikt is a proxy for route presence, and consists of the market share of seats available of the 
i-th (incumbent) airline in city-pair k and time t; CMSikt is a proxy for airport presence, and 
measures the average percentage of seats available on all origin and destination routes in both 
endpoints cities (aggregation of all airports within a city). Both CPMSikt and CMSik, represent 
firms' relative positions (capacity) in the market at, respectively, route and airport levels, 
serving as indicators of localised pricing power, as with Evans and Kessides (1993 )70. They 
also can serve as proxies for convenient service of dominant airlines at the route and airport 
levels and higher advertising levels (if advertising is increasing in the level of operations out 
of a city); CMSikt can also be regarded as a proxy for the effects of frequent flier programmes. 
CPMSikt and CMSikt are expected to have coefficients with positive sign, meaning that t7 
6" There can be much variability in prices according to flight-time, especially in more congestioned airports, such 
as Congonhas (CGH) in Sao Paulo. 
70 
, \fter the Second and 
Third Rounds of Liberalisation, changes in capacity were made easier via a 
simplification in the process of flight frequency requests to DAC (See Chapter One). One can argue that, apart 
from highlN congested airports, such as CGH and PLU, capacit\ is short-run adjustable for most of the routes. 
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dominance of capacity in the market confers competitive advantage to airlines 
ephhikt is the Herfindhal index of concentration calculated at the city-pair level (the market 
share variable used in this calculation was cpmSikt); chhikt is the same measure, calculated at 
the city level, that is, extracting a simple average of origin and destination endpoint cities' 
concentration (market share variable was CMSikt). 
In kMk and (In kMk) 2 are the logarithm of the distance of route k, and its square. These 
variables consider the one-way distance between origin and destination airports. This 
information was provided by Department of Civil Aviation's Laboratory of Simulation and 
was calculated by using the polar coordinates method. One important issue about these 
variables is related to distance calculation when the sample presents more than one airport in 
one or both endpoint cities of the given route. In both cases the latitude and longitude of the 
airports closest to the city centre were calculated and considered representative of the distance 
between cities. 
presICCkt is a dummy variable that accounts for the presence of Gol Airlines in the city pair on 
route k and time t. This variable is indicative of the price reactions to Gol's presence 
undertaken by the FSC's within the sample period. As the presence of the LCC was rather 
recent - ten months only, but could be lower, depending on the route -, one can regard it as 
controlling for the reactions to entry by incumbents in the market. 
presICCkt * In kMk is a slope shifter of presICCkt, that is, measures how the price reactions to 
entry were affected by the haul of the city pair, and thus serve, along with CPMSikt andCMSikt, 
as a straightforward way to inspect the significance of the stylised fact presented in last 
section, with respect to the effects of flight distance on product differentiation in the market. 
One would expect a positive coefficient associated with this variable, in case of product 
differentiation effects. 
And finally, the DC's, FSC's and DM are, respectively, city-specific, incumbent-specific and 
month-specific dummies. 
Table 3.2 below presents descriptive statistics of the variables in the model: 
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Table 3.2 - Descriptive 
StatiStiCS71 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
price, k, Average Price 275.063 124.330 57.883 791.395 
snst 41 Seats on Non-stop Flights (fraction) 0.799 0. _3 
16 0.000 1.000 
spk 41 Seats on Peak-Hour Flights (fraction) 0.491 0.3 15 0.000 1.000 
as: ý jkI Average Aircraft Si.: e 120.582 266.815 50.000 211.680 
CPMS &I City-Pair Market Share (fraction) 0.3 _39 
0.167 0.097 1.000 
CMS jkI City Market Share (fraction) 0.33) 7 0.129 0.077 0.647 
kM 
k Flight Distance 836.2 _35 
4 527.296 8 4.3) 42 2695.487 
cphhi k, City-Pair Concentration Level 0.345 0.198 0.058 1.217 
chhi k, City Concentration Level 0.355 0.042 0.294 0.578 
pres1cc k, Presence of LCC in the City-Pair 0.640 0.481 0.000 1.000 
3.4.4 Endogeneity, Instruments and Estimation Technique 
Equation (10) in 3.4.3 contains the following potential endogenous variables: In priceikt, 
snStikt, spkikt, aszikt, CPMSikt, CMSikt, cphhikt, chhikt, presICCkt and presICCkt*ln kMk- In order to 
inspect this issue, the procedure here was to first define instrumental variables likely to be 
helpful in estimating the model - once these instruments were obtained, I performed tests of 
the validity of instruments and tests of exogeneity. 
With respect to the problem of endogeneity and identification, and by having a brief 
inspection at the literature on airline pricing, one can conclude that the most common 
instruments consider a combination of the following procedures: 
1. use of exogenous demand and cost shifters; 
2. use of demand and cost characteristics of rivals on the route or of the same 
firms on other routes; and 
3. use of lagged, artificial or transformed variables. 
71 Source: DAC. 
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A combination of approaches I and 2, for example. is found in Berry. Carnall and Spiller 
(1996) and Borenstein (1989). In the former study, population and network characteristics at 
the endpoint cities are used in conjunction with the characteristics of other products in the 
market. They treat prices, market shares and spoke densities as endogenous. 
In the latter study, a measure of the presence at the endpoint airports (in terms of 
emplanements, which he considers exogenous) is used as an instrument for endogenous route 
market share of passengers. Also, he instruments route Herfindhal by using a measure that 
accounts for the squares of shares of rivals, assuming that "the concentration of traf)lc on a 
route that is not carried by the observed airline is exogenous with respect to the price of the 
observed carrier, e. g. TWA's price on Boston-Los Angeles route does not affect how the 
passengers it doesn't get are divided between American and United'. 
On the other hand, Evans and Kessides (1993) prefer making use of approach 3, and develop 
a "restricted rank" of firms on a route - calculated in descending order, that is, the largest firm 
on the route has a rank of one, etc - in order to identify route market share. This rank is 
restricted as they set the largest value of the rank at three, a procedure undertaken in order to 
avoid the effect of small carriers, which market shares are not significantly different from 
their next closest competitors in the rank: "With the restricted rank we lump all but the two 
largest carriers on a route into one category, and we must assume that changes in prices for 
(.. ) small carriers will not be large enough so as to move them out of this group". 
Moreover, approach 3 is also employed by Evans, Froeb and Werden (1993), and Marin 
(1995), which use lagged variables. The former instruments route Herfindhal by using a one- 
year lag of that variable, but assigning a value of 0 if the route was not among the top 1,000 in 
the previous year (their data sample). They also use a dummy variable indicating if the route 
was in the top 1,000 in the previous year as instruments. And the latter uses lagged variable to 
instrument a "relative advertising goodwill" variable, but combines this procedure with 
approach 1, making use of exogenous variables coming from an estimated demand equation. 
In order to account for endogeneity of right-hand-side variables, I used a combination of 
approaches I and 3. Firstly. I used lagged variables (one year). example: CPMSikt (t = October 
200 1) is instrumented by CPMSikt- 12 (t- 12 = October 2000). By using this kind of instruments. I 
take advantage of the fact that Transbrasil exited the industry in 2001 and then figures in 2000 
year could reflect a market x\ ith roughly the same number of major airlines (that is, the three Zý . 
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major airlines left and Gol), which served to increase correlation between instruments and 
enclogenous variables. 
With respect to the instrument for preSICCkt, there was clearly a problem of extraction of past 
realisations, as Gol entered the market only in 2001. On account of that, market share of 
Transbrasil Airlines and a dummy of her presence in 2000 was used, considering, as seen in 
Chapter 2, that Gol had significant incentives to avoid entering routes left by the bankrupt. I 
also make use of the market share of Transbrasil, and of variables accounting for the 
percentage of flights made by Fokker, Boeing and Embraer aircraft on the route, all lagged of 
one year 72 . Two tests of endogenous variables were performed and 
both rejected the null 
hypothesis that the abovementioned regressors were exogenous: Wu-Hausman F test, 
F(6,369) 5.66764 with a P-value of 0.00001; and Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-squared test: 
Chi-sq(6) 34.42726, with a P-value of 0.00001. 
The following tests of overidentifying restrictions confirmed the validity of the instruments, 
that is, the null that instruments were orthogonal to the error term: Sargan N*R-sq test, Chi- 
sq(7) = 7.453, P-value = 0.3833; Sargan (N-L)*R-sq test, Chi-sq(7) = 6.850, P-value = 
0.4447; Basmann test, Chi-sq(7) = 6.847, P-value = 0.4450; Sargan pseudo-F test, F(7,375) = 
0.979, P-value = 0.4464; Basmann pseudo-F test, F(7,368) =- 0.978, P-value = 0.4468. 
The following heteroskedasticity tests in IV regressions were performed, and, apart from the 
first one, all rejected the hypothesis that disturbance is homoskedastic: Pagan-Hall general test 
statistic: Chi-sq(39) = 44.555, P-value = 0.2495; Pagan-Hall test with assumed normality, 
Chi-sq(39) = 111.717, P-value = 0.0000; White/Koenker nR2 test statistic, Chi-sq(39) = 
51.008, P-value = 0.0943; Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey/Cook-Weisberg, Chi-sq(39) = 165.140, P- 
value = 0.0000. In the presence of heteroskedasticity, the IV estimator is inefficient, and the 
usual approach is to employ the Generalised Method of Moments; here I use two-step 
GMM 
efficient in the presence of arbitrary heteroskedasticity. The Hansen J statistic 
for 
overidentification test of all instruments was Chi-sq(7) = 8.253, with a P-value of 
0.3 1079. 
further confirming the validity of instruments. 
72 The mix of aircraft Oets, regional, etc. ) on a given route can 
be regarded as one of the determinants of the level 
of service, which is certainlý a demand shifter. 
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3.5 Estimation Results and Discussion 
Here I implement the GMM estimation of a pricing equation with city effects (CFE) and, for 
comparison purposes, also present the estimation with route effects (RFE), as in Evans and 
Kessides (1993). Results for the estimated models are presented in Table 3.3: 
Table 3.3 - Estimation 
ResultS73 
Variables 
In (priceikt) 
RFE CFE 
constant 5.551 0.310 
(0.071) (0,682) 
snst, k, -0.045 -0.052 
(0.047) (0.029) 
spk, k, 0.045 0.061 
(0.050) (0.0271) 
asz 41 -0.071 t -0.077 
(0.036) (0.029) 
cpins iki 0.162 t 0.133 t 
(0066) (0,067) 
C111S iki 0.691 0.759 
(0ý 139) (0,143) 
cphhi A., 
0.041 
(0.068) 
chhi ki -0.180 
(0,998) 
Ink"? k 1.051 + 
(0.175) 
(Inkin k2 -0.042 
(0.015) 
pres1cc A, -1.210 
(0,361) 
pres1cc k., * In kin k 0.170 
++ 
(0.058) 
Centered R2 0.961 0.946 
N. Observations 408 408 
*, t, I mean significant at, respectiN elv. 10% , 5% and 
I% levels. Fixed-effects not reported 
73 ignificance of the c it-, -effects: chi"( 18) = 69.55. P-Value = 
0.0000. 
Wald test of joint s 
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Firstly, let us make some comments on the significance and magnitude Of CPMSikt and CMSlkt. 
One can see that both variables are significant, whatever the estimation procedure employed: 
this probably means that they are both relevant as indicators of localised competitive 
advantage. In contrast to Evans and Kessides (1993), which reports reality in the United 
States, results for the Brazilian airline industry reveal that structure at the route level still has 
considerable significance in conditioning intra-firm heterogeneity in prices. 
Whereas Evans and Kessides (1993) found that "afirm's perceived pricing power at the route 
level is actually power conveyed to it through control of airport facilities", here I find that 
dominance at the route level can by itself be a source of competitive advantage along with 
airport presence. These findings are of extremely relevance when analysing price responses to 
entry (pres]CCkt), as one would question the role of routes as relevant market place (and source 
of pricing power) in favour of airports nowadays in the airline industry, and these results 
serve as an indicator that routes are still a locus of competition in recently-liberalised airline 
marketS74. 
There are two main reasons for the significance Of CPMSikt in conjunction with CMSikt: First, 
the still immature stage of liberalisation in Brazil, which means that well-known strategies 
typical of airline deregulated markets, such as hub-and-spoke method, are not fully developed 
yet, and maybe never become as sophisticated as in the US, as a consequence of the 
competitive pressure from the LCC's' hub bypassing tendency. And second, the existence of a 
centralised federal airport management, performed by INFRAERO (Federal Airport 
Enterprise) in conjunction with DAC: as the main directions over the years were towards 
giving equal access to airport facilities and terminals to all airlines, airport dominance has 
been rather rare to happen until very recently. 
With respect to the LCC's route presence, one can see, as discussed before, that only the 
11 city-effects model" proposed here is able to identify price reactions to entry, in opposition to 
the "route effects' 75 . 
The estimated effect is, as expected, negative and significant, meaning 
74 In fact the airport as a locus of competition would be representative of the evolution towards a hub-and-spoke 
network, in which the definition of a complex O-D pair structure confers more competitive advantage than local 
(route) attributes. 
75 Actualb, the "route effects model" would require a detailed inspection in the values of the estimated 
coefficients of the route dummies in order to permit this kind of analysis. 
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that, independent of airline and route-specific characteristics, incumbents have a propensitx to 
react in prices against the LCC. These results are in line with the findings of Whinston and 
Collins (1992), Windle, Lin and Dresner (1996) and Morrison (200 1), for the US industry. 
One can observe that the variables representative of the effects of flight distance on product 
differentiation (preSICCkt * In kMk) is significant and have a positive coefficient, which is in 
line with the Stylised Fact of 2.3. This means that competition is softer in markets Xvith longer 
hauls. With respect to the effects of route dominance on heterogeneity and price reactions. 
also described by the Stylised Fact, one would need to calculate the marginal effects via a 
given change in CPMSikt. The marginal effects of the LCC entry can be extracted from 
equation (10) in the following way: 
d In (price,, j dCPMSiki dcmS, kt 
dpres'CCk, 
alo + a, , In 
kMk + a4 
dpres'CCk, 
+ a5 
dpres'CCk, 
The issue with (10') is related to the definition of the impacts of entry on CPMSikt and CMSikt 
(the two last terms in the right-hand side of the marginal effects relation). With this purpose in 
mind, scenarious were then built, by considering a LCC entry with a market share of 20%, 
25%, 30%, 35%, 45%, 50% and 60% of the route's seats available, and thus by calculating the 
effect of a corresponding decrease in CPMSikt in the price of the k-th FSC airline. Also, these 
scenarios considered a hypothetical route with an average of 10% of traffic in the endpoint 
cities (that is, with a proportional decrease in CMSikt)- 
Results of these exercises are reported in Table 3.4, which provides the marginal effects of 
Gol's route presence on incumbents' reactions, by considering both the market share 
scenarious and a selection of representative flight distanceS76: 
76 For a better understanding of Table 3.4. consider the 
first entrý (kMk = 350, ICCMSikt = 201o). It is clear that 
-0.2228 = -1.210 + 0.170 
* ln(350) + 0.133 * (---'Oo, o * 0.339) + 0.759 * (-200, o' * 0.339 * 10%), where 10% 
is the 
assurned relation between the relative size of the route with respect 
to the total traffic out of a given airport, 
0.339 is tile sample mean Of CPMýIikt. and the other figures are the coefficients OC4, ctý, (xio and (xi, of equations 
(10) and (10'). 
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Table 3.4 - Marginal Effects of the LCC's Route Presence 
ICCniSiktN 
20% 
25% 
30% 
35% 
45% 
50% 
60% 
350 500 650 900 1,250 1,600 1,750 
-0.228 -0.168 1 -0.12' 3 ++ -0.068 -0.012 0.030 0.045 
(0.035) (0.027) (0.031) (0.042) (0ý058) (0.071) (0.076) 
-0.232 -0.171 -0.127 -0.071 * -0-015 0.027 0.042 (0.035) (0.027) (0.031) (0.042) (0.058) (0.071) (0.076) 
-0.235 -0.175 -0.130 -0.075 * -0.019 0.023 0.038 (0.035) (0.027) (0.031) (0.042) (0ý058) (0.071) (0ý076) 
-0.239 ý -0.178 ý -0.1334 1 -0.078 * -0.023 0.019 0.035 (0.035) (0.027) (0.031) (0.043) (0,058) (0.071) (0076) 
-0.246 -0.185 -0.141 -0.085 t -0.030 0.012 0.028 (0.035) (0.028) (0.031) (0.043) (0.059) (0.071) (0,076) 
-0-250 -0.189 -0.144 -0.089 t -0.033 0.009 0.024 M035) (0.028) (0.031) (0.043) (0059) (0071) (0,076) 
-0.257 -0.196 -0.151 1 -0.096 t -0.040 0.002 0.017 
(0036) (0.028) (0.032) (0.043) (0.059) (0.072) (0077) 
Notes: i. figures calculated holding CPMSikI at the sample mean: ii. represent an 
even decrease in the participation of the FSC incumbents in the market, - 
iii. ICCMSIki ý I- CPMSikf, ' iv. values o are represen )f tative of thefollowing 
percentiles: 0.20,0.35,0.50,0.65,0.80,0. 90 and 0.95. 
By inspecting Table 3.4, one can see that there are some markets potentially subject to a 
66not-to-react" tactic by incumbentS77, on account of the degree of product heterogeneity 
described by the Stylised Fact on LCC's of Section 11.3. Indeed, on the one hand, marginal 
effects are negative and very significant for shorter-haul markets and markets in which the 
incumbents have higher dominance (or alternatively, in which Gol have lower market share of 
seats available, measured by ICCMSikt)- 
On the other hand, marginal effects of Table 3.4 are increasing, that is, competition becomes 
softer, the higher is the flight distance and the lower is Gol's market share. Actually one 
cannot reject the hypothesis of "n ot-to -react" in all cases of entry in markets with flight sector 
higher or equal than 1,250 km; also, if one consider, for example, a given distance of 900, one 
cannot reject a "not-to-react' , tactic in all cases where the LCC's market share is lower than 
25%. Therefore, it is possible to infer from this analysis that product differentiation between 
77 One could use "to acquiesce" or "to accommodate" for this case, but, as these terms are strongly associate with 
very specific situations in the game theory literature, theN ýýere therefore avoided here, and "not-to-react" or 
"not-to-fight" \\as then used as meaning -not-to-change-prices I 
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the LCC and the incumbent FSC's is indeed a very relevant feature in this industr), at least for 
the period under consideration (2001, the first year of operations of Gol Airlines): these 
elements of heterogeneity were decisive in conditioning the patterns of price reactions to the 
LCC's entry. 
3.6 Conclusions 
The present paper targeted at examining the entry of the Brazilian LCC Gol Airlines, in the 
domestic market, in 2001. By making use of a price equation with city-specific effects, it was 
in a position of developing an analysis of reactions to entry which shares the advantages of 
both the intra and inter-routes traditions of the airline pricing literature. 
In particular, it was possible to perform a study of the determinants of localised competitive 
advantage in the industry, as Evans and Kessides (1993). Also, and within the same 
econometric framework, it was possible to investigate the causes of price variation betit, cen 
routes, and thus having an analysis of the patterns of price reactions to LCC entry. This was 
made possible due to a proposal of extension of the authors' procedure, in which the focus on 
the control for route-specific fixed-effects was changed to account for city-specific fixed- 
effects instead, without recurring to the use of random-effects. 
Final results permitted arriving at the conclusion that competition is located at both the route 
and the airport (city) levels, in contrast to the results found in the previous literature (US 
market). One can infer that a route is still a locus of competition in recently- I iberal i sed airline 
markets, mainly those not fully characterised by hub-and-spoke operations. 
Also, a significant and negative effect on prices caused by LCC entry was found, indicating 
that incumbents have indeed high propensity to react in prices, other things held constant. 
And finally, an analysis of the marginal effects of entry permitted reaching the conclusion that 
product differentiation between the LCC and the incumbent FSC's is certainly a very relevant 
feature in this industry and that these elements of heterogeneity were decisive in conditioning 
the patterns of price reactions to the LCCs entry in her start-up year (200 1 ). 
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Those findings can be compared with the results of Chapter 2, which investigated the entry 
patterns of Gol Airlines. There, we reached the conclusion that the LCC preferred routes ýý ith 
higher presence of the rivals in terms of direct seats available per passenger (a good proxy for 
market size and underlying route profitability), and from 2002 on, started entering a broader 
variety of markets and thus including longer-haul routes in her portfolio. 
The results here are certainly in line with the conclusions obtained before: firstly, we can 
consider that the tougher price reactions on shorter-haul routes, uncovered in the present 
chapter, can be thought as stimulating entry on longer-haul routes; additionally, one could 
regard the tougher price reactions associated with entry on routes with higher presence of 
rivals (on direct routes, the focus of the analysis of this chapter) as a stimulus for the LCC to 
avoid focusing only on either non-stop or one-stop flights in those situations, in order not to 
engage in excessive head-on competition with the FSC's 78 . This 
is certainly in accordance 
with the fact that Gol started providing several flights with stops and connections since 2002. 
It is important to emphasise, however, that the price reactions investigated in this chapter 
were mainly short-run related and, due to the usual state of financial distress of all FSC 
incumbents in Brazil, one would not expect predatory behaviour to be observed in the market. 
On account of that, it is not expected to observe Gol Airlines avoiding to enter some specific 
markets solely because of anticipated tougher short-run price reactions of incumbents, but, on 
the contrary, it is likely that she takes more into consideration a set of variables that affect the 
long-run conditions for profitability (as investigated in Chapter 2). To sum up, the 
newcomer's entry behaviour is certainly determinant of incumbent's pricing tactics, but the 
reverse was not necessarily observed in the industry, probably because the Brazilian FSC's 
have not been in a position of creating a reputation of tough players. 
78 The behaviour is more likely to be observed on medium-to-long-haul routes. 
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4. The Impacts of Liberalisation on an Air Shuttle Market 
4.1 Introduction 
This paper aims at developing an empirical model for assessing the impacts of economic 
liberalisation on competition in a relevant subset of the Brazilian airline industry: the air 
shuttle service on the route Rio de Janeiro - Sdo Paulo. In this market the first air shuttle in the 
world, the Tonte A6rea', was created in 1959, by an agreement of airline managers, and had a 
dominant position in the airport-pair linking both city centres for almost forty years. 
Air shuttles are usually characterised by very frequent service, walk-on flights with even 
intervals, no reservations and short-hauls. This concept is nowadays widespread in the airline 
industry, usually providing service for highly time-sensitive passengers, with classic examples 
being the Eastern Airlines' Boston-New York-Washington and the Iberia's Madrid- 
Barcelona. These airlines were pioneers in launching air shuttles in the United States (1961) 
and in Europe (1974), respective IY79. 
The competition model presented here is developed to represent the rivalry and strategic 
interdependence among airlines in a shuttle market with product differentiation, a relevant 
feature in the post-liberalisation setting. Firms are assumed to play static oligopoly game in 
which price is the strategic choice variable. Demand is represented by Gorman's model of 
stages of budgeting; an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) with two levels is then 
developed and own and cross-price elasticities are estimated in a flexible way. As route level 
costs are non-observable by the econometrician, an extension of the approximation proposed 
by Brander and Zhang (1990) is then performed in parallel with the estimation of first-order 
conditions for firms' profit maximisation. 
The framework for analysing the impacts of liberalisation on competition is based on the 
conduct parameter approach of the New Empirical Industrial Organisation, 
NEIO (see 
Bresnahan, 1989 and Genesove and Mullin, 1998), in order to infer the extent of de\iation 
79 Fastern Airlines' shuttle NNas purchased by Donald Trump in 1989 and became The Trump 
Shuttle. This 
serviceNNas operated b) LISAirafter itwent 
bankrupt in 1992, and \\as finallý acquired bý US Airwaýs in 1998. 
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from Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in the market. Therefore it was possible to pinpoint the 
change of airlines' behaviour due to three major exogenous events in the market: the 
measures of price and entry liberalisation (from January 1998), and two exogenous supply 
shocks (from, respectively, January 1999 and January 2001) on account of exchange rate 
depreciation - notably the main source of cost variation in the industry. 
Final results indicate a remarkable increase in competition due to liberalisation, represented 
by a plunge in the estimated conduct parameter. The shocks in costs tended to have somewhat 
ambiguous effects across firms, however, but overall did neither compensate nor exacerbate 
the changes in the degree of competitiveness permitted by liberalisation. 
The paper is divided into the following sections: firstly, some characteristics of the Brazilian 
airline industry are given, along with a historical background of the economic liberalisation 
performed by country's aviation authorities (4.2). Then, main elements of air shuttle markets 
are provided and the evolution of the Rio de Janeiro - Sdo Paulo air shuttle is described (4.3), 
data description is presented in 4.4, which is followed by the demand system specification 
(4.5) and by the first-order conditions specification (4.6); the system of equations estimation 
and the assessment of the impacts of liberalisation on conduct are performed in 4.7. Finally, 
the conclusions are presented. 
4.2 Historical Background 
As seen in Section 1.2, economic liberalisation of the Brazilian industry was launched as a 
part of a broader governmental program for deregulation of country's economy. Initial 
liberalisation measures were effectively accomplished in 1992. During this First Round of' 
Liberalisation, regionals' monopolies were abolished, except for the airport-pairs linking city 
centres of four major citieS80 (called "special" airport-pairs, SAP). What is more, the policy of 
"four nationals & five regionals" of the seventies was abolished, and thus entry vas 
stimulated by the authorities, which led to a wave of new small airlines in the market8 
I. Also, 
there were now reference prices and bounds of -50% up to +32% of their values, and price 
" Sdo Paulo (CGH). Rio de Janeiro (SDU), Belo Horizonte (PLU) and Brasilia (BSB). 
81 Sorne of the most important newcomers \Nere actuall\ affiliates of the majors, 
like Nordeste (Varig), Tam 
Regional (TANI) and Interbrasil Star (Transbrasil). 
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competition was now seen as "healthy" for the industry, and therefore encouraged. 
In the late nineties the aviation authorities decided removing two relevant regulatorN devices 
remaining in the market: the fare bounds and the exclusivity of operations of SAP's by 
regionals. This generated the Second Round of Liberalisation (enacted in Dec/97-Jan/98), 
which triggered much strategic interaction by airlines, with intense price and frequency 
competition. 
This phenomenon was exacerbated on the Rio de Janeiro - Sdo Paulo route, one of the SAP's 
and the country's densest flow linking its most known cities. One very relevant subset of this 
market is the airport-pair Santos Dumont (SDU, Rio de Janeiro) - Congonhas (CGH, Sao 
Paulo), the most important of the so-called "Special Airport-Pairs", SAP. Notably, the SDU- 
CGH airport-pair is closely associated with the competition of multi -frequency, walk-on, air 
shuttles in the market. In fact, it was there where the first air shuttle in the world was created, 
the 'Ponte A6rea' (literally, "air bridge , 82 ), in 1959 - two years before the pioneer service of 
Eastern Airlines shuttle in the United States. 
Since its creation, the Brazilian aviation authorities considered the agreement beneficial for 
consumers because of the market expansion it generated. As prices were regulated and entry 
was banned, it operated as a natural, state-controlled, cartel on the route, being an exception to 
regional's monopolies in SAP markets, since the seventies. With the gradual deregulation 
measures of the nineties, the agreement started losing strength and its dominance started being 
criticised, especially due to fears of market power exercise in the newly liberalised market 
conditions. In fact, when regional airlines were allowed to enter the route, in 1989, the Tonte 
A6rea' was seen more as a cartel of major airlines than an ordinary pooling agreement. 
With the Second Round of Liberalisation, the consequent increase in contestability led to 
relevant boost in price competition; even the fire at SDU, in February 1998, did not represent 
an impediment to it83 . Airlines started 
having own strategies on the route, in a process that 
ultimately led to the dissolution of the forty -year-o Id cartel, announced in June 1998. 
82 Also "airlift". this term first appeared in the cit-, of Berlin during the Cold War, "bv vit-me ofthe necessiti, 
civated bi, Me blockade imposed bi, 1he Soviet Union" (Aviation Daily. 2002). 
83 , the closing of SDU, as a result of tile liberalisation measures of JanuarN. in fact, prices fell b) 27% during 
'13 
The end of the cartel did not represent an end of air shuttle features on the route. On the 
contrary, new air shuttles were created by the existing airlines, in order to attract highly time- 
sensitive demand and to cope with increasingly fierce competition. Next section provides a 
more detailed description of market's main characteristics after liberalisation. 
Another relevant isuue of the period was the strong instability of currency exchange rates 
(specialiy the US dollar), which usually affects not only demand for international travel, but 
also aircraft lease, maintenance, and fuel costs, causing recurrent financial distress. Between 
1997 and 2001 - the sample period here -, two relevant shocks in costs due to currency 
devaluation were observed after the federal government changed the country's monetary 
regime allowing fluctuation, in early 1999. The two exchange rate shocks (EXRS) were 
observed from, respectively, January 1999 (EXRS99) and January 2001 (EXRSOI). Figure 
4.1 permits observing the degree of correlation among the effective exchange rate US$/R$ 
and average costs of the three major airlines on the occasion 84: 
" Unit costs include expenses on fuel and oil, maintenance and overhaul. 
flight crew (deck and attendants), 
flight equipment insurance, rental, depreciation, landing and en route charges, passenger ser, ce and other 
operatmo, expenses. Output is number of passengers times 
kilometres flown. Source: Department of Civil 
Aviation. The source of the effecti\ e exchange rate index is Instituto de Pesquisa 
Econ6mIca Aplicada's website 
(IPEADATA). Both indexes Nýere normalised atthe mean ofthe period (1997-2001) \\ith the 
base equal to 100. 
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Figure 4.1 - Evolution of Airlines' Average Costs and Effective Exchange Rate 
As Figure 4.1 shows, there is relevant correlation between the exchange rate and the unit costs 
in the industry, meaning that the former is a major source of variation of the latter. The two 
exogenous supply shocks engendered strong pressures for price increase in the whole 
economy, and as a result, the country's macroeconomic authorities started interfering in many 
industries in order to avoid inflation propagation. This represented a relevant constraint to 
airlines' strategies, as they could not increase prices whenever they wanted; besides that, 
antitrust authorities were now closely monitoring the market. 
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4.3 Market Characteristics 
4.3.1 Definitions and General Elements 
Air shuttles usually represent major air corridors linking important political. economical, 
social or cultural centres with a very high traffic density - the reason why they can be verly 
relevant markets for competing airlines. According to Teodorovic (1985) the main 
characteristics of this sort of routes are: 
i. equal intervals between two successive departures; and 
ii. the impossibility of reserving tickets in advance 
Following this definition, it is clear that a typical air shuttle configuration requires the airlines 
to provide one or more guarantees to passengers, in order to assure that "[either the. 11 will 
depart on the first departing plane, or that ii, ithin a certain probability, [the. ij ii, ill depart on 
the first departing plane, or that [they] i i, ill depart on the next departing plane if cannot get a 
vacant seat on thefirst departingplane, etc" (Teodorovic, 1985 )85. 
In practice, air shuttles (also known as "m u Iti -frequency" markets) are characterised by very 
frequent service, with intervals between flights from fifteen minutes to an hour. depending on 
the time of day; US Airways Shuttle. for example, flies 24 daily roundtrips between Boston 
and LaGuardia, and 14 daily roundtrips between LaGuardia and Ronald Reagan Washington 
National Airport (October 2002). As a consequence, they are commonly operated on short- 
haul domestic routes, such as Boston-New York (258 km, with Delta and USAirways 
Shuttles), Madrid-B arce Iona (483 km, with Iberia's "Puente A&eo"), Paris Orly-Toulouse 
(574 km, with the extinct Air Inter Europe's "La Navette"), Glasgow-London (approximate 
640 km, with BA's "Super Shuttle", created in 1975 and relaunched in 1989), etc. 
It is important to emphasise that one might find slight variations in air shuttles around the 
world, specially related to its "\\alk-on" features - that is, the last-minute availability x\ ithout 
ss Airlines can add other operational guarantees to the typical air shuttle guarantee. For example, in the Boston- 
New York-Washington market Delta Shuttle commits Nvith 3 guarantees (Triple Guarantee Policý ). whereas US 
AirNvavs Shuttle %Nith fi\e. 
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having to book -, due to country-specific airline regulation, which may impose releNant 
constraints. For example, in the Eastern Air Shuttle case, passengers could buy tickets on 
board, whereas in the Brazilian Tonte A6rea' this was not permitted by authorities - 
nowadays it is possible to make reservations in CGH-SDU market, but airlines are still not 
allowed to sell tickets during the flight. Nevertheless, airlines have recently developed 
mechanisms of increasing customer's flexibility of time, by introducing automatic ticketing 
machines and dedicated counters and boarding gates. Irrespective of these variations, the main 
idea of shuttles is still to serve a demand that is very time-sensitive and business-purposes 
related, in a relatively ordered way (equal intervals); therefore, it is important to emphasise 
that the "impossibility of reserving tickets in advance" feature pointed out by Teodorovic 
(1985), is not as relevant nowadays for air shuttles as it used to be in the paSt86. 
The air shuttle market SDU - CGH is formed by central airports in Rio de Janeiro and Sao 
Paulo, in a non-stop flight of approximately 50 minutes (365 km). With approximately ten 
percent of the total number of passengers within the country 87 , it is notable 
for its very high 
service levels, with average distance between flights being lower than 25 minutes (August 
1998); actually, this could be down to 17 minutes during peak hours. 
The airport-pair is a subset of the market consisted of the route linking the cities, which 
includes International Airports of Galedo / Ant6nio Carlos Jobim (GIG, in Rio de Janeiro) and 
Guarulhos (GRU, in Sao Paulo). Nevertheless, among the four possible airport-pairs 
combinations, GIG-GRU is the most relevant alternative to SDU-CGH. Table 4.1 presents 
how demand distributes across airport-pairs in the city-pair market: 
86 Although at the cost of making the distinction between air shuttles and other routes much more abstract. 
8' Source: Department of Civil Aviation's Statistical Yearbook, 2002. 
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Table 4.1 - Demand Distribution across Airport-Pairs'8 
Airport-Pair Jan-Jul 1997 Jan-Jul 2001 
GIG-GRU 396,889 26.4% 359,777 14.8% 
GIG-CGH 3,793 0.3% 183,935 -. 6% 
SDU-GRU 3,166 0.2% 7,010 0.3% 
SDU-CGH 1,101,390 73.2% 1,879,428 77.3% 
Total R. Janeiro - 1,505,238 2,430,150 S. Paulo 
Other alternatives for travellers in the airport-pair include coach and telecommunications. The 
former represents the only transport alternative to air travel, due to non-avai lability of a rail 
89 
system for passengers . The latter is usually reported as relevant by the transport literature, 
and air shuttles may be especially influenced: "During the economic downturn of the early 
1990s [in the United States] (.. ) many businesses were relying on facsimile machines, 
electronic mail, and videoconferences in place of air travel" (O'Connor, 1995). Besides that, 
telecommunication industry was privatised and liberalised during the mid nineties in Brazil, 
and the consequent fall in tariffs made this alternative even more attractive. 
Although indeed relevant, of the three aforementioned alternatives, GIG-GRU, coach and 
telecommunications, only the first one was explicitly regarded in this study-, the main reason 
is that here I aimed at focusing on the behaviour of the typical traveller of SDU-CGH market, 
which means a given (and more homogeneous) standard of disutility to travel times. The 
argument here is that the typical traveller of the SDU-CGH market has little incentive to 
bypass the shuttle via other alternatives, such as the international airports or coach, as these 
are certainly less convenient markets (for example, the travel time by coach is more than 
seven times longer, almost six hours); also, telecommunication effects can be seen as 
affecting behaviour only in the long run. 
In number of passengers; source: Department of Civil Aviation. I 
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,A ver) 
different situation when compared to the competition provided by train operators in the shuttle markets 
Ne\\ York-Washington (Amtrak's "Acela Express") and Tok-yo-Osaka (Shinkansen "bullet trains"). I 
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4.3.2 Evolution from "Classic" to Prod uct-Differentiated Air Shuttle 
The main rationale for establishing an air shuttle service is the provision of higher service 
levels to passengers, and the soothing of competition between flights9o. The former is reached 
by providing departure times closer to passengers' preferred times due to the more even 
spread (and dominance) of the schedule over an operating day. The latter is reached by the 
increase in departure-time differentiation, that is, instead of having clusters of similar 
departure times, there is an increase in the distance between them, in order to maximise 
spatial product differentiation across a day of operations (as in Borenstein and Netz, 1999, 
and Salvanes, Steen and Sorgard, 2003). 
On the other hand, however, air shuttle operations may represent a very relevant source of 
product homogeneity in a given market: one can hypothesise the representative consumer for 
air shuttle service as the one who is always willing and able to catch the first flight 
available. As Teodorovic (1985) describes: "After establishing the air shuttle, a large number 
of passengers will become familiar with the services offered Most of them will adjust their 
arrival at the airport to the service, trying to minimize waiting time". This interaction between 
supply and demand may, ceteris paribus, make airlines' products homogeneous by letting 
passengers make their choice based only in their desired departure time, regardless the name 
and specific attributes of the airline they are travelling with. 
Therefore, one should expect the degree of product differentiation in an air shuttle market to 
be determined by the balance of the two aforementioned effects, that is, the spread of 
departure-times and the increase in passengers' desire to get the first flight irrespective of the 
airline. What is more, the existence of price regulation and additional airline coordination (eg. 
by ticket endorsement9l), can be decisive in terms of determining market outcome. ie., either 
product homogeneity or product heterogeneity. 
90 One can observe that air shuttles are very likely to engender competitive advantage for participant firms, as 
they create reputation of very frequent and flexible service; this can be demonstrated by Iberia's legal battle of 
eight years in Spain's Supreme Court in order to be allowed to use the term "Puente Aereo" as its own brand 
name, and then, preventing its competitors from using it, on the route between Madrid and Barcelona (Aviation 
Daily, 2002). The air shuttle concept, in this case, represented first mover advantage. 
91 That is, a common policý bet\\een existing competitors permitting aný traveller holding a ticket issued b" one 
airline to be able to go to the ticket counter of any airline, have the ticket endorsed (acknowledged), and board a 
flight provided b\ this airline. 
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Indeed, one can observe that air shuttles are potential candidates for coordination of flight 
schedules among airlines, mainly because it requires large scale of operations in terms of very 
frequent service. In order to spread flight times in an even way across the relevant time period 
of a day, without causing much increase in departure intervals, conjoint operations are usually 
considered a reasonable strategy, either by airlines or even by regulators. For example, the 
Tokyo-Osaka shuttle service is performed jointly by All Nippon Airways, Japan Airline and 
Japan Air System, with codeshare agreement, ticket endorsement and specific website for e- 
ticketing. 
If we consider a shuttle route with and full ticket endorsement and similar guarantees, 
operational features and fares across airlines (due to regulation or a "pooling agreement", for 
example), this could be undoubtedly regarded as market with homogeneous product. This 
situation is defined here as classic air shuttle market. 
In the CGH-SDU case, the aviation authority indeed allowed the shuttle agreement since its 
creation, and, what is more, made it an official "monopoly" for years. During the eighties, 
Varig, Vasp, and the extinct Transbrasil and Cruzeiro, operated in this market with full ticket 
endorsement and common ticket counters at both airports, and in a pooling agreement, the 
"Ponte A6rea". This could be undoubtedly considered a period of classic air shuttle. 
In the nineties, however, with the liberalisation measures and the allowed entry of regionals 
on the route (Tam and Rio-Sul), the market gradually evolved from "classic" to a more 
modern concept of shuttle. Especially in 1998, with the Second Round of Liberalisation and 
the fare war of March, airlines started introducing several elements of product differentiation, 
launched after the post-fire restoration of Santos Dumont Airport 
92: firstly, "Ponte A6rea" was 
split into individual shuttles; and secondly, explicit efforts of demand segmentation were then 
performed. Indeed, one could observe Varig and Tam offering frequent flyer programmes, 
more flight time options, higher peak-dominance, better service levels at the airports, newer 
aircraft, etc, focusing on the more frequent travellers in order to enhance brand loyalty, 
whereas Vasp and the extinct Transbrasil were providing a basic service with deep discounts, 
focusing on the less frequent consumers. Table 4.2 provides details of firms' products in the 
92 SDU was closed for almost six months due to a fire in February 1998. Airlines were then transferred to 
GIG 
until SDU's fulIN restoration, which happened in AW! USt 1998. 
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market since August 1998. 
Table 4.2 - Airlines' Attributes in the Market" 
ATTRIBUTES VRG TAM VSP 
Average Price 176 1,7-) 126 
Market Share (Passengers %) 0.50 0.22 0.17 
Route Presence 
(Share of Seats %) 
0.40 0.33 0.17 
Airport Presence 
(Share of Seats %) 
0.38 0.34 0. /l 
City Presence 
(Share of Seats %) 
0.42 0.23 0.17 
CodeShare Agreement With subsidiary RSL - - 
Departure Lounge One exclusive 
One Exclusive / One Shared 
One shared (T4,1 f I'SP TBA) (T4.11 ISP TB. 4) 
Seat Assignement Available Available Not available 
Average Distance Between Flights (mins) 45 51 147 
Average Distance Between Flights in Peak 
Hours (mins) 
30 30 92 
Aircraft Type Boeing/Enibraer Fokker. Airbus Boeing 
StarAlliance: .4 it- 
Canada, 
Alliances and Mileage Lzifiliansa, SAS, Thai e United AmericanAirlines Exchange 
.4 irlines 
Counting Scheme Aftles Trips Trips 
F T ll requent rave er 
Advantages 2000 nules = 20 trips =I ftee 0 trips =I fi-ee trip to ani, city 9 trips I fi-ee trip on the Mileage Scheme travel to any city served in 
served in Bra:: i1 route LatinAnierica 
4 Categories, - Discounts i. it 3 Categories, - 12 pat-king hours 
Elite Status taxis and car rentals at CGH; fi-ee at CGH, - express check-in 
I express check-in 
By examining Table 4.2, one can see that Varig and Tam are the airlines with the highest 
price in the market, which is consistent with the superior bundle of attributes they possess, in 
comparison to Vasp. In terms of an air shuttle market, characteristics such as the average 
distance between flights (or route presence) are decisive in order to confer localised 
competitive advantage when providing service to premium travellers, that is, those ý, N ith 
higher \\ illingness to pay. These product heterogeneity elements serve as explanation for the 
93 Source: DAC's Statistical Yearbooks (various) and newspapers. Table 4.2 is representative of tý pical 
attributes from 1998 to 2000, data on route presence and price coincides with the sample used 
for the empirical 
modelling. 
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fact that Vasp has the lowest market share in spite of having the lowest price, a fact that 
would certainly be puzzling if the product was homogenous. Indeed, this is further confirmed 
if one considers the survey of Oliveira (2003), which examined travellers' declared 
preference: brand loyalty was found to be a strong attribute for the travellers of Varig and 
Tam, but not of Vasp; moreover, when asked "How does price influence your choice". the 
vast majority of Vasp's travellers expressed a high or very high influence, again, in contrast to 
Varig and Tam's travellers. Details of the survey can be found in Appendix 4.1. 
In summary, one can observe the existence of two major periods in the air shuttle market after 
the first liberalisation measures of the early nineties: one, with competition between Tonte 
Mrea" and the regionals, prevailing until mid 1998; and the other, with competition between 
individual shuttles aiming at different positioning in the market, according to the degree of 
product quality and brand loyalty. Both periods represented a clear departure from the 
"classic" standards of air shuttle operations. 
4.4 The Data 
Data for this paper were kindly supplied by Brazil's Department of Civil Aviation (DAC) and 
were available in published and non-published reports and yearbooks. DAC monthly collects 
information from all scheduled airlines to DAC according to specific legislation within the 
country. It is relevant to mention the problem of asymmetry of information in the process of 
data collection. In fact, there is no Brazilian equivalent to the U. S. Department of 
Transportation's "Origin and Destination Survey", a 10 % random sample of all tickets in 
domestic markets of that country. Therefore, in spite of the fact that DAC's analysts from both 
the statistics and economics departments are in charge of assessing the accuracy of the 
information provided by airlines, one must take into account that database is subject to 
relevant principal-agent interference. 
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4.4.1 Demand 
Here I employed the definition of "route" being the non-directional airport-pair. By 
considering a non-directional route, I then treated traffic on flights going from SDU to CGH 
as aggregated with traffic on flights from CGH to SDU. Ito and Lee (2003b) and Richard 
(2003) also make use of the assumption of non-directional markets. By considering the 
airport-pair, I then focused on the typical traveller between the central airports of both cities, 
Morrison (2001) is a notable example of an analysis disaggregated to the airport-pair level. 
DAC's Statistical Yearbook - Volume I (Statistical Data) contains data on origin and 
destination traffic (in number of passengers) disaggregated by airport-pair and available 
yearly. The traffic data for this research was the unpublished report used for preparing the 
Yearbook. 
) extracted 
from DAC's system in January 2002. This report contains data on all 
passengers with departure at Rio de Janeiro's Santos Dumont Airport (SDU) and landing at 
Sdo Paulo's Congonhas Airport (CGH), and i1ce versa; passengers with flight connections in 
both airports could not be discarded, unfortunately, but are a minor fraction of the traffic in 
4 the airport-pair9 . 
Therefore, contrary to the Yearbook, the data collected for this research is disaggregated by 
airline and available on a monthly basis, from January 1997 to October 2001 (DAC's 
unpublished Monthly O&D Traffic Report). It contains information of all airlines in the 
market, namely, Varig, Tam, Vasp, Transbrasil and Rio-Sul. However, as Transbrasil exited 
twice within the sample period (May 2000 to December 2001, and from June 2001 on) due to 
bankruptcy, and accounted for less than ten percent of the market, data for this carrier was 
discarded. Also, as Rio-Sul is a subsidiary of Varig and had a formal code-share agreement 
with that airline since August 1998, data for both airlines was aggregated. 
Another very important peculiarity of the data set with respect to demand is the existence of a 
gap due to the fire at Santos Dumont Airport in February 1998. as mentioned before; this 
forced the airport to be closed for six months and airlines to cease virtually all operations 
04 This problern is certainly more serious if one considers traffic on the routes 
linking the international airports of 
both cities, as this is not the case here, the data are accurately representati\ e of the real 
O&D traffic on the route. 
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from or to it. In the majority of the cases (air shuttle included) the alternative was to transfer 
flights to Rio's international airport, GIG, which made CGH-GIG data potential candidate for 
data filling purposes. Actually, the only reason of not taking into account GIG-CGH data 
would be related to the bias that could have been caused by the competition with the existino 
airlines in the airport-pair. This matter is not relevant, however, because GIG-CGH \\as 
relatively unexplored before the fire at SDU (the only airline that operated in that market in 
Jan/1998 was VSP with less than 300 pax, a very inexpressive figure if compared to more 
than 85,000 total pax in February, after the transfer of flights). 
4.4.2 Fares 
Information on fares was collected from ATPCO (Airline Tariff Publishing Company). the 
world's leader in the collection and distribution of airline fare and fare-related data from more 
than 500 airlines over the world and distributing it to computer reservation systems, such as 
global distribution systems like Amadeus, Galileo and Sabre. By consulting the ATPCO 
screens, it was then possible to collect the fares information for the 15 th day of each month, 
disaggregated by airline and fare code 95 , for the same period of the traffic 
data. 
A general price index was used to deflate the fares series; the price index used was provided 
by the Brazilian Census Bureau (IBGE, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica), the 
Broad Consumer Price Index (IPCA), which the federal government uses as its measure for 
official inflation targeting. 
QS Codes representative of fares for business class were not considered, as it is not typically avaliable in the 
shuttle market. 
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4.4.3 Costs 
DAC's Statistical Yearbook - Volume 11 (Economics Data) contains detailed information on 
costs disaggregated by airline. In particular, Chapter I provides detailed data on direct and 
indirect operating costs by aircraft in both domestic and international travel segments. This 
information is not route-specific, but refers to the aggregation of routes served by each 
aircraft. As the air shuttle market is mainly operated with Boeing 737-300s (Varig and Vasp) 
and Fokker- 100 and Airbus A-319 (Tam), specific information on these aircraft was collected. 
As with traffic/demand data, unpublished expenses and costs reports that constitute the basis 
for the Yearbook were obtained, and yielded monthly cost figures (DAC's unpublished 
Monthly Costs and Operations Report). Information was then gathered on expenses on fuel 
and oil, maintenance and overhaul, flight crew (deck and attendants), flight equipment 
insurance, rental, depreciation, landing and en route charges, and passenger service. 
4.4.4 Operations 
Data on total output by aircraft was collected in the same way as costs, that is, from DAC's 
unpublished operational figures report. A monthly series of total output by aircraft was then 
designed. 
Route-specific data on flight operations was collected from DAC's HOTRAN, "Hordrio de 
Transporte", a data system that generates reports containing information of all scheduled 
flights within the country (non-published information), disaggregated by airline/flight code. 
Therefore, data on flight frequency and number of available seats were accessible on a 
monthly basis, as with the ATPCO's screens, information from HOMAN was collected for 
the mid-point day of each month. 
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4.5 The Demand System 
4.5.1 Theoretical Specification 
In this paper I make use of a demand system based on Gorman's stages of budgeting 
approach. See Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994) and Ellison et al. (1997) for similar 
implementations of this approach, which employs the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) 
of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), and which is very popular among applied demand analysts. 
Basically, the AIDS model allows for a demand system which is second order flexible, in a 
sense that "the price elasticities are unconstrained at the point of approximation" (Hausman. 
1997). Therefore, it allows for free estimation of elasticities between every pair of airline in 
the market. 
The basic idea of the framework is to consider a hierarchic decision making approach with a 
stepwise process of consumer's choice. Here I consider the two-levels structure, in a similar 
fashion of Ellison et al (1997): the top level indicating the overall demand for transport 
service in the airport-pair, and the bottom level specifying the competition among airlines 
within the airport-pair. Intuitively, this means the passengers first choose the desired pair of 
airports and then choose the preferred airline. 
Consider first the demand at the top level: 
qt =f (pf 5 Yl, F) 
Where q, is the overall airport-pair demand, pt is an average price, Yt is a vector of demand- 
shifters, and F is a vector of parameters. Demand within the airport-pair (bottom level) is 
formed by the following system of equations: 
n 
s, t = a, + 
Y; v, In pt +, fl, In (TR, IPt 
(12) 
Where si, is the share of revenues of airline i at time t, Rit represents the price of the j-th 
airline, TRt is the overall expenditure in air transportation in the market (= Y-plq, ), Pt is a price 
index, and uo, (xi, Oc. 1, Yij, Pi are parameters. 
Pt is associated Nvith the folio\\ ing expression: 
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nnn 
In P =ao + aj In pj, +Y2 In & in pjt t 
j 
According to Buse (1998), the linearisation of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)'s AIDS b. N- 
making use of the Stone price index approximation with respect to (13), has proved to be a 
popular method - known as the LA-AIDS, Linear Approximate Almost Ideal Demand 
System. The linearisation of the model is usually performed by making use of In P, with the 
Stone Index configuration: 
n 
In Pt* Y s, t In p,, 
i 
By making use of (14) in (12) one is able to obtain the following expression: 
S, t - a, + ,; v, 
In pj, +, 6, In (TR, IPt* 
i 
However, Buse (2000) provides Monte Carlo evidence that the Stone and the Paasche indexes 
is "unambiguously inferior to the Laspeyres and Tornqvist indices, specially ifprices are not 
strongly positively correlated'. Table 4.3 presents the correlation among prices in the sample: 
Table 4.3 - Price Correlation Matrix 
VRG TAM VSP 
VRG 1.00 - 
TAM 0.84 1.00 - 
VSP 0.09 0.24 1.00 
As Table 4.3 shows, it is not evident that strong and positive price correlation is observed in 
the market; in fact, due to the market positioning of the airlines on the route (discussed in 
4.3.2), whereas Varig and Tam tend to have stronger correlation, Vasp tends to have a more 
idyosincratic behaviour, avoiding close price movements with the higher-quality rivals. 
Therefore here I opted for the use of the Laspeyres index: 
n 
In P, * sjo In pj, 
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Where sjo 0=1,..., n) is the market share in the base period, which was set at the sample mean 
for this analysis. 
In order to properly estimate the model, some restrictions are necessary. FirstlY ýNe haNe 
adding-up conditions, which are given by: 
1ai 
=lý 17ij yßi 
iii 
(17) 
As Buse (2000) describes: "the adding-up conditions imply a singular variance-covariance 
matrix for the disturbances and this is handled in the conventional manner by deleting the n- 
th equation". In the present setting, Varig's equation was dropped. 
I also made use of homogeneity and (Slutsky) symmetry restrictions: 
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4.5.2 Empirical Specification 
(18) 
The empirical specification of the top and bottom levels discussed in last section are presented 
in (19) and (20) below. See Section 4.4 for details on the sources of data. First, one have the 
overall demand equation: 
In q, = 50 +, 5, In P, + (5, In gdp, + (53 In qt- + o54dfire + o55dlib + u, (19) 
Which has a log-log specification, in the same way of Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994) 
and Ellison et al. (1997). 
qt is the overall airport-pair demand, and, as discussed before, represents the number of total 
revenue traffic, that is, the total number of passengers excluding people travelling for free for 
any reason (source: DAC's Monthly O&D Traffic Report). 
Pt is an average market price (source: ATPCO), deflated by IPCA (source: IBGE). Prices are 
expressed in Brazilian currency (reais, R$), it is calculated b\ \\eIghting airline's average 
prices by their respective market share of passengers. 
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gdpt is an index of real gross domestic product, normalised by figures of Januarý 1997 
(source: Instituto de Pesquisa Econ6mica Aplicada - IPEA). 
qt- is the overall traffic of all other airport-pairs within the city-pair Rio de Janeiro-Sao Paulo, 
and controls for potential competition among airlines in different airport-pairs (source: DAC's 
Monthly O&D Traffic Report). The use of quantities instead of prices of the substitute goods L_ 
(in this case, the alternative airport-pairs) is certainly not standard in the literature. however. 
due to limitations in terms of availability of a complete series of prices for these markets. this 
procedure was then employed. 
dfire is a binary variable that controls for the period of closed SDU due to a fire (February 
1998 to July 1998); dfib is a dummy assigned with one for the months subsequent to the 
liberalisation measures of January 1998 (once and for all). And finallý, ut are the 
disturbances. 
The share equations representative of the bottom-level were specified in the folio\\ ing \\ ay: 
n (20) 
s =ao, +al, sseatsit+y; vlnpj, +, 8, ln(TR, 
IP, *)+ 
it 
+a 2i dcshare 
_ 
paer +a3, dcshare _ 
vptb + a, dcshare _ 
tatb + it,, 
Where sit is the share of revenues of the i-th airline at time t: revenues are calculated by 
multiplying the number of revenue passengers by the average price of the airline at time t. 
sseatsit is an index of the share of seats available of airline i at time t. Available seats carried 
are calculated multiplying the number of daily flight frequencies by the average aircraft size 
for each airline, and this by the number of days in a given month (Source: DAC's HOTRAN). 
The average airline-specific prices (pjt's) are calculated by \N, eighting the assumed peak price 
(full fare) and off-peak prices (simple average of available discounts) by respective number of 
passengers. For this calculation, "peak time" was defined considering all 
flights \\ith 
departure \Nithin 5arn to lOam (morning peak) and 4.30pm to 
lOpm (evening peak) on 
\\eekdays, and those \\ith departure from 7pm to lOpm on 
Sundaýs. As discussed before. 
DAC's HOTRAN Report provides the information of flight number / \\ eekdaý s/ 
departure 
times, which made possible the segregation into tN\ o periods (--peak" and 
"off-peak"). 
Z__ 
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One final note on prices: Moschini (1995) argues that within the LA-AIDS framework, the 
condition for the price index to be valid and not to generate biased and inconsistent parameter 
estimates, one has to perform prices scaling. I then performed a normalisation of prices at the 
sample means to transform data in such a way that is in line with Moschini's criticism, in 
order to calculate Pt*. Also, individual prices pjt were normalised at Varig's fig"Llres, Nýhich 
had the equation dropped. 
TRt/Pt* is the index discussed in last section. dcshare_paer, dcshare 
- vptb and 
dcshare_tatb are dummies that are assigned with one in periods when a codeshare agreement 
is observed in the market and account for the alliance of, respectively, the "Ponte A6rea- until 
July 1998, the Vasp-Transbrasil codeshare from September 1998 to June 1999, and the Tain- 
Transbrasil codesharing from May 2000 to January 200 1. uit are the disturbances. 
4.5.3 Endogeneity and Instruments 
Undoubtedly, the demand system specified in 4.5.2 engenders a relevant issue on 
identification of the endogenous variables. In particular, prices (Pt, Pt* and pit's), quantities 
(qt), expenditures (TRt) and passenger shares (sit) are usually thought to be endogenously 
determined. In order to deal with this issue, the procedure here was to first define instrumental 
variables likely to be helpful in identifying these variables. 
Once instruments were obtained, I then performed tests of the relevance and validity of 
instruments (F tests of excluded instruments, and Hansen J-tests) and tests of exogeneity of 
some other variables under suspicion of endogeneity, like qt- and sseatsjt (C tests or 
"difference-in-Sargan" tests, as described by Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2003). 
With respect to the problem of endogeneity and identification, and by having a brief surve\ of 
the procedures found in the literature on airline economics, one can conclude that the most 
common instruments consider a combination of the follo\\ ing procedures: 
1. use of exogenous demand and cost shifters; 
2. use of demand and cost characteristics of rivals on the route or of the sarne firms 
on other routes, and 
3. use of laacyed. artificial or transformed variables. 1-: ) 11: ý 
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A combination of approaches I and 2, for example, is found in Berry, Carnal] and Spiller 
(1996) and Borenstein (1989). In the former, population and network characteristics at the 
endpoint cities are used in conjunction with the characteristics of other products in the i-narket. 
They treat prices, market shares and spoke densities as endogenous. On the other hand. E\ ans 
and Kessides (1993) prefer making use of approach 3, and develop a "restricted rank" of firms 
on a route - calculated in descending order, that is, the largest firm on the route has a rank of 
one, etc - in order to identify route market share on their pricing equation. Moreover. 
approach 3 is also employed by Evans, Froeb and Werden (1993), and Marin (1995), ýNhich 
use lagged variables. 
In order to account for endogeneity of right-hand-side variables, I used a combination of all 
three approaches. Firstly, I used two sets of exogenous cost shifters: input prices and an index 
of effective currency exchange rate. Unit prices of fuel and maintenance of Varig, Vasp and 
Tam were used. The unit cost of fuel disaggregated by airline was calculated by dividing 
expenditures on fuel by the consumption of fuel. Consumption was measured in thousands of 
litres of aviation fuel (mainly aviation kerosene). Unit costs of maintenance disaggregated by 
airline was calculated by dividing expenditures on maintenance by the number of flight hours. 
Information on unit costs are disaggregated at the aircraft level, as discussed before (DAC's 
unpublished Monthly Costs and Operations Report). The effective exchange rate index was 
collected from Instituto de Pesquisa Econ6mica Aplicada's website (IPEADATA) and was 
lagged of one period. 
Secondly, I used the prices of the same firms on another route of the Brazilian airline system: 
the airport-pair Congonhas-Brasilia. The major source of problems of quality of this sort of 
instrument is related to the existence of common shocks, due to national advertising, for 
example, in fact, this problem is aggravated as both airport-pairs share one same endpoint 
city, Sdo Paulo, which is also potentially problematic due to the existence of local advertising, 
In order to avoid I these problems, I used lagged realisations (one period) of prices and 
96 expenditures for that route 
96 One observation in the final market share data sample was dropped on account of that. 
The relevance and validity of the abovementioned instruments were challenged by the 
following procedures, after regressing a GMM procedure for (19) and (20). Results of the 
tests are presented in Appendix 4.3, Tables 4.11 and 4.12. 
1. Firstly, in terms of the relevance of the proposed instruments. partial R-squarecl (? /' 
the first-stage regressions, accounting for the squared partial correlation between 
excluded instruments and endogenous regressor were extracted, along ý\ ith Shea 
Partial R-squared. Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2003) report that, in general, the 
literature consider that one must not have low values for both statistics, in order 
not to have instruments which lack significance; and the minimum R-squared 
computed (of all total demand and share equations) was 0.66, which \ý'as 
considered satisfactory. 
2. Also in terms of relevance, the F-tests ofjoint significance of instruments in the 
first-stage were used. Again, Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2003) report a 
common use of an F-statistic that is higher than 10 in order for the instruments to 
be relevant. The minimum F-statistic was 18.40. 
3. Moreover, in terms of validity (orthogonality), Hansen J tests were employed for 
both the market share and the total demand equations, with the null hypothesis 
being that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. All tests failed to 
reject the null at 5% of significance. 
4. And finally, one may cast doubts on the exogeneity of share of available seats, 
even if one argues that airlines still need to submit changes in the number of flight 
frequencies and aircraft type (and size) to the authorities' consideration, in a 
process that may still be considered slow, and exogenously determined. C-tests of 
the exogeneity of the variable In sseats, (and also of qt-) were performed and did 
not reject the null. 
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4.6 The Pricing Game 
Once the demand system was specified, it was then possible to design a framex\ork to 
investigate the impacts of the liberalisation measures of 1998 (the Second Round (? /' 
Liberalisation) on the conduct of the firms. In this section I make use of a standard model 
from the New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO) tradition9', and ývhich is suitable for 
markets with product differentiation, in order to perform the analysis of the changes in 
behaviour due to exogenous shocks, such as the policy measures of January 1998, and the 
supply shocks of 1999 and 2001 (currency devaluation). 
4.6.1 Theoretical Structure 
Consider static price competition in a product-differentiated (Chamberlinian) setting. Prices as 
choice variables are also assumed by Berry, Carnall and Spiller (1996)98, this can be justified 
by the evidence on airlines' behaviour since liberalisation: for example, TAM reduced her 
single fare by 27% in 1998, in a movement that industry analysts claimed to target an 
expansion in market shares, and this price reduction was soon followed by "Ponte A6rea'"; 
also, there were fare wars in 2001 and 2002, after Gol Airline's entry on the city-pair, and 
finally, Vasp advertised a "buy-one-way-and-get-the-retu rn -free" sale, effectively reducing 
prices by 50%, in January 2000. 
Suppose qit is quantity and pit is the price of the i-th airline at time t. Consider the following 
first-order conditions for profit maximisation of airline i: 
May (p, qj, - tc, > q, + p, 
aqll 
- 
atc, aqll 
=0 
Pit Opl, aqll Opil 
Where tcit are the route-specific total costs. By performing some algebraic manipulation: 
97 See Bresnahan (1989) and GenesoNe and\ IuII in (1998). 
98 In opposition to Marin (1995). Captain and Sickles (1997), Brander and 
Zhang (1990), %Olch assume 
competition in quantities. 
H3 
qll + pit 
aqll 
= Mc,, 
aqll 
--- ). mr, = "I I pit UP', opit q,, = mc,,, ql apil 
(22) 
Where mrit and mci, are, respectively, the (route-specific) marginal revenue and marginal cost Z__ 
of airline i. Suppose now there is a parameter Oi that measures the extent of deviation fi-om 
Nash-Bertrand behaviour of airline i (which would be represented by equating marginal 
revenue to marginal cost); following Bresnahan (1989), 1 define the -perceived marginal 
revenue" of the i-th airline (pmrii)99 as: 
pmý, = qi, + 0, ' pi, qi 
(23) 
Where Oi is the conduct parameter, an index of the competitive nature of the i-th airline in the 
market. 0 is usually known as the firm's conjecture. although here I interpret it in the same 
way as Slade (2001) - see also Slade (2004) -, that is, "as misspecýfication parameter that 
measure the extent of the deviation ftom the null hypothesis of static Nash-equilibrium 
behavior". 
Basically, if firms' conduct is consistent with Nash behaviour, then one would expect each 
airline's marginal revenue to equate marginal costs (Oi =1, for all i). The lower the 0, the more 
competitive firms are and, in the extreme, 0=0 represents marginal cost pricing. On the other 
hand, the higher 0, the more collusive firms are and, in the limit, there will be perfect 
collusion. Both cases (that is, 0<I and 0> 1) shall be regarded as deviations from non- 
cooperative Nash equilibrium. Therefore we have the following expression: 
pmýI = me', ) p +ý' q = mc 
qi 
(24) 
We finally have the standard pricing equation of the New Empirical Industrial Organisation 
(NEIO): 
99 It is "perceived" because it depends on the extent to which firms recognise the distinction between its demand, 
its marginal revenue, and market marginal revenue functions, which is controlled bý 0. Check Bresnahan ( 1989) 
and Appendix 4. 
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Pit = mcj, - 
01, 
q 
4.6.2 The Costs Side 
(25) 
The problem with (25) is that costs at the route level are typically non-observables'00. In 
contrast, costs at a more aggregate level can usually be observed, either at the system level 
(global figures for the whole network) or even with some disaggregation (any subset of the 
network). Consider then the following total cost function at the "aggregate level": 
TCl, = TC (Ql 9 uýI ) zit 5; v) 
(26) 
Where TCit and Qit are, respectively, total cost and total output, Wit is the vector of input 
prices, Zit is a cost shifter vector, all with respect to airline i, at time t and at the more 
aggregate level. y are unknown parameters. 
Suppose now there exists a link between the route-level costs and the aggregate-level costs: 
MCikl :- Cik 
aQl = clý- 
(MCIJ 
(27) 
WhereMCikt is the (unobservable) marginal cost of airline i on route k and time t. Ck(-) is a 
function representative of the adjustment between the two levels. Brander and Zhang 
(1990)'01 make further simplification by assuming constant marginal cost, and then make use 
of the following relation: 
MC1kl =: Olk 
(dk 
'4 VSTL,, ) A VC, = 
dk 
dk A VC, 
(28) 
Where AVCjt is the average cost at the aggregate level, AVSTLit is the average stage length of 
airline i at time t; and ýik is a non-linear function of the route's fligh distance (dk) and the 
airline's AVSTLit. Actuallý, ýik is a route-specific function which accounts for the 
100, As Brander and Zhan2 (1990) describe, the appropriate operational definition of route-specific marginal costs 1: 1 is 'fiarftoni obvious", and one has to develop proxies for it, as for ex., Douglas and Viller ( 1974). 
101 A Iso in Ourn, Zhan and Zhang (1997). 
11; 1 
phenomenon of "cost taper", that is, when -total cost per passenger-mile drops as the length 
of the trip grows" (O'Connor, 1995). In Brander and Zhang (I 990)'s words: "There are ( ... ) 
strong a priori reasons to believe that cost is not linear in distance. A lot of crew time is used 
in boarding and deplaning, andfuel consumption is highest during take-off and landing ( .. )". 
Cost taper may be a relevant feature especially within the context of short-hauls, due to higher 
costs per seat-mile - known as the "short-haul problem" and which usually affects air shuttle 
02 markets' . 
In the present case I also assume a non-linear relation between route marginal costs and 
distance/average stage length; I use a less restrictive model, however, as costs in the all, 
shuttle market in relation to overall unit costs may need to be adjusted on account of other 
factors apart from distance, like the marginal opportunity cost of flights and passengers, 
relative daily utilisation of aircraft, average load factors, etcl03. Here I propose the following 
expression for route-specific marginal costs: 
2 In A VSTý, A VC, A VQ A VC, (29) MC, kl POik + (Pl1k + ý921k + ý93ik + ý04, k 
Where (POik, ýDM5 ýNik, ýD3ik andT4ik are route-specific parameters. Note that here I allow for a 
non-linear relation between costs at the route level and AVSTLi,, which is a systemwide 
measure, in order to control for the cost tapering effects; also, one is able to more freely 
estimate the adjustment of aggregate average costs to route level marginal costs (the AVCit's). 
102 O'Connor (1995) mentions the demand and costs side of the short-haul problem: "Not only is the cost l? er 
seal-mile higherfior shorter stage lengths, but the demand is highly, elastic ( .. ) since alternative modes of 
transportation, notabýy the private awomobile, are relatively, attractive over shot-ter 
distances". Air shuttle 
markets, however, may not feel the demand effect so intensively, as they are characterised 
bý highly time- 
sensitive and price-inelastic passengers. 
10' In fact, Brander and Zhang (1990) are a\Nare of this problem (see p. 575). 1 
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4.6.3 Empirical Specification 
Here I define the following empirical counterpart of equation (26): 
p, l = (po, + (pl, In A VSTL,, + (p2, A VC, + g, A VC,, + ý94, A VC, 3, + (30) 
+(5o, q,, + 51, q,, dlib + iý, gdexrs99 + (54iq,, dexrsol + -cl 
Note that I am now removing the index k of (29), which refers to the route-level, because 
there is only one route in the sample (non-directional airport-pair CGH-SDU, see Section 
4.4); also, it is important to keep in mind that variables with capital letters are not available at 
the route level, but are only representative of the more aggregate level (aircraft). 
As discussed before, AVCit and AVSTLit are, respectively, the average cost and average 
stage length of airline i at time t, at the observable aggregate level. As explained in 4.4.3, here 
I have data on direct and indirect operating costs, and output, disaggregated ky aircrqft, a 
information which refers to the aggregation of routes served by each aircraft. By making use 
of specific data available in DACs unpublished Monthly Costs and Operations Report, 
aggregate average cost figures were calculated for Varig's Boeing 737-300s, Vasp's Boeing 
737-300s and Tam's Fokker-] 00 (until July 1999) and Airbus A-319 (from August 1999). In 
the case of Tam,, I also included a dummy of change of operating aircraft, assigned with one 
from August 1999 on (dairbus). 
In order to calculate average costs, one needs figures of total production and costs. Firstly, the 
measure of production used here is the number of passengers times kilometres, a standard and 
commonly used measure of output in the industry. 
And secondly, in terms of total costs, one relevant issue arises: it is certainly debatable 
whether all costs figures have influence in a given airline's short-run pricing; Brander and 
Zhang (1990), for example, report a similar problem of cost definition: "it is not clear which 
costs should be taken as variable costs and which should be taken as fixed costs-; in this 
sense, by making use of a rather broad definition of costs would probably cause noise in the 
estimation of route-level marginal costs, especially if one considers that the price variabilitý 
across inputs is far from similar. 
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Besides that, as I allow for a more flexible estimation in (30), one would onl,., - need to 
consider costs figures with high variability within the sample period, in order to provide a 
reasonable estimation of marginal costs. In other words: it suffices to have good cost shifters 
in order to identify costs at the route level. On account of that, only the following operating 
costs were used in order to calculate an aggregate unit cost figure: fuel. maintenance and 
flight crew. I also experimented with more aggregative costs, by considering, for example, 
expenses on flight equipment rental, landing and en route charges, and passenger service. but 
results in identifying route-level marginal costs proved to be inferior. 
qit is the number of revenue passengers flown with airline i at time t, available in DAC's 
unpublished Monthly O&D Traffic Report. In order to test for a structural change in qj, due to 
three main exogenous events on the route, I then make use of dummies of slope ý'N, ith respect 
to qt: dlib, which controls for changes due to the liberalisation measures from January 1998 
on; and dexrsgg and dexrsol, which account for changes in behaviour due to the exchange rate 
shocks of, respectively, January 1999 and January 2001. All variables are assigned with one 
from the following month of the event, on a once andfor all basis. Finally, E: it represents the 
disturbances. 
4.6.4 Endogeneity and Instruments 
Here I employ the same procedures of 4.5.3 to analyse the issues that arise during the 
estimations of the pricing equations (FOC) of the system of equations in (30). Here again, one 
have qit as clearly jointly determined with p, t, and therefore one needs to find suitable 
instruments for identification; also, one might be suspect of the endogeneity of aggregate 
average costs (AVCit) and therefore it is relevant to test for it. 
The list of instruments for qj, are the following: firstly, the number of passengers flown and 
number of flights of the same firms on another route, the airport-pair Pampulha (Belo 
Horizonte)- Brasil i a. In contrast to 4.5.3, here the existence of common demand shocks is not 
a relevant issue, as that route does not share any endpoint city with the air shuttle market 
under analysis (CGH-SDU). And secondly, the average stage 
length of the rivals in the 
market is also used for identification. Both sets of instruments are 
in line N\ith item 
presented in 4.5.3. that is, the procedure of using characteristics of the rivals on the route or of 
the same firms on other routes. 
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Once again, the relevance and validity of the instruments were challenged by the folloxX in (-, 
procedures, after regressing a 2SLS for the pricing equation (30) of each airline (discussion of 
the procedures are given on 4.5.3). All tests are presented in Appendix 4.3, Table 4.13. 
1. Partial R-squared of the first-stage regressions (minimum): 0.53; F-test of 
instruments joint significance in the first-stage (minimum): 13.90. 
2. Hansen J tests of orthogonality: in all equations, the tests failed to reject the 
null; 
3. C-tests of exogeneity of AVCit: again, the null was not rejected for all 
equations. 
4.7 Estimation and Results 
Once the empirical specifications were defined, and the instruments were considered relevant 
and valid, the econometric technique could then be chosen. Here I estimate all share, total 
demand and first-order condition equations as a system, by making use of an autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity consistent estimator. 
The Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) for a system of equations was therefore used, 
with the weighting matrix set to represent heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown 
form (HAC). Here I used the Bartlett kernel with Newey and West's fixed bandwidth 
selection criterion. 
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4.7.1 Demand System and Estimated Elasticities 
Results for the estimation of equations (19) and (20) are reported below. in Tables 4.4 and 
4.5. Firstly, we have the overall demand equation: 
Table 4.4 - Estimated Results - Total Demand 
Variable In q, 
In p, -0.3 10 
(0ý024) 
In gdp, 3.963 
(0.072) 
In q, - -0.352 
(0.070) 
dfii-e -0.195 ++ 
(0.004) 
dlib 0.234 
(0.007) 
Constant -0.957 
(0.433) 
Adj. R Squared 0.682 
N. Observations 58 
Note: *means significant at 10%, 
t at 5% and I at I% level 
Then, we have results for the system of share equations: 
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Table 4.5 - Estimated Results - Market Share 
Variables 
Market-Share (sj 
VRG TAM VSp 
sseats -1.888 0.625 1 1.263 ++ 
(0.014) (0.009) (0.021) 
In p (VRG) -0.3241 0.1633 1 0.161 ++ 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
In p (TA A 1) 0.163 1 -0.2041 0.041 ++ 
(0.003) (0.005) (0,003) 
In p j, (VSP) 0.161 0.041 $ -0.202++ 
(0.004) (0.003) (0,003) 
In (TR, P, j 0.0761 -0.023 T -0.053 ++ 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
dcsharepaer -0.0441 -0.0361 0.080 + + 
(0.003) (0.001) (OM3) 
dcshai-e_vptb 0.0041 -0.011 1 0.0071 
(0003) (0.001) (0.002) 
dcshai-e_tatb 0.003 1 0.0301 -0.033 ++ 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
Constant -1.383 1.083 1 1.3001 
(0044) (0.036) (0.049) 
Adj. R Squared 0.932 0.855 
N. Observations 57 57 
, 
'ficien Notes: i. I'arig-relatedcoqf ts were inferredfirom the 
coefficients in the remaining equations ii. * means 
significa nt at 10%, t at 5% and t at 1% level 
It is important to note that overall demand is associated with a very low price elasticity in the 
market (-0.314). This is consistent with the fact that the route is strongly business-related, 
with travellers who are usually more time-sensitive than price-sensitive (as 
discussed in 
Section 4.3). This is also consistent with the process of purchase of tickets, in which 
approximately only 36% of the travellers actually pay for their trips (See 
Appendix 4.1). 
Therefore, one would also expect airline-specific price elasticities to be relatively 
low-, those 
elasticities can be recovered from estimates in Table 4.5 
from the following expressions. 
associated with equation (20), as in Buse (1994) and Ellison et al 
(1997) : 
I'll 
77y = -90 + 
(7, IS, )-8, 
j 
(Sj IS, ), i=1, 
... (31) 
Where nij is the elasticity of the demand for airline i with respect to the price of airline j. 6,., Is 
binary, and equal to I if i=j, and equal to zero otherwise. Calculated (Marshallian) 
elasticities are conditional on total expenditure in air transport on the route. Table 4.6 present 
the estimated elasticities for each airline in the sample, extracted at the sample mean of 
passenger shares: 
Table 4.6 - Estimated Conditional Elasticities 
Elasticity of the Demandfor 
VRG TAM VSP 
VRG -1.722 ++ 0.794 1.077 
With (0.011) (0.015) (0.019) 
Respect TAM 0.292 -1.903 0.301 ++ 
to the (0.006) (0.023) (0.020) 
Price of VSP 0.295 0.204 -2.107 
(0.004) (0.014) (0ý01 6) 
Note: * means significan t at 10%, 
t at 5% and I at I% level 
As one can inspect from Table 4.6, estimated price-elasticities are consistent with both the 
description of the market and of airlines' positioning presented in 4.3.2, and the results of the 
survey of Oliveira (2003), presented in Appendix 4.1: on the one hand, Varig and Tam have a 
higher perceived quality, due to higher route, airport and city presence, being able to focus 
more on the very time-sensitive traveller, typical of air-shuttle markets. 
On the other hand, Vasp positioned herself as a more budget carrier, with lower-quality (for 
instance, fewer departures engendering a higher average distance between flight times) and 
lower price. The higher price-elasticity of Vasp (25% higher than Varig's. the airline with 
dominant market share) is a clear evidence of this positioning. 
Also important to emphasise from Table 4.6 is the impact of the codeshare agreements on the 
route, which in most cases permitted market share to significantly increase 
for the 
participating airlines. This is the case of, 
for example, Vasp during both the "Ponte A6rea- t=ý 
(coefficient of dcshare_paer equal to 0.080) and the Vasp-Transbrasil 
(dcshare_\, ptb equal to 
1 -12 
0.007) agreements, and also with Tam during the Tam-Transbrasil agreement (dchsare 
- 
tatb 
equal to 0.030). The only exception is Varig in the **Ponte Aerea" period. ý'\hich could be 
representative of the fact that airlines with an already high participation in the market ma) not 
be as benefited from the agreement as the other airlines. 
4.7.2 First-Order Conditions and the Estimated Evolution of Conduct 
Results of the estimation of the empirical counterpart (30) are presented below: 
Table 4.7 - Estimated Results - FOC (2SLS) 
Variables 
VRG 
In (priceikt) 
TAM VSP 
In A VSTL,, 842.41 165.3 1 -421.01 
(25.9) (14.3) (21 4) 
A FC -29.509 8.772 13.9901 
(3.267) (1835) (1.712) 
(A VC 
2 0.8891 -0.174 t -0.342 
(0.105) (0.067) (0.046) 
(A VC 3 -0.0081 0.001 t 0.003 1+ 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
q, I. -)gl 1 4.4 23) ++ 0.6021 
(0.055) (0.170) (0.059) 
q dlib -0.655 -4.235 -0.809++ 
(0.019) (0.136) (0.030) 
q, dexi-s 99 -0.027 ++ 0.104 -0.847++ 
(0,008) (0.036) (0.023) 
q, * dext-s 01 0.093 ++ -0.221 
1 0.287 ++ 
(0.019) (0.061) (0.017) 
dail-bus 27.9441 
(1 472) 
Constant -5196.0 -1063.2 2712.0 
++ 
(172.0) (1160) (1379) 
Adj. R Squared 0.808 0.616 0.916 
N. Observations 58 58 58 
Vote: * means significant at 10%. f at 5% and., * at I% level 
By inspectin" Table 4.7, one is able to see hox\ the costs model fits reasonably for Varig and 
Vasp*, in contrast, Tam had somewhat poorer results. speciall. \ 
in the costs side, ý\hich is not 
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only indicative that this airline utilised her fleet of Fokker 100 in other distinct routes in terms 
of cost generation (and thus the AVC terms could not be good proxies for marginal cost shifts 
on this particular route), but also that the change in flight equipment in 1999. ývhen she started 
using brand new Airbus A319, was certainly a generator of noise in the estimation. 
Now let us draw attention to the estimation of conduct and, more specifically, to the impacts 
of the liberalisation measures of 1998 on the behaviour of airlines. A relevant issue is related 
with how to identify the conduct of the airlines in the market from the estimates of Table 4.7. 
This is possible if one considers the relation between (25) and (30) in terms of the estimated 
coefficient of qjt (the base case, in which all dummies of events are set equal to zero): 
>=&k q, 
(32) 
Where o5,,, is the estimated parameter of qit in the base case, 4, ' is the estimated first 
derivative of the demand of airline i with respect to price, and 
ý, is the estimated conduct 
parameter of airline i. As we have already estimated the demand system, in Section 4.5, it is 
then possible to identify ý, from the pricing equations of (30), specially if we consider that 
price elasticities are related to first derivatives of demand in this way: 7T, =q"(p'1q'). By 
considering the elasticity at the sample mean, that is, with q and p evaluated at the mean, q-, 
and p, one can obtain the following expression: 
ol 
(33) 
By making use of (33), one can obtain the associated conduct parameters and, what 
is more, is 
able to recover the structural changes associated with the dummies of the three exogenous 
events considered here (liberalisation and two supply shocks). Results are presented 
in Table 
4.8: 
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Table 4.8 - Evolution of Conduct in the Air Shuttle Market 
VRG TAM VSP 
Period 
Oj AOj Oj Aoi Oj AOj 
Pre-2nd Round of 
Liberalisation 
Base (1997) 1.0461 1.1721 0.107++ 
(0.045) (0.052) (0.011) 
Post-2nd Round of 
Liberalisation 
1998 0.903 1 -0.143 1 0.1171 -1.055 1 -0.042++ -0.149 ý 
(0.053) (0.008) (0.028) (0.032) (0.009) (0.006) 
Post-EXRS99 1.0330 0.127 0.206 0.089 -0.195 -0.153 
(0.055) (0.008) R031 (0.024) (0.010) (0.0/0) 
Post-EXRSOI 0.761 -0.269 0.052 -0.154 -0.286 + -0.091 + 
1 1 (0.041) 
-1 
(0.025) 1 (0.048) 1 (0.044) 1 (0009) 1 (0.005ýj 
A'oles: i. * means significant at 10%, tat 5% and I at I% level 
ii. AO, means the change in conduct between two events. 
As we can infer from Table 4.8, liberalisation had a positive effect on competitive behaviour, 
as there are clear evidence that airlines had a substantial reduction in their parameters of 
conduct, Oi. Indeed, when comparing the Base Case (1997) with figures of 1998, one can 
observe that there was a statistically significant plunge in conduct of all airlines: Varig, from 
1.046 to 0.903 (-0.143, or -14%), Tam, from 1.172 to 0.117 (-1.055, or -90%), and Vasp, from 
0.107 to -0.042 (-0.149, or -149%). This is certainly in favour of the effectiveness of 
governmental policy with respect to enhancing competition in this industry. 
Also important are the tests of nullity of the conduct parameters in the post-liberalised 
environment (from 1998 on): actually, one cannot reject the hypothesis that both Vasp and 
Tam engaged in either marginal-cost or even below-m arginal -cost pricing tactics after 
liberalisation. The changes in behaviour due to the supply shocks are somewhat ambiguous 
and not clear, however: whereas Vasp significantly reduced her conduct parameter after both 
events of exchange rate shock, in 1999 and 2001 (EXRS99 and EXRSOI), Varig and Tam 
actually increased their conduct parameters in 1999 and then let them plunge in 2001. 
Another relevant issue is that Varig seemed not to be engaged in marginal-cost prichi(_,. apart ,,: N - 
from the fact that her conduct have significantIN decreased after liberalisation. This may be 
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due to the strong brand loyalty this airline possess in the market, which permits her to 
successfully price above marginal cost. 
In this case, the difference between Varig and Tam may be due to two relevant facts: first, as 
Varig is a dominant national carrier on most international routes from and to Brazil, and has 
higher presence in the route, airport and city levels, this airline is conferred with more 
competitive advantage with respect to frequent flyer travellers willing to accumulate mileage 
points; secondly, Tam's reputation on this route was somewhat damaged by an accident at 
Congonhas Airport, in 1996; and finally, as Tam's Airbus fleet was recently acquired, she 
certainly have higher lease payments and resulting higher operating costs associated N\ ith 
capital, which certainly constrained her price-cost margins on the route. 
And finally, it is important to mention that the behaviour of Tam before the EXRS99 and of 
Vasp after it are clearly not consistent with the claims from some analysts that firms in the 
market play a leader-follower game. 
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4.8 Conclusions 
The present paper developed a competition model to investigate the impacts of the Second 
Round of Liberalisation of the airline industry in Brazil, on one of its most relevant markets: 
the air shuttle service linking Rio de Janeiro to Sdo Paulo. Quasi-deregulation measures \\ere 
undertaken by the Department of Civil Aviation in order to enhance competition in the 
market. 
By making use of both a two-stages budgeting representation of the demand system, and a 
competition model with product heterogeneity among rivals, and based on the framework of 
the New Empirical Industrial Organisation, it was then possible to infer whether a structural 
change on airlines' conduct parameter was observed. This exercise ultimately served as a test 
of the efficacy of the policy employed by the regulators since 1998. 
The main conclusions were that regulatory reform effectively stimulated fin-ns to significantly 
increase the degree of competitiveness on the route, and that marginal-cost pricing was not 
rejected for some airlines. On the other hand, the airline with the highest presence in the 
market was able to persistently sustain positive mark-ups due to product differentiation 
elements and brand loyalty permitted by a higher presence on the route, endpoint airports and 
city. Those attributes are usually associated as conferring localised competitive advantage and 
therefore final results were in line with the existing literature (e. g. Evans and Kessides, 1993), 
the findings of Chapter 2, and with the traditional wisdom among airline market analysts. 
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Appendix 4.1 - Summary of the Survey of Oliveira (2003) 
In this survey, 402 passengers were interviewed at CGH airport, in January 2000. and N, \ere 
asked about their preferences when choosing an airline in the market. 
Table 4.9 - Main Results of the Survey - Disaggregated by Airline 
Do you always travel with this airline (Loyalty)? 
TOTAL % VRG TANI VSP 
Yes 251 
No 151 
62% 
38% 
80% 
20% 
70% 
30% 
360o 
64('o 
Who payed for the flight ticket? 
TOTA 1, % VRG TANI VSP 
Myself 144 
The institution I repi*esent 256 
36% 
64% 
24% 
76% 
34% 
66% 
48"'0 
520o 
How do AIRLINE ATTRIBtTTES influence y 
TOTAL % 
our choice ? 
VRG TANI VSP 
Very Much / Much Influence 316 
No / Medium Influence 84 
79% 
21% 
87% 
13% 
87% 
13% 
620o 
-')8("o 
How does PRICE influence your choice ? 
TOTAL % VRG TANI VSP 
Vei-y Much / Much Influence 228 
No Medium Influence 174 
57% 
44% 
41% 
59% 
51% 
49% 
79% 
210, o 
How doesAVAILABLE FLIGHT TFNIE influence your choice ? 
TOTAL % VRG TANI N'SP 
Much / Much Influence 306 
No Medium Influence 95 
77% 
24% 
80% 
20% 
76% 
24% 
750o 
250ýo 
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Appendix 4.2 - Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.10 - Descriptive Statistics - Demand Side 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
VRG 
Sit 0.50 0.05 0.41 0.63 
sseats, t 0.40 0.05 0.29 0.48 
Pit 176.48 38.16 129.28 267.71 
TAM 
Sit 0.22 0.08 0.08 0.35 
sseatsit 0.33 0.11 0.14 0.51 
pit 172.30 32.09 124.3- 2 -16.2 3 
dairbus 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 
VSP 
Sit 0.17 0.07 0.05 0.26 
sseatsit 0.16 0.04 0.09 0.23 
Pit 126.33 37.12 -6.23 199.46 
Market 
qt 233,415.40 51,398.48 73,670.16 314,796.00 
qt- 63,594.34 14,708.28 42,291.00 103,698.00 
Pt 164.98 30.16 126.14 214.29 
gdp, 108.78 4.80 97.8- 
117.76 
TRJP, * 350,591.69 100,732.14 201,249.00 567,12-1.20 
dlib 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00 
dfire 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
dcshare_paer 0.33 0.47 0.00 1,00 
dcshare_vptb 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
dcshare tatb 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
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Table A. 1- Descriptive Statistics - Supply Side 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
VRG 
Pit 176.84 37.92 129.28 267-1 
%, 117.00 29.30 62.08 180. -9 
avc, t 54.944 6.214 36.906 69.50- 
avsdit 822.669 52.492 522.188 901.365 
TAM 
Pit 172.73 31.98 124.32 2 20.23 
qjt 54.33 27.59 13.0- 104.93 
avc, t 114.218 17260 -6.222 152,612 
avsdit 582.628 138.331 3-3.8-2 --3.0417 
VSP 
Pit 127.56 37.96 199.46 
qit 38.61 13.45 14.36 63.06 
avc,, 47.451 8.674 28-059 85.651 
avsdi, 562.177 56.023 399.137 639.896 
Market 
dlib 0.78 0.42 0.00 1.00 
dexrs99 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00 
dexrsOl 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 
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5. Contributions and Limitations 
This thesis aimed at examining the behaviour of airlines in recently-liberalised airline 
markets, by considering the case of air transportation in Brazil. From the three essaNs 
contained in this study, one is able to extract analyses on: first, the entry behaviour of a lo\\ 
cost carrier (LCC), a theme of major relevance nowadays in the market, given that the path of 
expansion of the LCC's is clearly shaping the frontiers of competition of the industry. 
Also, one has the examination of the pricing behaviour of the legacy carriers in this market 
with recent liberalisation and, from this evidence, can infer that the locus of in those markets 
is both the route and the airport/city - and is not located only at the airport/city level, as 
emphasised by previous literature. 
And finally, one is able to better understand the impacts of liberalisation on competition on a 
major air corridor of a developing country, and infer that regulatory reform constitutes a 
relevant instrument in enhancing competition, but also that such countries are usually subject 
to other sources of exogenous interferences (eg. exchange rates instability), that could 
significantly affect airlines' conduct and performance. 
In summary, here we have an examination of how and where airlines compete and how 
governmental policy affects competition in domestic markets of a developing country. 
Next sections contain a brief description of the relevant issues that arose in terms of 
contributions and limitations of this research. 
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5.1 Data 
Li Empirical 10 studies are very demanding on data. With this requirement in mind. a 
thorough plan of data collection was designed, and was implemented in the forth 
quarter of 2001. 
Li The author spent 4 months in a field research at the Department of Civil Aviation, 
DAC, and gathered probably the most detailed database ever developed. for (117 
academic study of the Brazilian airline; 
Lj On the other hand, however, due to the fire at Santos Dumont Airport, where DAC 
was located in 1998, most of the post-liberalisation data was lost, which constituted a 
major limitation for the present research. 
Li Also, many of the data sets available at DAC were very recent, as the need for 
monitoring the airline market was as recent as the liberalisation measures; the 
availability of data was then restricted by the limited amount of information DAC had 
in possession. 
5.2 Hypotheses 
Lj Some hypotheses that whilst very relevant in understanding the airline industry, could 
not be implemented here: multimarket contact, as in Evans and Kessides (1994), 
network competition, as in Ourn, Zhang and Zhang (1995); airline alliances, as in 
Park (1997); competition on location, e. g. considering departure-time differentiation, 
as in Borenstein and Netz (1999) or Salvanes, Steen and Sorgard (2003)-, mixed 
strategies, as in Perloff, Golan and Karp (1998); dynamic competition. as in 
Brander and Zhang (1993); capacity as strategic variable, as in RbIler and Sickles 
(2000); among others. 
L: j All those issues could be regarded as extensions to the present research. as the 
hypotheses involved pen-nit useful insights in understanding competition in airline 
markets. 
I-'- 
I i: 
5.3 Entry Model of Gol Airlines 
Li The use of an estimator that controls for endogeneity of regressors within a di. ycrete- 
choice ftamework (AGLS) was a major issue of the paper; along with the use of a 
flexible functional form for profits and city dummies to control for unobservables. 
these features were considered the contributions of the paper. 
u The major limitation was the data, as there were few years available (2001 and 2002): 
The proposal of paradigms for LCC operations and positioning was considered a 
contribution, considered useful for a better identification of true LCC behaviour, 
especially because nowadays is becoming increasingly difficult to deten-nine if a given 
airline is really operating in that niche. 
The analysis of LCC paradigms and the empirical investigation over the consistency 
of Gol with either the JBP or the SWP was a major challenge; the author recognises 
that the availability of additional data would improve the analysis. However, one can 
see this investigation as thefirst study that systematically associates LCC behaviour 
with the classic standardsfor this increasingly relevant market niche. 
5.4 Competitive Advantage and Price Reactions to Entry 
zi A positive aspect of this study was that it generated more evi . dence for the debate of 
Borestein (1989) and Evans and Kessides (1993) over the location of competitive 
advantage in airline markets, that is, either the route level, or the airport/city level, or 
both; for the present case, new evidence from recently liberalised markets is used and 
results were indicative of the relevance of both levels in explaining the patterns of 
price competition. 
Li The use of city dummies effects, which permitted the extension of the ftameivork o/ 
Evans and Kessides (1993) in order to allow for identification of route-specific effects 
such as the impacts of LCC entry, was considered a methodological contribution. 
Li AcTain, data scarcitv constituted a major limitation (a very short time series). 
13 6 
5.5 The Air Shuttle Study 
Li As far as I know, and apart from Teodorovic (1985), this is the first study to focus on 
air shuttle markets, their characteristics and specificities; the discussion of the "classic 
air shuttle" versus a modern concept of shuttle operations, with heterogeneous 
product, is a major issue of the paper. 
Li Also, the use of AIDS demand system is a novelty in air transportation studies, an 
extension to the way it was used here would be not to use the linearised version 
(LAIDS), but to perform non-linear estimation of the system of demand. 
u Again, the dataset was very limited, with 58 observations for each airline only; 
L3 Unfortunately, apart from the studies of the US market, for which there are very 
detailed data on average prices (from the US DOT), one has instead to rely on 
information about the fare structures (available, for example, on ATPCO's screens), 
and therefore to design ways of calculating the average fare; this is a major limitation 
for many researchers of this industry all over the world, and was also an issue here. 
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